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Editorial 
 
Sustainable Democracy, Development and Environmental 
Policies 
 
Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 
Issue 8/9: May-November 2011 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg 
 
Guest Editors: 
 
 
Urbanisation, climate change, footloose economies, multi-culturality and resource 
constraints pose unprecedented challenges for local governments today. In the 
developing world the gulf between needs and finance remains acute.  Many western 
countries forced to reduce public spending in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis, are 
struggling to reconcile the need for efficiency savings with local pressure to maintain 
service standards and working conditions.  This special double issue of the journal 
features a selection of papers presented at the third Commonwealth Local Government 
Research Colloquium held in Cardiff on 13-15 March 2011 which explored these and 
other important contemporary challenges.  Hosted by the School of City and Regional 
Planning and the Centre for Local and Regional Government Research at Cardiff 
University, the colloquium provided a valuable opportunity for scholars from across the 
Commonwealth to present research on three key themes: sustainable democracy and 
governance, sustainable economic development and environmental sustainability.   
 
In his welcoming address Professor Chris Webster highlighted the way in which the 
shifting boundaries of local governance are presenting new challenges for researchers. 
Privately managed neighbourhoods which bypass traditional local government services 
are now commonplace.  Relations between central and local government are increasingly 
Steve Martin  
Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University 
 
 
 
Alison Brown 
School of City and Regional Planning 
Cardiff University 
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fluid as imbalances in resources between rich city governments and poorer neighbouring 
authorities become more acute.  Developments such as the adoption of new financing 
models (including the use of government bonds) and innovative approaches to service 
delivery are forcing researchers, policy makers and practitioners to think again about the 
role of local governments.  Following this introduction, Professor P. S. Reddy presented 
the key themes from the insightful background paper that he was commissioned to 
prepare for the CLGF conference which followed the research colloquium.  The paper 
explored the opportunities and challenges for local government as it seeks to promote 
local economic development and can be accessed at http://www.clgc2011.org/clgc2011-
background-paper. 
 
The contributions to this special issue reflect all three of the colloquium’s themes.  The 
first four research papers focus on sustainable democracy and governance.  Robin 
Hambleton explores the concept of placed-based leadership which he argues deserves 
more attention from scholars and practitioners. Robin identifies three realms of civic 
leadership: political leadership which derives its legitimacy from the ballot box; 
professional leadership exercised by paid officials, and community leadership provided 
by activists, business people and volunteers.  Applying this model to the development of 
Freiberg in Germany as a successful ‘eco-city’, Robin suggests that inspirational civic 
leadership can facilitate innovation and strengthen local democratic accountability. 
 
In a fascinating analysis of the Panchayati Raj of West Bengal, Bhaskar Chakrabarti, 
Raghabendra Chattpadhyay and Suman Nath analyse the decentralisation of 15 state 
departments' functions to district and block level governments in 2005.  The move 
followed the 1992 73rd  Amendment of the Indian Constitution, which sought to enable 
the Panchayat to function as effective institutions of self-government.  They map 
activities in the restructured government system, including capacity-building, financial 
assistance, budgeting, co-ordination and monitoring.  Their analysis highlights a range of 
problems including inadequate coordination, the lack of a mandate for effective 
collaboration, and role confusion and power struggles amongst officials and members.  
The authors argue that there is an urgent need to redefine respective roles and enhance 
collaboration. 
 
Stephen Greasley’s paper examines the effectiveness and stability of cabinet-style local 
government which was introduced in the UK in 2000.  To date little research has 
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explored the role of cabinet members, who play a crucial role in policy development.  
Stephen’s research painstakingly analysed cabinet and committee reports from 114 
councils, tracking electoral change and the movement of cabinet members from 2004/05 
to 2009/10.  He reports that there have been significant differences in cabinet turnover, 
with relative stability in the three mayoral authorities.  Stephen concludes that stabile 
leadership is crucial for effective democracy in cabinet-style government. 
 
Steve Martin tracks the recent history of performance evaluation in local government in 
the UK.  Top-down performance regimes imposed by the centre-left Labour government 
between 1997 and 2010 were seen by their critics as wrong in principle and costly to 
implement. However, the evidence suggests that they contributed to significant 
improvements in local government performance.  A Localism Bill introduced by a new 
Coalition government in 2010 promises to sweep away external assessment of local 
authorities.  Steve argues that only time will tell whether this represents a genuine 
attempt to devolve power to local government or is simply a cloak for spending cuts.   
 
Turning to the colloquium’s second theme, Lucienne Heideman’s paper describes an 
innovative approach to economic development known as Plugging the Leaks. This 
community-led approach asks communities to liken the local economy to a 'leaky bucket' 
and to explore ways to stop the leaks.  Developed by the New Economics Foundation, 
the pilot was run by four local authority associations - Sweden, South Africa, Botswana 
and Namibia - in 24 municipalities in the African partner countries.  Lucienne reports the 
results of the first four Plugging the Leaks workshops in South Africa and Namibia.  
These identified potential for collective action and networking to promote local growth, 
but highlighted the need for much better market awareness amongst small-scale 
entrepreneurs.   
 
Taking up the third theme of environmental sustainability, Tony Jackson and William 
Lynch explore the ways in which local authorities in Scotland are responding to climate 
change.  Scotland achieved a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from the mid-1990s 
to 2007, but evaluations based on production emissions fail to reflect the fact that many 
goods are manufactured elsewhere.  Tony and William argue instead for a focus on 
consumption emissions, which some Scottish authorities now adopting.  Fife Council, for 
example, has adopted a system for monitoring and controlling its carbon footprint, whilst 
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the Highland Council has published a climate-change adaptation plan to counter the 
impact of sea-water cooling on the economies of coastal regions. 
In the first of the three commentaries in this special issue, Olubunmi Ajayi argues for a 
new emphasis on the role of professionalism in local governments in Africa to combat 
issues of poverty, inequality and corruption.  National policies on professionalism often 
fail to filter down to local level.  African communities need effective local governments 
which are able to provide democratic leadership, deliver effective services, and empower 
communities and citizens.  However, they face problems associated with 
compartmentalisation of services, a lack of skills and low pay.  Olubunmi argues that 
these will not be tackled until professionalism becomes embedded in local governments 
and that this requires the development of professional learning communities that draw on 
a hybrid of qualifications, on-the-job training and appropriate internal support.   
 
Next, Peter McKinlay examines experience from New Zealand of the potential for shared 
service provision to cut costs and improve service delivery.  He suggests that a lack of 
expertise combined with political resistance to sharing control with neighbouring 
authorities have limited the growth of shared services.  However, the harsh realities of 
funding cuts have sparked renewed interest in collaboration.  Two examples from New 
Zealand demonstrate the potential and pitfalls of developing joint council-owned 
companies.  In the Waikato region 13 councils agreed to work together to develop a 
valuation and ratings database but faced problems of coordination.  In the Bay of Plenty 
the focus was on shared IT and GIS services.  Here buy-in at a senior level and the 
achievement of some 'quick-wins' demonstrated the value of the partnership.  Peter 
argues that this highlights in particular the importance of personal relationships in the 
development of shared service models. 
 
In their commentary, Brian Dollery, Lin Crase and Bligh Grant argue for adoption of a 
broad definition of local government sustainability.  A narrow focus on financial 
sustainability in Australia has, they suggest, obscured other important issues. Key 
performance indicators bear little relationship to financial results so it is important to pay 
more attention to a range of criteria such as the vibrancy of local democracy, local social 
capital and local council capacity.  Brian and his colleagues believe this could focus 
attention on the importance of local differences, a sense of community, and pluralist 
processes which would in turn counter arguments for amalgamation of services.  
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Kevin Tayler explores innovations in municipal financing in his review of the new 
publication on Municipal Infrastructure Financing: Innovative Practices from 
Developing Countries by Munawwar Alam.  Innovations include national development 
banks and financial institutions, financial intermediaries, municipal bonds, and public-
private partnerships. All of them require well-managed local government in order to 
succeed.   
 
Finally, Sue Rhodes (Director of Communications at the Commonwealth Local 
Government Forum) provides an overview of the proceedings of the CLGF Conference 
which followed the research colloquium and explored the concept and practice of local 
economic development from a range of perspectives and different countries.  Sue gives 
details of the key recommendations agreed by delegates in the conference statement - 
the Cardiff Consensus for Local Economic Development.  She explains that this 
statement was subsequently endorsed by the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government in Perth at the end of October 2011, a move which strengthens the 
CLGF’s attempts to promote actions that enable local government to play its full 
role in promoting local economic development in a range of countries. 
 
The contributions to this special issue provide a fascinating insight into contemporary 
challenges facing local governments around the world.  The papers presented here and at 
the research colloquium in March (available at http://www.clgc2011.org/research-
colloquium) confirm the value of research evidence which can inform political debate 
and policy decisions.  They also highlight the continued appetite for discussion among 
scholars from across the Commonwealth, which augurs well for the future of the journal 
and research network.   
 
We would like to thank the participants at the colloquium and the authors for their 
contributions to this special issue and their patience in bearing with a production process 
which has taken longer than we originally intended.   We are very grateful to Gareth 
Wall for helping to organise the research colloquium and to Lucy Slack at CLGF for her 
advice and support.  We want to put on record our appreciation of the invaluable support 
given to us by Daniel Grafton and Chris Watterson at University of Technology, Sydney 
who have taken on the tasks of formatting, proof reading and uploading this issue with 
patience, skill and good humour.  We also acknowledge Daniel’s tireless work as 
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assistant editor of previous editions of the journal responsible for co-ordinating the 
production process.   
 
Finally, particular thanks are due to Graham Sansom at UTS who is handing on the 
editorship of the journal to Alison Brown after several years at the helm.  Graham has 
been the driving force behind the journal and research network and generous in his 
support and guidance to us as we planned the colloquium and have drawn together the 
papers for this special issue.  He will be a hard act to follow.   
  
 
RESEARCH and EVALUATION 
 
 
Place-based Leadership in a Global Era 
 
 
Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 
Issue 8/9: May-November 2011 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the major challenges now facing local governments across the 
world and advocates the development of a new focus on place-based leadership for local 
government scholarship and practice. The challenges facing local authorities are many, 
but they can be summarised in two words: globalisation and urbanisation. In response to 
these we have witnessed, in many countries, a shift from ‘local government’ to ‘local 
governance’. This shift is discussed, and it is suggested that new models of partnership 
working could, if handled in the wrong way, undermine local democracy. To combat this 
danger it is essential to give civic leadership far more attention – in the worlds of both 
academe and practice. A new way of conceptualising place-based leadership – one that 
identifies three ‘realms of civic leadership’ – is put forward. This model emphasises the 
role of civic leadership in shaping emotions and supporting public service innovation. To 
illustrate the argument an example of highly respected place-based leadership is 
presented. Freiburg, Germany is recognised as a very successful eco-city and the 
leadership model is used to help explain why. The article concludes with some reflections 
and pointers for research and policy. It is suggested that new forms of ‘engaged 
scholarship’ – approaches that bring together academics and practitioners to co-
produce new knowledge about place-based leadership in an international, comparative 
perspective – should be encouraged.  
                                            
1  Robin Hambleton is Professor of City Leadership at the University of the West of England, Bristol and 
Director of Urban Answers, a company he founded in 2007: <www.urbananswers.co.uk>. 
Robin Hambleton1
Centre for Sustainable Planning and Environments 
  
University of the West of England, Bristol 
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Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
Local governments across the world now face remarkable challenges, mainly because the 
world is changing very rapidly. The global economic recession, shifts in our 
understanding of the causes of climate change, growing ethno-religious friction in many 
multicultural cities, and startling advances in personal communication technologies are 
just four developments that pose massive challenges for local leaders and managers.  
 
Sceptics will say that every generation believes it is living through tumultuous change. 
Localities – both urban and rural – have always faced tough challenges. What’s new? 
There are two overarching reasons why the current dynamics of change lay down 
unprecedented challenges for local governments: globalisation and urbanisation. 
 
This article provides a very brief description of these challenges and then sets out a 
discussion of how local governments in different countries are responding. The shift 
from ‘local government’ to ‘local governance’ appears to be taking place in many 
countries. While this can have advantages, it also has drawbacks and, depending on how 
it is handled, it could actually undermine local democracy. It will be suggested that civic 
leadership – and, more specifically, ‘place-based’ leadership – can play a vital part in 
strengthening the orchestrating role of local government in this rapidly changing 
environment. The trouble is that civic leadership is being given insufficient attention in 
both academic and policy debates relating to the future of local government. This article 
aims to make a contribution to filling this gap. A conceptual framework, designed to 
advance understanding of place-based leadership, is presented. This distinguishes three 
realms of civic leadership in any given locality – political, managerial/professional and 
community.  
 
The model emphasises the critical role that leaders from all three realms can play in 
creating innovation zones – or new spaces of interaction – in which new ideas can be 
generated and tried out. A short summary of the outstanding achievements of the leaders 
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of Freiburg, Germany, is then presented to illustrate the argument. Here is a city that is 
very comfortable with the idea of innovation – of setting remarkably high standards and 
then delivering on them. This illustration is followed by a final section offering some 
reflections. This develops some pointers for policy and practice and some pointers for 
academe. It will be suggested that one way forward is for academics and practitioners to 
work closely together in the co-production of new knowledge relating to civic leadership 
and public service innovation. 
 
A caveat is due at the outset. Cities and localities are geographically and culturally 
specific – they exist in different economic, political, socio-cultural and legal contexts. It 
follows that we should guard against generalising too freely about how to lead and 
manage local governments across the world. Having said that, it is hoped that the 
discussion that follows identifies ideas that can be used to stimulate fresh thinking on the 
nature of place-based leadership and how to improve and develop it. 
 
2. Globalisation and Urbanisation 
The background discussion paper for the 2009 Commonwealth Local Government 
conference on Improving Local Government: the Commonwealth Vision held in Freeport, 
Grand Bahama, provides a helpful overview of the challenges now facing local 
governments across the world (Amis 2009). This discussion paper reviews the changing 
international context for local government and highlights: the Millenium Development 
Goals (MDGs); the global economic crisis; and energy efficiency and climate change 
challenges. Thirty years ago local governments did not, on the whole, need to concern 
themselves too much with international developments. Now they do. 
 
Earlier it was suggested that the two words ‘globalisation’ and ‘urbanisation’ sum up the 
overarching reasons why local governments across the world face new challenges.2
                                            
2  This discussion draws on Chapter 1 of my co-edited book on Governing Cities in a Global Era 
(Hambleton and Gross 2007). 
 The 
economic, political, social, environmental and cultural changes implied by the term 
‘globalisation’ are truly startling. Hutton and Giddens bring together a collection of 
essays on the contours of contemporary capitalism that give weight to this view: ‘It is the 
interaction of extraordinary technological innovation combined with the world-wide 
reach driven by global capitalism that give today’s change its particular complexion. It 
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has now a speed, inevitability and force that it has not had before’ (Hutton and Giddens 
2000 pvii). 
 
Globalisation is not, of course, just an economic phenomenon – it has social, political, 
environmental and cultural dimensions. Globalisation enhances mobility and 
connectivity among people and can, as a result, enhance the local quality of life. 
However, the economic dimension of globalisation is particularly important. Some 
authors argue that cities cannot do much other than compete for inward investment.3
 
 
Tiebout (1956) pointed to this over fifty years ago, when he suggested that people and 
industry choose their locations based upon a simple cost-benefit ratio of goods and 
services available. Peterson (1981) later suggested that, due to local resource deficits and 
the need to maintain their competitive position, cities had become dependent on higher 
levels of government and private investment for survival. Thus, in his view, local policy 
is heavily constrained – in effect local leaders can do little in the face of wider economic 
forces. Urban dependency, on this analysis, increases as the world becomes increasingly 
global. Labour and capital are mobile, people follow jobs and industry opts to move to 
more distant locations, where the cost of land and labour are lower.  
Others argue, however, that urban dependency theories overstate the power of 
international and national actors and understate the power and influence of local leaders 
and activists. For example, Savitch and Kantor, in their cross-national comparative 
research on urban development, point out that city leaders can, in fact, bargain with 
business and that: ‘Cities with strong popular control systems exercise greater influence 
over capital investment and influence the course of economic development decisions’ 
(Savitch and Kantor 2002, p45). Other urban scholars support this view and some even 
suggest that cities now have elevated in importance in the global world (Denters and 
Rose 2005).  
 
Reference was made earlier to the fact that we now live in a predominantly urban world. 
In fact, the world is urbanising at a remarkable rate. Figure 1 shows how the overall 
population of the world is set to climb from 6.5 billion in 2005 to around 8.2 billion in 
2030. By then almost five billion people (or 60% of the world population) will live in 
urban areas. This is a staggering increase of 1.8 billion in the world urban population in a 
                                            
3  I use the word ‘cities’ at various points in this article but the argument applies equally to smaller towns and 
localities in general. 
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comparatively short space of time. In 1950 there were 86 cities in the world with a 
population of more than one million; today there are 400, and by 2015 the UN predicts 
that there will be over 550. 
 
This urban population growth is spectacular. From a city planning and a local 
government point of view it is just as important to record that this growth is mainly 
happening in areas that have not seen much in the way of urbanisation in the past. As 
Davis (2006) points out most of this surging urban expansion will occur in the 
developing countries. He notes, correctly, that the scale and velocity of Third World 
urbanisation dwarfs even that of Victorian Europe.  
 
Figure 1. World Population Growth 
Source: United Nations World Urbanisation Prospects, <http://esa.un.org/unup/>. 
 
3. From Local Government to Local Governance 
In this section we explore the movement from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ – a shift 
that appears to be taking place in many countries. The argument runs that the forces of 
globalisation and, to some extent urbanisation, described in the previous section have 
forced change on local governments. It can be argued that the established systems of 
local ‘government’ were pressured into introducing ‘governance’ models in order to cope 
with radical change. The phrase ‘local governance’ is now very familiar in both public 
policy and academic debates about cities and city regions, but this has not always been 
the case.  
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Back in the 1970s and 1980s analysts would be more likely to talk of ‘local government’ 
and/or ‘urban management’. Indeed, ‘urban management’ is still a phrase that is widely 
used in the literature relating to developing countries, and it is even described as ‘a 
relatively new topic’ in one recent, and important, contribution to the field (Dijk 2006, 
pxix). The literature on ‘urban management’ usually gives insufficient attention to the 
political processes that shape local affairs and this is a limitation. This is why urban 
scholarship, in western democracies at least, has been giving increasing attention to the 
politics of urban planning and city development.  
 
A number of scholars have contributed to the urban government/urban governance 
debate. Stone (1989), in his classic study of governing coalitions in Atlanta, influenced a 
generation of urban scholars, and DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993) made an important 
early international contribution to the field of urban governance, with their comparative 
study of power in selected cities in the US and the UK. Over the last decade or so the 
international literature examining the shift from urban government to urban governance 
has grown significantly (Denters and Rose 2005; Davies and Imbroscio 2009; Hambleton 
and Gross 2007; McCarney and Stren 2003).  
 
But what do these terms mean? For the purpose of this discussion government refers to 
the formal institutions of the state. Government makes decisions within specific 
administrative and legal frameworks and uses public resources in a financially 
accountable way. Most important, government decisions are backed up by the legitimate 
hierarchical power of the state. Governance, on the other hand, involves government plus 
the looser processes of influencing and negotiating with a range of public and private 
sector agencies to achieve desired outcomes. A governance perspective encourages 
collaboration between the public, private and non-profit sectors to achieve mutual goals. 
Whilst the hierarchical power of the state does not vanish, the emphasis in governance is 
on steering, influencing and coordinating the actions of others.  
 
Moving to the local level, local government refers to democratically elected authorities. 
Local governance is broader – it refers to the processes and structures of a variety of 
public, private, and community and voluntary sector bodies at the local level. It 
acknowledges the diffusion of responsibility for collective provision and recognises the 
contribution of different levels and sectors. This argument suggests that approaches to 
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leadership and public service management that may have served societies well in the past 
will need to be updated to meet the needs of changing times.  
 
Elsewhere, I have argued that to contrast two ‘schools’ – the pro ‘government’ school 
and the pro ‘governance’ school – runs the risk of presenting a caricature of a more 
complex political debate (Hambleton, 2007). However, for the purposes of our 
discussion here, this juxtaposition will suffice. A key theme in these debates concerns the 
degree to which elected city governments are able to exercise democratic control over 
what happens to their localities and the people living in them. As mentioned earlier some 
scholars argue that locally elected politicians can do little to shape the fortunes of their 
city – for example, Peterson (1981) argues that cities must serve powerful economic 
interests if they are to prosper. Others take the view that ‘place-based’ power can be 
significant (Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Heinelt et al., 2006).  
 
The move to ‘governance’ approaches is important for our discussion of civic leadership 
as it raises questions about the effectiveness of local democracy. Several studies – in, for 
example, the UK and the USA – have shown that the new kinds of partnership created to 
advance collaboration between different stakeholders in the city lack transparency. 
Worse than that, it would seem that local ‘public/private partnerships’ and ‘special 
authorities’ are becoming increasingly undemocratic and authoritarian (Davies, 2007; 
Judd and Smith, 2007). We can, then, raise a concern about the degree to which elected 
local authorities are able to have a decisive impact on the life chances of their residents. 
Certainly we need to recognise that powerful global economic forces limit the power of 
the local state and partly explain the continuing existence of major inequalities in cities. 
 
4. Conceptualising Place-Based Leadership 
We now turn to the theme of civic leadership, which is used here to refer to all leadership 
activity that serves a public purpose in a given locality. Civic leadership is ‘place-based’ 
leadership – meaning that those exercising decision-making power have a concern for the 
communities living in a particular ‘place’. Some of the most powerful decision-makers in 
modern society are ‘place-less’ leaders in the sense that they are not concerned with the 
geographical impact of their decisions (Ranney 2003). Following Stiglitz, who draws on 
Putnam, I take the view that an unfettered market, especially in the context of 
globalisation, can destroy communities (Stiglitz 2006). There is now a substantial body 
of literature on ‘social capital’ and the role that it plays in fostering a caring society 
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(Putnam 2000; Gilchrist 2004). There are different kinds of social capital and sometimes 
this capital can be used to exclude groups – the creation of social capital will not 
necessarily reduce socio-economic inequalities. However, with the right kind of civic 
leadership – of which more in a moment – it may be possible to encourage the bridging 
of social ties between different social groups. 
 
Civic leadership is inspirational and collaborative. In previous work, I have defined 
leadership as ‘shaping emotions and behaviour to achieve common goals’ (Hambleton 
2007 p174). This implies a wide range of activities aimed at generating both new insights 
and new ways of working together – it prizes respect for the feelings and attitudes of 
others as well as a strong commitment to collaboration.4
 
 If we apply this definition to 
place-based leadership it implies an approach that is very different from leading the 
‘organisation’ or ‘leading the local council’. It invites leaders to move outside their 
organisation (be it a local authority, a business, a social enterprise, a university or 
whatever) to engage with the concerns facing the place. We can surmise that most of the 
people ‘concerned with’ a place actually live there. However, some individuals may be 
committed to a place and the people living in it without actually living there. For 
example, the chief executive of a local authority may live in a neighbouring area. The 
central point is that it is concern for the people living in a particular place that drives 
leaders to act. 
The literature on leadership – on political leadership, on managerial leadership and on 
local government leadership – has given scant attention to how people feel. Some 
scholars and writers have started to address this issue. For example, Goleman et al. 
(2002) draws on earlier work on emotional intelligence to develop a ‘leadership 
repertoire’ that displays some awareness of emotions. Hoggett (2009), in his wide-
ranging study of human feelings and identities in political life, makes a remarkably 
insightful contribution by introducing different theories of collective emotion. The point 
to emphasise here, however, is that these contributions are surprisingly few and far 
between. More worrying, there appears to be little evidence that these ideas have 
impacted debates about local leadership, still less the actual practice of leadership and 
management in local government.  
                                            
4  This definition resonates with recent contributions to the literature on leadership, including Sashkin and 
Sashkin (2003); Heifetz, Grashow and Linksy (2009); and Keohane (2010). 
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Civic leaders are found in the public, private, and community/voluntary sectors and they 
operate at many geographical levels – from the street block to an entire sub region and 
beyond. Three kinds of civic leadership, reflecting their different sources of legitimacy, 
can be distinguished: 
 
• Political leadership – referring to the work of those people elected to leadership 
positions by the citizenry. These are, by definition, political leaders. Thus, all 
elected local councillors are political leaders, although we should acknowledge 
that different councillors carry different roles and responsibilities and will view 
their political role in different ways. We should also note that many councillors 
see themselves as ‘community leaders’ and this is no bad thing. However, the 
key point I wish to highlight here is that their legitimacy stems from the ballot 
box. Because they are elected local politicians have a right to exercise political 
power. This distinguishes them from other local leaders. 
 
• Managerial/professional leadership – referring to the work of public servants 
appointed by local authorities, central government and third sector organisations 
to plan and manage public services, and promote community wellbeing. These 
officers bring professional and managerial expertise to the tasks of local 
governance. 
 
• Community leadership – referring to the work of the many civic-minded 
people who give their time and energy to local leadership activities in a wide 
variety of ways. These may be community activists, business leaders, voluntary 
sector leaders, figures in religious organisations, higher education leaders and so 
on. Particularly important here is the potential contribution to civic leadership of 
an independent and engaged voluntary and community sector. 
 
It is essential to point out immediately that Figure 2 represents a drastic simplification of 
a more complex reality. There is no suggestion here that, because the circles are an equal 
size, the three realms of place-based leadership are equally powerful. On the contrary, 
the relative power of leaders operating in the different realms varies enormously by 
locality. The way the realms are configured in a particular place will be shaped by a 
range of external pressures as well as by local factors. The model is presented only as a 
conceptual framework to aid thinking about the nature of place-based leadership. 
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In addition to distinguishing different sources of legitimacy, the model suggests that 
leaders from all three realms can play a critical role in promoting public service 
innovation. More than that the model is designed to highlight the significance of the 
areas of overlap between the different realms of leadership. These areas of overlap can be 
described as ‘innovation zones’ – areas providing many opportunities for innovation – 
see Figure 2. This is because different perspectives are brought together within these 
zones and this can enable active questioning of established approaches. If mishandled 
processes of dialogue in these spaces can become ‘conflict zones’ with little listening 
taking place. This is where civic leadership can play a vital role – in shifting the focus to 
learning and innovation and away from dispute and fear (Kahane 2004). Wise civic 
leadership is critical in ensuring that settings of this kind – sometimes referred to as the 
‘soft spaces’ of planning (Illsley et al. 2010) – are orchestrated in a way that promotes a 
culture of listening. This, in turn, requires emotional sensitivity and an awareness of the 
importance of various sources of community identity. 
 
Figure 2. Realms of civic leadership 
 
 
 
Innovation does, of course, take place within each of the realms of leadership shown in 
the diagram. The suggestion being made here is that the areas of overlap tend to be 
neglected, despite the fact that they can provide exciting opportunities for the 
development of new approaches to social discovery that, in turn, lead to public service 
innovation. 
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This framework is elaborated elsewhere (Hambleton 2009; Hambleton et al. 2009). For 
our purposes an important point to stress is that inspirational, civic leadership can 
emanate from any of the three realms of leadership. Elected politicians can exercise a 
path-breaking role but so, too, can community leaders operating outside the state. It is 
also the case that appointed officers – for example, an inspiring city manager or service 
director, a neighbourhood manager or area police officer – may set the tone of local 
leadership. The role of managers and professionals in local civic leadership is, in fact, 
often undervalued. Officers can and do work closely with political figures and 
community stakeholders to bring about transformative change. In particular, street-level 
workers can play a key role in promoting dialogue over time that stimulates creative 
solutions to local problems. In the US context Nalbandian (1991) has emphasised the 
importance of professional managers identifying, understanding and working with the 
values of their local communities. And in more recent work he has shown how 
professionals can play a crucial role in promoting community involvement and, what he 
describes as, ‘civic discovery’ (Nalbandian 2007). 
 
There is an important dimension to the local leadership debate that we should not ignore 
– the powers of local authorities and the institutional design of local government. The 
powers granted by higher levels of government to local authorities in various countries 
vary dramatically. Clearly this shapes the capacity of local authorities to lead their place. 
In addition, the detailed design of local democratic institutions can vary significantly 
between countries. In relation to the civic leadership debate we can note that an 
increasing number of countries believe that it is important to strengthen the local political 
executive – either by introducing a strong directly elected mayor or by creating a senior 
executive group of councillors (Borraz and John 2004; Magnier 2006; Swianiewicz 
2007). Directly elected mayors have, for example, been introduced across local 
government in Germany and Italy, and the model has also been introduced into English 
local government (Hambleton and Sweeting 2004; Copus 2008). Former UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair was enthusiastic about this approach (Blair 1998) and, in 2000, the 
Labour Government created the Greater London Authority (with a directly elected 
mayor). This was a major breakthrough in urban leadership. The model underpins bold 
outgoing leadership by the Mayor. Opposed by just about all involved in UK local 
government at the time, there are now few, if any, local government voices calling for 
the abolition of the directly elected mayor for London. In the Localism Bill, presented to 
Parliament in December 2010, the present UK Coalition Government proposes 
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introducing directly elected mayors in twelve major cities in England (subject to local 
referenda). The institutional design debate about local leadership can be expected to 
continue in England.  
 
The debate about institutional design is, in fact, very much alive and well across 
Commonwealth countries. For example, in New Zealand the Royal Commission on 
Auckland Governance recently carried out a thorough study of alternative approaches to 
metropolitan governance (Royal Commission on Auckland Governance 2009). In this 
case the Commission recommended the introduction of a directly elected mayor for a 
large, newly created unitary authority. The Government, while rejecting important 
aspects of the Commission’s recommendations, decided to introduce a directly mayor 
and moved swiftly to pass new legislation. Mayor Len Brown took up his duties as 
Mayor of Auckland in November 2010, and is now the directly elected leader of the 
largest local authority in Australasia (Cheyne and Hambleton 2011). For our purposes, 
the important point to note about the institutional design of local government is that it 
can either support outgoing civic leadership or hinder it. There is not space here to 
elaborate the pros and cons of alternative institutional designs. In any event, one of the 
arguments of this paper is that local government can gain much by paying more attention 
to leadership processes rather than focussing too much attention on structures and 
organisational charts. 
 
Let us now provide a brief recap on the argument developed so far. Today local 
governments exist in a rapidly globalising world, a world that is also rapidly urbanising. 
Buffeted by external economic and other forces, that appear to be outside their control, 
local governments strive to create a positive and predictable future for their residents. As 
a result of these various pressures many local authorities have decided that the ‘state 
cannot go it alone’ and they have developed models of working designed to enhance 
partnership working with other stakeholders in the locality. This shift from government 
to governance has many advantages as important players can be brought into the process 
of leading the city – local enthusiasts, ethno-religious organisations, local businesses, 
economic players, the voluntary sector, social enterprises, universities and so on. A risk, 
however, is that local democratic accountability vanishes as new, secretive ‘partnership 
organisations’ take over local decision-making. Various studies of these partnership 
arrangements have suggested that they often lack transparency and are vulnerable to take 
over by vested interests (Davies 2007; Judd and Smith 2007).  
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In the face of these challenges it is imperative that local government, and all those who 
care about local democracy, develop much stronger models of place-based leadership 
that can withstand place-less power. It has been suggested that a new approach to civic 
leadership – one based on strengthening the connections between the three realms of 
civic leadership shown in Figure 2 – is needed. In the UK context there is some 
recognition of the merits of adopting a place-based approach. The Total Place initiative, 
introduced in 2009, attempts to assess the totality of public spending in an area and 
strives to uncover waste and duplication so that resources can be deployed more 
effectively (HM Treasury 2010). And the follow up policy of Community Budget pilots 
adopts a similar approach. It is too early to say whether these efforts to adopt a total 
approach to a locality will bear fruit. 
 
In the next section an effort is made to illustrate what strong, place-based leadership 
might look like in practice by providing a short case study of the achievements of civic 
leaders in Freiburg, Germany. This is not intended to be a detailed case study, rather the 
aim is to outline the contours of an approach to studying place-based leadership that 
might prompt further scholarship in this vein. 
 
5.  Going Green – A Radical Approach to Local Leadership 
Imagine a city with a population of 220,000 where car ownership is going down, and the 
citizens are proud of it. From having no bike paths in 1970 the city now has a network of 
over 300 miles of bike lanes. The railway station has its own ‘bike station’ with 1,000 
supervised spaces, together with repair and bike hire services, a cycle shop, a café and a 
travel agency. Some neighbourhoods have been designed to achieve zero-energy or 
‘energy plus’ development. In these areas you will find solar powered houses 
contributing to the electricity supply – not taking from it. Freiburg, Germany’s 
southernmost city, can now claim to be a world leader when it comes to responding to 
climate change.5
 
 Urban designers in the UK have been so impressed with the 
achievements of the city that they published The Freiburg Charter for Sustainable 
Urbanism in an effort to identify guiding principles for good planning and design from 
the city (Academy of Urbanism 2011). 
 
                                            
5  For more information visit: <www.freiburg.de/greencity>. 
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A summary of the Freiburg success story 
The origins of the community activism that underpins current innovations in Freiburg 
can be traced to the late 1970s. A successful local and regional campaign against a 
proposal to locate a nuclear power station in nearby Wyhl provided the original impetus. 
Those involved recall that the campaign was both creative and inclusive – it united 
farmers and conservative businessmen, students and activists, old and young – in a new 
kind of political movement, a ‘green’ movement. A colourful coalition of anti-nuclear 
activists was born and, from small beginnings, success spurred further success. As early 
as 1986, the year of the Chernobyl disaster, the council declared the city a nuclear power 
free zone. 
 
In 1992 Freiburg was chosen as Germany’s ‘Environmental Capital’ for its pioneering 
achievements, such as the installation of an early-warning system for smog and ozone 
pollution, pesticide bans, recycling measures and its high quality public transport. 
Freiburg is now one of the greenest cities in Germany – no city of comparable size has 
more forests, vineyards and open space. It has a high quality public transport system and 
it is very easy to move around the city either by tram or bicycle.  
 
The Green Party has strong roots here and the city council, which has 48 members, 
currently has twelve Green Party councillors. In 2002 Freiburg became the first sizable 
city in Germany to elect a member of the Green Party – Dieter Salomon – as mayor. The 
population at large has a strong commitment to environmentalism, one that has stood the 
test of time. Many young people are now choosing to move to Freiburg not just because 
it has a well-respected university, but also because of the strong, green values it stands 
for.  
 
The largest solar research institute in Europe – the Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy 
Systems (ISE) – is based here and solar technology has created over 1,000 new jobs in 
the last ten years. The city council organises ‘Solar Tours’ to enable visitors to learn 
from the practical experience of some of the 500 solar projects that are now up and 
running in the city. Environmental policy, solar engineering, sustainability and climate 
protection are key features of public policy and the city council is deeply committed to 
further innovation to advance the green agenda for the city. 
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A key strength of the ‘Freiburg approach’ is that the city is not complacent. Visitors from 
across the world now flock to the city to learn about the achievements of the city – in 
public transport, solar energy, green jobs, urban design, and the creation of communal 
forests and green spaces. But the city is keen to redouble its climate protection efforts. 
Deputy Mayor, Gerda Stuchlik, who leads on environmental and educational matters, has 
recently promoted plans to reduce CO2 emissions to 40% of 1990 levels by 2030. There 
are many examples of high quality, green urban developments in the city. For example, 
Rieselfeld, is a new district in the west of the city which has been constructed in the 
period since 1994 to very high urban design standards. In the next section we provide a 
short profile of just one green neighbourhood – Vauban. 
 
Vauban – a child-friendly, green suburb 
The Vauban district, an area of about 40 hectares, on the south side of the city, is a newly 
created, family-friendly neighbourhood full of green spaces and attractively designed 
homes. It contains 5,200 people and around 600 jobs. Many local people work in stores, 
markets and gastronomy. There are teachers and public service professionals, architects 
and designers. Around one hundred work in a local electrical installation company and 
there is a balance of social groups. 
 
By bringing together urban planners and residents in a highly constructive process of 
public participation, the neighbourhood has achieved outstanding environmental 
standards. The land was divided into relatively small plots, and preferences were given to 
private builders, households, social housing providers and co-operatives. Major house 
builders were banned. The outcome is a child-friendly, green suburb with an abundance 
of small-scale creativity. Sensitive, people friendly design is central and building 
controls are demanding. 
 
Highlights: 
• Tram service available in the development from an early stage giving frequent, 
fast and reliable service to the city centre and the city as a whole 
• First class bike network encouraging cycling for longer and shorter trips 
• Safe environments outside the homes with children free to roam 
• Extensive green spaces for recreation and social interaction 
• No parking in the car restricted residential streets, except for unloading and/or 
dropping off frail or elderly people 
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• Multi-storey car parking in two garages on the fringes of the neighbourhood 
provides space for cars for those that want them – but at a price 
• Creative design of streetscapes, public spaces and community facilities. 
 
How local government works in Freiburg 
Freiburg is located within the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg and the local authority of 
Freiburg has two political institutions: 
 
• The City Council (Gemeinderat). This has 48 members who are elected for a 
term of five years. The law requires that the number of councillors, reflects the 
population size of the city. The city population is 220,000 and this results in 48 
councillors. They are elected ‘at large’ – they do not represent districts or wards 
within the city – and they are expected to serve the whole city. Candidates must 
be 18 years old and there is no upper age limit. The City Council, which meets 
around twenty times each year, is the main policy making body of the city – 
covering planning, the budget, city laws and taxes. 
 
• The Mayor. This person is elected by the citizens for a fixed term of eight years. 
The Mayor chairs the City Council and is the 49th member (and can vote). The 
Mayor is also the most senior representative of the city and is the Chief 
Executive Officer of the city administration. In cities like Freiburg one or more 
Deputy Mayors support the Mayor. There are four in Freiburg and they cover: 
budget and public housing; environmental politics, schools and youth; social and 
cultural affairs; and planning and development. Deputy Mayors are elected by 
the City Council for a term of eight years but they are professionals, chosen for 
their professional skills. They are not members of the City Council, but attend all 
Council meetings and have the right to speak on matters relating to their 
department.  
 
Local authorities in Germany are stronger than local authorities in many countries in the 
sense that the position of municipalities is guaranteed – they are given the right to local 
self-government. In addition, they have the authority ‘to deal with all local matters 
affecting the municipality’.  
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Civic leadership in Freiburg 
We now turn to consider how the leadership model outlined in Figure 2 can help us 
understand the process of innovation in Freiburg. The evidence suggests that leaders 
from all three realms of civic leadership have helped create an innovative approach to 
local governance. 
 
The role of politicians has been critical in promoting and implementing green policies. 
The elected politicians set the direction and tone of local policy. Mayor Dieter Salomon 
says: 
‘Freiburg is geared towards the principle of sustainable development and this 
principle guides all our political decisions. The most notable changes can be 
found in our energy and public transport policies. We promote the use of 
renewable energies – solar power, wind power, water power and biomass – and 
we have managed to significantly increase the percentage of renewable energies, 
mainly with solar energy. We also promote the concept of a ‘city of short 
distances’. To achieve this we put great emphasis on having a high quality public 
transport service and an extensive network of bicycle lanes’.6
 
 
Eckart Friebis, a Green councillor elected in 1989, adds:  
‘The role of politicians was particularly important at the beginning of our work. 
This is because the administration did not really know what sustainability meant 
and did not really want to try out new ways. Before we had a majority on the City 
Council we could not force the administration to change, but at least we could 
enrich council and public discussions with our new ecological ideas. Later, when 
we [the Green Party] gained power, we were able to push these ideas more 
strongly and they are now embedded in the thinking of the administration’.7
 
 
Professional and managerial leaders have also played a key part. For example, Wulf 
Daseking, the long-serving Director of Planning in Freiburg, has provided strong, 
professional leadership to the planning and design work of the city. His efforts have been 
recognised internationally. For example, in November 2009 the British Academy of 
Urbanism gave the award of ‘European City of the Year 2010’ to Freiburg. In the 
following year, the Academy made Wulf Daseking an Honorary Member of the 
Academy in recognition of his outstanding contributions to city planning and urban 
design and reference has already been made to The Freiburg Charter for Sustainable 
Urbanism (Academy of Urbanism 2011). 
 
                                            
6  Personal communication. 
7  Personal communication. 
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In various speeches Mr Daseking has encouraged professionals to ‘stay put’ in a given 
place for a reasonable length of time because this can enable professionals to have more 
impact. He says:  
‘It takes years to bring ideas to fruition. You must follow ideas through to the 
stage of implementation. We have too many young people who just run after a 
career – whatever that is – and change jobs like changing shirts. No, a planner 
must work to make changes on the ground. This can be difficult as planning time 
horizons are long - and can be in conflict with political time horizons that tend to 
be short. Professionals have an important role in civic leadership - alongside other 
leaders – partly because they are able to take the longer view’.8
 
 
Finally, community leaders are critical. The roots of current approaches can be traced to 
the community activism of the 1970s. Without the drive and energy of community-based 
activists it is difficult to see how significant change could have been brought about. 
Mayor Salomon stresses the importance of working with a wide range of community 
actors in order to advance green objectives: 
‘To achieve our objectives we need the awareness of our citizens to make 
contributions of their own, for example, by investing in the thermal insulation of 
their homes in order to save energy. Many stakeholders are involved in realising 
the goals of sustainable development – our citizens, our businesses, 
environmentalist groups and institutions and, of course, the administration itself’.9
 
 
There are, of course, conflicting views within Freiburg about the direction of public 
policy. Some citizens believe that the Mayor and the City Council are pushing the green 
agenda too hard, while there are radical groups that believe that not enough is being 
done. Axel Mayer, Director of the Freiburg branch of Friends of the Earth – is positive 
about the achievements of the people of Freiburg, but he makes the point that the 
‘ecological footprint’ of Freiburg is still not satisfactory: 
‘Many goods and resources consumed in Freiburg are produced and won in 
countries far away from the Green City. These goods don’t actually pollute our 
Green City, but they do damage the environment of those countries producing 
them. An objective evaluation should not omit this pollution when calculating 
Freiburg’s ecological balance’.10
 
 
Summary of key lessons from Freiburg 
It is important to acknowledge that the story of Freiburg’s achievements outlined here is 
impressionistic. The analysis does not stem from a major research project. Rather the aim 
has been to begin to apply the place-based leadership model to a particular city and 
consider how it might be developed. Three lessons emerge for policy from the Freiburg 
story. First, it illustrates the value of strong, local political leadership. Indeed, it provides 
                                            
8  Personal interview. 
9  Personal communication. 
10  Personal communication. 
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an inspiring example of localism in action. Local leaders, unconstrained by centrally 
imposed performance indicators, have developed a forward looking strategy and 
delivered on it. Second, it is also clear that the officers and professionals appointed by 
the city to push at the boundaries of good practice have played a crucial role. Third, there 
is a clear lesson relating to the importance of working with local communities and civil 
society in general. The community activism in the neighbourhoods within Freiburg is 
lifting. The commitment to green values and collective purpose is highly developed and 
this external pressure has ensured year-on-year improvements in environmental 
performance.11
 
  
It should be noted that the German Federal Government has a national policy of 
providing substantial subsidies to promote renewable energy. But this observation does 
not weaken the argument set out here suggesting that civic leadership in Freiburg has 
been very successful. This is because most other cities in Germany, cities that enjoy the 
same Federal Government subsidies, are unable to match the high performance that 
Freiburg has achieved. 
 
6.  Reflections and Pointers 
In this final section I offer some reflections and pointers for the world of policy and 
practice and for the world of academe.  
 
Pointers for local government policy and practice 
Three main pointers for policy and practice emerge from this analysis. First, it is clear 
that civic leadership matters. As part of this, it is evident that elected politicians can 
exercise a critical role in setting the tone and this is true for both local and national 
politicians. President Obama provides an inspiring example of this kind of leadership. 
When campaigning for the US Presidency Senator Obama gave a remarkable speech on 
race relations in Philadelphia on 18 March 2008. It is widely remembered for the way in 
which he saw ‘both sides of the race debate’ (Wolffe 2009, p178). But it also provides a 
critique of place-less leadership. In his speech he set out the choice that continues to 
present itself to all civic leaders: 
For we have a choice in this country. We can accept a politics that breeds 
division, and conflict, and cynicism... Or, at this moment, in this election, we 
can... talk about the shuttered mills that once provided a decent life for men and 
women of every race, and the homes for sale that once belonged to Americans 
                                            
11  Further information on the Freiburg experience is available in report for the UK Local Government 
Improvement and Development (LGID) agency (Hambleton 2011). 
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from every religion, every region, every walk of life. This time we want to talk 
about the fact that the real problem is not that someone who doesn’t look like you 
might take your job; it’s that the corporation you work for will ship it overseas for 
nothing more than profit. (Obama 2008) 
 
Obama captured the mood of the nation and went on to win a spectacular victory in the 
Presidential election later that year. 
 
In this article it has been suggested that, given the growth of ‘place-less’ power in our 
rapidly globalising world, it is becoming increasingly important to strengthen place-
based leadership. This is because ‘place-less’ leadership disregards the concerns of 
communities living in particular localities, and it rides roughshod over the rights of local 
people. A conceptual model for thinking about civic leadership in a given locality has 
been put forward – see Figure 2 – and this outlines three realms of civic leadership. This 
model suggests that inspirational, civic leadership can emanate from any of the three 
realms - elected politicians, paid public servants or from civil society. 
 
But are there limits to place-based leadership? The answer is ‘yes’. It is important to 
recognise that the argument should not be taken to the extreme. Untrammelled ‘place-
based’ power can work against good race relations and the creation of a just city. For 
example, if neighbourhoods are granted massive authority to rule their areas we can be 
sure that the rich and selfish will be quick to ensure that people who differ from 
themselves are excluded. Indeed, as documented by Davis (1992), Minton (2009) and 
others, the growth of privatised, ‘gated communities’ is a worrying international urban 
trend. The creation of gated communities with high walls and security guards could be 
described as an example of ‘place-based’ leadership. In this case the residents of the 
fortified enclaves strive to secure the success of their ‘place’ in what they consider to be 
an increasingly hostile urban environment. This is not what I am advocating when I 
argue for a strengthening of ‘place-based’ leadership. Rather, following Frederickson 
(2005), I am suggesting that politicians, professionals and community activists should be 
guided by ‘instincts of appropriateness’ and what is understood to be right and fair.  
 
Second, the institutional design of local governance arrangements matters. Structures, 
constitutions and decision-making processes are not the whole story when it comes to 
defining ‘good governance’, but it is misguided to believe that they are irrelevant. 
Institutional design can either hinder or promote effective and accountable civic 
leadership, public involvement and effective place shaping. Thus, governance 
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arrangements can foster inclusion of excluded voices or do the opposite. A warning note 
has been sounded about the shift from government to governance. Privatised forms of 
urban governance, sometimes advanced in the name of ‘public/private partnership 
working’, can erode the corrigibility of decision making. A risk with these models is that, 
‘behind closed doors’ local leaders become servants of ‘place-less’ leaders to the 
disadvantage of their communities. 
 
Third, it seems clear that public service innovation – defining it, understanding it, 
developing practical ideas on how to promote it – is a very important topic now, not just 
for local government and governance, but also for all those concerned with public 
services as a whole. There is light weight thinking in this area and more than a little lofty 
rhetoric. Scholars can play an important role in advancing thinking about public service 
innovation and helping public service leaders move beyond performance management 
regimes that seem to be increasingly outdated. The emergence of major, new challenges 
for governments – notably climate change and the economic recession – give added 
weight to this argument.  
 
The civic leadership model advanced in this chapter advocates a political, as opposed to 
a managerial, approach to public service innovation.12
 
 It has been suggested that the 
overlaps between the different realms of civic leadership can provide ‘innovation zones’ 
in which new ideas can be explored and tried out. It goes without saying that it is 
imperative that the creation and design of these new spaces for interaction need to be 
shaped by local people, and this is particularly true in the multicultural city. This will 
require risk taking by both political and managerial public service leaders. 
Pointers for academe and training providers 
I offer three pointers for the world of academe and training/educational development – 
two relating to what universities and training providers might do, and one relating to the 
need to stimulate a new wave of action research on local leadership. 
 
First, in relation to education we can at least raise the question of whether leadership is 
being given sufficient attention in the undergraduate and postgraduate courses being 
pursued by those who might hope to play a part in shaping the quality of life in the place 
                                            
12  Many writers and consultants advocate a managerial approach to public service innovation (Tidd et al 
2005). These approaches can play a role in improving service responsiveness, but radical change requires 
political, rather than managerial, thinking because significant shifts in power are necessary. 
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where they live. Are we doing enough to educate future locality leaders? It would seem, 
for example, that many of the courses providing pathways into local government careers 
are dominated by professional institutes who perhaps have a vested interest in 
perpetuating a highly specialised approach to knowledge and understanding. Are these 
courses neglecting the cross-cutting skills and competencies future civic leaders will 
need?  
 
At a more advanced level the argument set out in this article has significant implications 
for leadership development programmes at local, regional and national levels. For much 
of the time countries are investing in a ‘silo’ approach to public leadership analysis and 
development. Civic leadership development, if it is supported at all, tends to be handled 
separately within each of the three realms civic leadership set out in Figure 2. And there 
is further segmentation within each of the realms. Thus, there are many leadership 
courses for specific professional groupings of officers, development courses for 
councillors, courses for community organisers and so on. A consequence is that 
breakthrough educational practice - linking leaders in the different realms of leadership 
together in a shared process of social discovery - is sorely under developed in 
universities and elsewhere.13
 
  
A second pointer concerns the trajectory of research in universities. In many countries, 
higher education performance management regimes are skewing research away from 
policy relevance and away from active engagement with the challenges faced by local 
communities (Hambleton 2006; Goddard 2009; Hambleton 2010). Despite the recent 
increase in interest in assessing ‘research impact’ in some countries, the thrust of 
university promotion procedures and research council funding priorities is to promote 
esoteric research. Learned journal articles are highly prized within these performance 
regimes, and it is certainly important to strengthen the quality of peer reviewed 
scholarship in the field of local government studies. But it is essential that universities 
reconsider the nature of modern scholarship to bring it into line with the expectations and 
requirements of modern society. Ernest Boyer has provided a marvellous start to this task 
by mapping out a holistic vision of scholarship (Boyer 1990). A growing number of 
universities are following this model – particularly public funded universities in the USA 
                                            
13  It is encouraging to note the emergence of new leadership development programmes that relate to ‘place’, 
for example, programmes recently developed in England (Local Government Association 2011).  However, 
even these pioneering place-based leadership programmes neglect leaders from outside the state.  This would 
seem to be a weakness when the community sector has so much to offer to local leadership (Community 
Sector Coalition 2009). 
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– but there is much more to do on this front and this could be of immense benefit to the 
field of local government studies.  
 
Third, and this brings the place-based leadership agenda back into sharp focus, how can 
we stimulate a major expansion in place-based action research on local leadership? One 
strategy is to develop an expanding set of collaborative place-based research projects – 
studies and projects that bring together universities and local authorities and other 
agencies in particular places. The place-based leadership conceptual framework set out in 
this article could provide a starting point for some of these collaborations.  
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Abstract1
In India, the 73rd constitutional amendment of 1992 decentralises agriculture, irrigation, 
health, education along with 23 other items to the Panchayats, the village level self-
government body. It is envisaged that the three-tier Panchayat system at the District, Block 
and the Village level would coordinate with different ‘line departments’ of the government 
for planning various schemes and their implementation. In West Bengal, a state in eastern 
India, where the Panchayats were revitalised before the constitutional amendment, the initial 
years were marked by strong coordination between the Panchayats and other departments, 
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especially land and agriculture, making West Bengal a ‘model’ case for the Panchayats. 
However, where service delivery through the Panchayats has been criticised in recent years, 
the disjuncture between Panchayats and the line departments is a cause for alarm. In this 
paper, we search for the causes behind the low level of coordination between government 
departments and the Panchayat at each tier. We analyse the complex process of 
organisational coordination that characterises decentralisation, and show how decision 
making in local governments is nested within various levels of hierarchy. The study focuses 
on the formal structures of coordination and control with regard to decision-making between 
the Panchayats and the line departments. We show how these processes work out in practice. 
These involve lack of role definition, problems of accountability, and politics over access to 
resources and relations of power within, as well as outside, the Panchayat.  
 
Keywords: Architecture of Local Governance, Organisational Network, Inter-departmental 
Coordination 
 
1. Introduction 
Where “inter-institutional harmony is of the utmost importance” (Geldenhuys 2008), 
effective service delivery by government institutions should draw on unique local structures. 
This is an outcome of three fold pressure: a need for specialised government organisations to 
work together, providing government services through a single window, and the importance 
of addressing local needs in synergy (Goss 2001). Goss (Ibid) argues that this coordination 
calls for “public bodies [to] purchase services from other public, voluntary or private 
organisations” which demands considerable emphasis on strategic planning and “in many 
cases shared delivery systems still do not work smoothly”. The nature and success of 
coordination is one of the determining factors of organisational effectiveness (Crowston 
1997; Stokes & Hewitt 1976; Thompson 1967). With an appreciation of the need for inter-
governmental coordination, the present paper seeks to address what is happening at the 
operational level of inter-governmental relations and how this can be improved in order to 
achieve the policy goals of effective service delivery in West Bengal, through ‘line 
departments’: rural local governments – the Panchayats – and government departments such 
as education, health, public works etc., which are supposed to work ‘in line’ with the local 
governments – hence their name. The case of West Bengal is not typical because 
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decentralisation has been effectively pursued, so problems here indicate broader issues that 
need to be addressed. 
 
2. Intergovernmental Relations: Existing Perspectives 
Government institutions have a complex nature, with actors often having multiple cultural 
backgrounds, and where the system lacks normative underpinning in public opinion. 
Consequently, the system requires strong coordination (Miller & Dickson 1996). One 
approach is to understand intergovernmental relations through descriptive analysis aimed at 
identifying:  
• the nature of governmental units;  
• the nature of officials and their attitudes, perceptions and roles;  
• patterns of interaction;  
• the range of officials involved – elected representatives and appointed officials for 
example, and policies to be implemented (Wright 1988).  
 
A second approach looks analytically at historical trends in relations among governments 
(Conlan 1988) and identifies distinctive features in a given historical phase (Grodzins 1966; 
Stewart 1984).  
 
A third “Community Power” approach (Krane & Wright 2000, p. 86) addresses the ways in 
which local government officials exercise political power.  
 
Enhancement of inter-organisational linkages should involve careful observation of 
institutional environments, procedural and structural aspects, and subjective dimensions. 
Therefore, an effective design for coordination should see an organisation as an open system 
affected by its environment (Scott 1992). Furthermore, it is vulnerable to its context 
especially in dealing with issues of information processing, which ought to match the 
institutional environmental demands (Tushman & Nadler 1978). The interdependence of the 
parts within the organisational whole is a challenge to institutional collaboration, as it 
enhances role confusion and complexity of the system (Lawrence & Lorsch 1967; Thompson 
1967). In larger systems, coordination is not practicable through simple group meetings 
(Galbraith 1973; Kiesler et al.1994; Thompson 1967 ; Van de Ven et al. 1974), as the 
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structures and processes are interwoven. The components of linkages, like ongoing 
conversations, discourse, shared human experiences and interaction patterns (Foucault 1971; 
Schutz 1967; Weick 1979), create meaning, social worlds, norms, shared interpretive 
schemes, understanding, common rituals and knowledge, coordination, and social order 
(Bechky 2003; Habermas 1984; Schein 1992; Wageman 1995; Weick 1993; Schutz 1967; 
Chwe 2001; Hutchins 1990; Weick et al. 1993; Polanyi 1975).  
 
We need to look carefully at these issues to understand their processes and how they are 
embedded within the structure. Therefore, for designing an effective strategy of coordination, 
due emphasis should be given to the subjective dimensions (Bastien & Hostager 2001), 
including mental models, frameworks and scripts (Weick 1995; Gioia & Poole 1984; 
Levesque et al. 2001), knowledge (Adler & Borys 1996; Hutchins 1991), shared 
meaning/mutually shared fields (Kickert et al. 1997, Weick et al. 1993), and rules and 
resources (Giddens 1984).  
 
However, we realise that management of networks is not restricted to achievement of inter-
organisational coordination alone. It “involves the application of applied behavioural science 
techniques such as team building, conflict resolution skill, and coordinating abilities” 
(Agranoff & McGuire 1999, p. 109-10). The success of the network depends both on how far 
the network manager has taken care of the technical, legal and political dimensions (Ibid, p. 
107-8) and on the extent to which she adopts a meta-governance approach. Thus, only 
persons who have the capacity to handle this diverse array of tasks are suitable for the role of 
a network manager. The introduction of these actors result in the creation of a heterogeneous 
network comprising local governments and other departments that not only differ in structure 
and culture but also in terms of goal, power and relationship with society (Klijn 2005). Also, 
while selectively activating the network one should be extremely careful about two factors: 
which actors are selected (and who are not selected), and what information is shared (Kickert 
et al. 1997, p. 47).  
 
3. Approach and Methodology  
While attempting to understand the operational level of intergovernmental coordination of 
the Panchayat system of West Bengal, we use both descriptive and analytic approaches, 
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which are backed by field narratives inspired by the community power approach. We studied 
policy documents and activity maps in order to gain insights about mechanisms of 
coordination as established. We have done fieldwork in six District offices and twelve Block 
offices (sub-district) by selecting two from each of the districts. We studied a total of twenty 
four Village Panchayats, selecting two from each of the Blocks to analyse problems faced by 
the officials due to lack of co-ordination. The paper therefore contains a descriptive 
presentation of policies designed to strengthen coordination, identifies gaps, and presents 
systemic problems and their operational consequences . Analysis of the reasons for failure of 
coordination analysed through studying the complex organisational structures.  
 
The Indian context 
In India, the 73rd constitutional amendment of 1992, which received presidential assent early 
in 1993, recommended decentralisation of twenty-seven areas of government jurisdiction, 
including agriculture, irrigation, health, and education to the Panchayats, the village level 
self-government body.2
 
 It was envisaged that the three-tier Panchayat system at the District, 
Block and the Village level would coordinate with different ‘line departments’ of the 
government for planning and implementation of various schemes. To strengthen the 
initiative, sector wide sub-committees at Village level, and standing committees at Block 
level and District level, were constituted. At present, ten standing committees work on 
different topics, including issues of infrastructure and empowerment where elected 
representatives and officials from concerned ‘line departments’ work together (P&RD, 
GoWB 2009). The local government system demands vertical coordination with different 
tiers and horizontal coordination with ‘line departments’.  
The system is prone to interdepartmental incompatibilities, when departments with different 
business goals have to work together. The local government manager formulates the goal, 
identifies the potential partners and creates the network for their project management 
(Meuleman 2008). Coordination becomes a big challenge (Thompson 1967) because a) the 
chance of blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues 
(Putnam 1993), and b) ambiguities about the roles played by different stakeholders increases 
(Alper et al. 1998; Blake & Mouton 1970; Broadbent et al. 1996; Lax & Sebenius 1986). 
                                                 
2  Most state governments have not devolved all 27 subjects. 
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The system is prone to power struggles and opportunistic behaviour (Hirchman 1991) where 
inter-organisational coordination requires careful manufacturing of ‘rules of the game’ to 
blend capacities of stakeholders to meet their organisational objectives (Jessop 1996). If the 
organisation fails to design an effective mechanism for interdepartmental coordination, 
constructive negotiation and stakeholders’ willingness to engage in problem-solving 
behaviour becomes crucial (De Dreu et al. 1999; Fisher & Ury 1981; Rubin et al. 1994; 
Thomas 1992; Tjosvold 1991; Van de Vliert et al. 1997). This achieved when employees 
take into account both the goals of their own department, and also the goals of other 
departments (Blake & Mouton 1970; Rubin et al. 1994; Thomas 1976). 
 
Intergovernmental relations in operation 
The local government system therefore needs better information flows between various 
stakeholders and better management of complexity, since the system is large and tasks are 
cumbersome.  
 
The need for coordination is also recognised by the Government of India. The recent Annual 
Plan3 emphasises the need for inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral linkages, and adjustments in 
programmes to ensure effective collaboration. Sectors such as soil and water conservation, 
afforestation and pasture development, water resource development, and activities such as 
animal husbandry, horticulture, floriculture, and fisheries are targeted for building 
collaboration between relevant departments and the three-tier Panchayati Raj system.4
 
  
The analysis of policy documents shows the primary emphasis for building effective 
collaboration has been on a) activity mapping of the various stakeholders, and b) organising 
group meetings. 
 
4. Mapping of Activities: Existing Mechanism and Problems 
A detailed analysis was undertaken from activity mapping of internal Government Orders 
(GO) of the Department of Panchayat and Rural Development (P&RD), Government of 
West Bengal (GoWB) (P&RD, Government Order 2005, P&RD, GoWB 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009). The analysis shows two major initiatives: a) attachment of the line department 
                                                 
3 GoI (2010) Annual Plan 2010-11; Planning Commission, Government of India: New Delhi 
4  <http://planning.up.nic.in/annualplan0405/part2/Chapter-02.htm>, retrieved 18th April 2009. 
 CHAKRABARTI, CHATTOPADHYAY & NATH: Local Governments in West Bengal 
 
 
 CJLG May-November 2011 39 
 
officials to three tiers of the Panchayati Raj institution through different standing 
committees, and b) the roles to be played by the different lines of command (P&RD, GoWB 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). The activity mapping of the line departments and standing 
committees shows the following categories of activities: 
1. Selection of beneficiaries for various government schemes 
2. Capacity-building activities 
3. Input distribution 
4. Assistance – mostly financial 
5. Sensitisation and awareness raising activities 
6. Budget estimation 
7. Building and/or maintaining infrastructure 
8. Co-ordination of activities of the tiers 
9. Monitoring (P&RD, Government Order 2005). 
 
The activity pattern falls broadly into four categories: a) information collection, b) input 
distribution, c) awareness generation, and d) fiscal management (Ibid). Analysis of patterns 
of work of different standing committees indicates two inherent problems with the present 
structure: 
 
1. The top down problem: the beneficiary selection process is largely top-down. A 
government order from the Department of Panchayat and Rural Development in 
2005 indicates that officials and standing committee members decide the numbers 
(of schemes, for example) where local demands are often not reflected. Subsequent 
initiatives on financial assistance or training inputs are based on this initial selection, 
and as a result the entire system follows a top-down flow of decisions.  
 
2. Incomplete collaboration: P&RD, GO (2005), P&RD (2009) show that the work 
pattern provides limited scope for collaboration and information flow between the 
Panchayat tiers because of a) the top-down flow of decisions, and b) that work 
programmes and targets are set a priori.  
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In addition, the system is heavily dependent on standing committee meetings and monthly 
meetings for a collaborated and integrated approach. The analysis of annual reports as well 
as gazetteers shows that no formal stipulation is made for effective collaboration between 
local government and line departments.  
 
5. Issues of Co-ordination  
With the Government of West Bengal’s commencement of provisions of the 73rd 
amendment, the Panchayati Raj institution is expected to be formally strengthened with the 
process of participatory and decentralised planning. The initiative was mostly related to 
planning and fiscal issues. The Government of West Bengal's administrative report of 2002 – 
2003 (P&RDa), says that “government has decided to ... make the services of the Line 
Department officials at the district level available to the respective tiers of the local self-
government institutions.”5 It was thought the initiative that formally integrates the District 
Magistrate Zila Parishad offices6 would lead to a strong link between other government 
departments with Panchayat system. The formation of ten standing committees with a 
“balanced mix of elected representatives and appointed officials concerned with the related 
programmes” was projected as a sound mechanism for effective collaboration.7
 
  
On 27th September 2005, fifteen line departments were devolved to Panchayats, which were 
expected to discuss their initiatives in Panchayat standing committee meetings before taking 
decisions. Different reports show the system depends heavily on the standing committee 
meetings, but field data shows that these meetings are often not held or not attended by line 
department officials. The activity-mapping shows that line department officials are expected 
to consult standing committees, but it is not mandatory. Apart from these occasional 
meetings, no mention is made about the process of collaboration between the line 
departments and the Panchayati Raj system. The administrative reports show the lack of 
endeavour by the officials, though “in respect of planned development in most of the cases 
(emphasis added) decisions are taken by the line departments after discussing the same in the 
meeting of the standing committee concerned8
                                                 
5  P&RD. Annual Administrative Report 2002 – 2003 
” and “it is always desirable to have formal 
6  Ibid, p. 15  
7  Ibid, p. 18 
8  P&RD. Annual Administrative Report 2006 – 2007, p. 21-2. 
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orders or support of legal framework for defining the responsibilities of the Panchayats as 
well as delineating inter-tier responsibilities.”9
  
 An awareness of this 'taken-for-grantedness' 
is shown in these reports, which draw to the attention of the relevant departments the need 
for formalizing the responsibilities of the Panchayats. 
The Kolkata Gazette shows the same casual mindset towards issues of co-ordination:  
 
there shall be proper coordination between Panchayat Samiti [local government at the 
Block level], its Sthayee Samitis [the standing committees] and block level officers of 
line departments of the State Government in all matters relating to planning, execution 
and administration of development work and the sabhapati, sahakari sabhapati, [head 
and assistant-head of the Block] of the Block, executive officer and other 
functionaries, officers and employees shall endeavour to maintain, and also desist 
from disrupting, such coordination so as to ensure unhindered progress of 
development programme.10
 
  
However, the ways to ‘endeavour for coordination’ or ‘desist from the disruption’ remain 
unexplained. The gazette talks about the possible ‘mismatch’11
 
 of initiatives taken by line 
departments and Panchayat, but there is no mention about the ways to avoid this mismatch. It 
is presumed that the standing committee meetings will mitigate these issues.  
The system is backed by differential fund disbursement.. Panchayats do not have an 
exclusive functional domain, as line departments continue to be funded to carry out 
development functions where mandates for discussion with elected representatives are not 
monitored properly. 
  
The initiative for decentralisation with the enhancement of Panchayat’s decision-making 
capacity lacks the impetus for integrating line departments within the formal Panchayat 
system. There are structural problems which suggest the limited nature of the line 
department’s integration into the system. 
 
However, it is important to address the following question: Why do the line department 
officials remain reluctant to attend the meetings? Is it solely because of role confusion and 
                                                 
9  Ibid, p. 22 
10  P&RD. Extraordinary. (2008), p. 12 
11  Ibid, p. 3. 
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absence of strict mandates? Or has it something to do with the present organisational 
structure? To address the question, an analytical study of the organisational structure of the 
Panchayat system was undertaken. Figure 1 shows the organisational structure of the 
Panchayat system currently in operation. 
 
The organisational structure shows that although line departments are linked to the three tiers 
of the Panchayat system, they are not accountable to elected representatives or to executives. 
Therefore, unification of the line departments with the three tiers has been incomplete. As a 
result, the structure has created power and role confusion as well as the lack of 
accountability. Although there are many standing committees, their mandates are overlooked 
as they cannot oblige the government officials who are accountable to their department 
headquarters.  
 
Outcome of the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ 
Field interactions with officials from different tiers (12 Block Development Officers [BDO] 
the Chief Civil Servant at the Block Level), twenty-four Gram (Village/ Local) Panchayat 
Pradhans (Heads) and Secretaries indicate a lack of clarity in the roles between the different 
tiers and also within the line departments. The situation leads to poor use of manpower as the 
Panchayat and the line departments are assigned with similar tasks with blurred role 
definition. From the field experience it appears that role-confusion and lack of clarity are 
outcomes of the ‘taken-for-granted’ attitude of the line departments. Fifteen line department 
officials interviewed argue that their presence in the meeting is not mandatory, and often fail 
to attend meetings due to other preoccupations. With this preliminary understanding, we try 
to address the consequences of the lack of clarity in roles. 
 
Lack of coordination at planning level 
Each BDO accepts that annual plans prepared by the District Council, other tiers of the 
Panchayat, and line departments are not well integrated. The communication between 
Panchayat and line departments is restricted to the top-level officials, which creates a lack of 
integration at the start of the planning process which ideally should be bottom-up. 
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Figure 1. Organisational structure of different levels of officials of the Panchayat system. (Ref. 
P&RD, Unpublished, Organisational Issues for Strengthening Rural Decentralisation in West Bengal 
PRI Review) 
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Lack of information-flow between line department(s) and Standing Committees 
From the analysis of policy documents and Annual Administrative Reports, it appears that 
the government is hopeful about the success of standing committee meetings and monthly 
meetings with executives. However, in reality, line department officials are reluctant to share 
information with standing committees, and lack interest in participating in the standing 
committee meetings. Each BDO reports that not all line department officials care to attend 
monthly meetings. Moreover, since these officials are accountable only to their respective 
departments, BDOs cannot take any disciplinary action against them.  
 
Lack of effective utilisation of resources 
Line department officials commonly plead insufficient staff to carry out effective planning, 
proper needs assessments and feasibility estimates. Better coordination can mitigate issues of 
understaffing through better use of resources and less overlap of initiatives. Policy problems 
also concede unintended power to bureaucrats and technocrats of the line departments. 
Inequality of power and role-confusion have created a situation where “there is no planning 
by Panchayat tiers and implementation has been reduced to a nexus between the contractors, 
the elected representatives and line department officials.”12 As a consequence, instead of 
evolving as institutions of self-governance, the role of Panchayats is reduced, as people 
outside the line departments suffer from absence of skills, which impedes grassroots 
democracy; “the Sarpanch (Pradhan) and the Panchayat secretary along with the officials of 
the line departments continue to rule Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and people simply do 
not have any other option but to depend on their decisions … also, there is a tendency of 
PRIs, especially the Gram Panchayats, to perceive themselves as government contractors 
rather than as change agents.”13
 
 
This partial administrative decentralisation means that the role of local officials is largely 
confined to implementation of development programmes, and elected representatives have 
minimal influence over local development priorities and exercise limited oversight over line 
department officials (Mathew and Jain 2005) as “essential services ... continue to be the 
preserve of line departments which operate in a top down manner and which have not been 
                                                 
12  Mathew and Jain (2005), p. 73 
13  Action for Social Advancement (2005), p. 2. 
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made subject to effective accountability mechanisms with regards to the elected 
government.”14
 
  
6. Narratives of Domination 
Members of different standing committees as well as BDOs frequently cite instances of 
domination by the line departments. They identify lack of role-clarity and problem of 
accountability as prime reasons. However, there are instances of “good officials” too, who 
because of their good “human qualities” were “kind enough” to listen and care for the 
collaborative effort to the development. 
 
We have no power to compel them (Line Department Officials) to do things that we 
need. In fact if they do not follow the Annual Action Plan, we cannot do anything. 
They have separate plans and most of the time they work accordingly… their control 
lies with their departments not with me. Even if an official misses monthly meetings 
regularly, I cannot even ask them not to do so. I have no formal control (Voice of a 
BDO Recorded on January 13, 2009) 
 
The helplessness is well reflected when the BDO says “their control lies with their 
departments not with me.”  
 
Although elected representatives and heads of different standing committees try to convince 
line department officials to recognise local needs, they frequently remain unheard. 
 
There is a separate allowance of Rs. 750/- for the cleaning of water reservoirs. We 
have tried to convince the PHE department to perform regular cleaning operations … 
they did not care for our requests … they are government employees. Since I am the 
karmadhakshya [head of the standing committee] … if something happens with water 
contamination, people will blame us… but in reality… I have no power … (Voice of 
head of the standing committee at the District, recorded on January 19, 2009) 
 
It seems that the elected representatives have no formal line of command over the decisions 
of the line departments as they cannot take any formal steps.  
 
A similar allegation was made by the head of Agriculture, Irrigation and Cooperative 
Standing Committee of one district: 
 
                                                 
14  P&RD, Unpublished, Organisational Issues for Strengthening Rural Decentralisation in West Bengal PRI 
Review. 
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Line department staff do not work in the Blocks … there are six defunct deep 
tubewells in Nowda Block … I personally requested the irrigation department official, 
but they have refused to work … Now I have heard they are demanding money from 
the poor villagers … (Recorded on December 21, 2008) 
 
The present mechanism has created space for the line department officials to dominate. Lack 
of accountability to the local administrative and political cadres hinders proper monitoring 
and evaluation. As reported by elected representatives and BDOs, this monopoly of line 
department officials not only creates problems of coordination but also promotes corruption, 
as there is no local monitoring and evaluation system in operation. 
 
7. Conclusions 
West Bengal is a well administered state, and a state in which governments have been 
enthusiastic about decentralisation since 1977. Most less developed countries are less well-
administered than West Bengal, and many governments are less enthusiastic about 
decentralising. This study is therefore important, because the problems of West Bengal may 
be more acute in other parts of India and the developing world. Furthermore, coordination 
with line departments has had little attention in the literature on decentralisation. The 
conclusion, therefore, draws together practical recommendations identified through the 
project. 
 
Inter-governmental coordination helps in providing effective use of scarce resources. In the 
present paper, we show that Panchayati Raj system in West Bengal is severely affected by 
lack of coordination between line departments and three-tier local government because of the 
absence of role-clarity and mandates, and faulty organisation design. The Panchayati Raj 
governance system is complex and multilayered. Without a clear mandate for effective 
collaboration, role-confusion and power struggles among officials and elected members are 
notable. The standing committees are intended to integrate line departments and the 
Panchayati system, but it lacks appropriate strategies. The provision for monthly meetings 
between members and line department officials shows the intention of coordination, but any 
monitoring of such meetings depends heavily on people’s self-interest in problem-solving. 
There is an urgent need to devise and reorder the entire system to redefine the hierarchy and 
respective roles, and to formulate a detailed strategy to enhance collaboration. To tackle this 
task, a fuller study of issues mentioned by scholars across disciplines is needed, but steps can 
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be taken to combat the immediate problems of lack of co-ordination and accountability of 
line departments. Mathew and Jain (2005) suggest empowering the standing committees by 
making them “responsible for approval before, during and after the execution of works.” In 
addition, a thorough study of the practical solutions as provided by scholars such as Goss 
(2001) and Gendenhuys (2008) may be useful. Below is a list of practical measures designed 
by the authors, which is an outcome of the theoretical and field-level understanding of the 
issue. The first four recommendations are general, and the last eight deal with practical 
solutions for the Panchayati Raj Institutions of West Bengal in the light of recommendations 
by Goss and Geldenhuys. 
 
1. Role-players should clearly identify the objectives of cross-boundary working. This 
would mean a shared understanding of what networks are for, and a greater degree 
of information exchange between different stakeholders.  
2. The agenda of inter-governmental networking should be continuously refreshed and 
researched, and continuous reform should be practised by involving all stakeholders. 
3. The loose ends in inter-governmental coordination should be identified and tied 
down through adherence to strict regulations. 
4. There should be clearly defined roles, expectations and responsibilities for all 
stakeholders.  
5. Empowerment of the PRI institutions should be accompanied by making line 
departments accountable to the three tiers of the Panchayat system. 
6. The reporting practices should include the standing committees, so that the 
committees can monitor the progress of the initiatives taken by the various line 
departments.  
7. Different stakeholders including elected representatives, executives, officials and 
line department staff should be merged with the different standing committees. 
8. Salaries of line department officials should be controlled by the Block Development 
Officer. Different offices, including Gram Panchayats should be given powers to 
certify line department officials at the time of their retirement.  
9. There should be an internal evaluation system of line department officials attached to 
different standing committees. 
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10. The Village Panchayat should play an active role the in the assessment of work 
through the social audit process. 
11. Plans prepared by the Village Panchayats, Panchayat Samitis (at the Block level), 
Zila Parishads (at the District level), line departments and the District Planning 
Committee should be coordinated through regular meetings. The District Planning 
Committee can act focus for co-ordination. If necessary, special planners should be 
appointed at all three levels. 
12. Devolution of funds will allow Panchayats to implement schemes to be planned and 
designed through Gram Sabhas and Village Panchayats that will be subsequently 
consolidated with plans prepared by Intermediate Panchayats and District 
Panchayats through the District Planning Committee. Line departments should 
actively involve themselves in the total process which would be monitored by the 
Block Development Officer at the Block level and coordinated by the District 
Planning Committee. 
  
Operational actions and interactions determine effective interdepartmental coordination in 
the local government. In the Indian context, especially in West Bengal, the most 
comprehensive challenge lies at the operational level as the system lacks a proper regulatory 
mechanism. It is reasonable to emphasise two things: designing the inter-organisational 
collaboration is an interactive process and demands attention to structural, procedural and 
cognitive aspects of the organisations; and without careful design of the ‘rules of the game’ 
for interdepartmental coordination, the networking remains inefficient and triggers numerous 
problems in practice, which undermines the real essence of democracy.  
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Abstract 
Policy-makers have long been concerned with the quality of local political leadership 
and have often resorted to institutional reform to try to improve political leadership. This 
paper looks at a specific and neglected facet of the political management reforms that 
have been implemented in English local government over the last decade: the tenure and 
turnover of cabinet members. The tenure of top politicians may be an important influence 
on the performance of local government particularly when political management is 
designed to favour individualised leadership. On the one hand, excessively short tenures 
for top politicians may damage the ability of governments to develop strategic plans and 
ensure they are implemented while on the other hand the risk of loss of office is central to 
political accountability and excessively long tenures may be indicative of an insulated 
and unresponsive elite. While some research attention has been paid to the tenures of 
leaders of councils in England there is little systematic information about the tenure of 
cabinet members. This paper discusses the relevance of cabinet stability and provides an 
overview of recent experience in England. 
 
 
Stephen Greasley 
The University of East Anglia 
Norwich, UK 
 
    
 
GREASLEY: Cabinet Governance and Political Stability 
 
 
CJLG May-November 2011 53 
  
1. Introduction1
In 2000 the UK parliament passed an Act that was designed to strengthen the political 
leadership of English local governments. It aimed to make local leadership more 
efficient, transparent and accountable by establishing small executive cabinets which 
would be responsible for the day to day decision-making of local authorities. The 
concerns about local political leadership were not limited to England. In the early 2000s 
a number of European countries were reforming local political leadership or considering 
it (Borraz and John, 2004) and similar issues have been discussed in this journal in 
relation to South African municipalities (de Vissier, 2010). This paper uses the English 
reforms to explore an important aspect of political systems: the stability of political 
leadership.  
  
 
The research that has been conducted on the effects of the English reforms has focused 
largely on the role of the leaders of councils (for example Greasley and Stoker, 2008; 
Lowndes and Leach, 2004). This is entirely appropriate but it has downplayed the 
importance of the other members of a council’s cabinet (for an exception see Bochel and 
Bochel, 2010). Consequently, we currently know very little about the tenure and turnover 
of cabinet members and certainly less than is known about the leaders of councils (Boyne 
et al. 2010). This is an important issue, cabinet members are expected to become expert 
and lead strategy development in their portfolios and at the same time they are 
accountable for the council’s performance in the areas that they cover. The first of these 
expectations would seem to require some stability of tenure to allow cabinet members to 
gain experience of their portfolios, develop political leadership skills and see projects 
through to completion. However, accountability requires that poor political performance 
should sometime lead to the removal of a cabinet member. The pattern of tenures of 
cabinet members will therefore partly reflect the trade off between political 
accountability and political capacity, however there are a number of other factors that 
may influence the survival of local cabinet members and can thus muddy the issue.  
 
This paper explores cabinet instability in the context of local political cabinets in 
England. It starts with a discussion of the history of political management reform in 
England covering its goals, its implementation and the debates over some of its 
consequences. The next section then discusses the literature that has developed recently 
on cabinet and portfolio holder stability at the national level. The final section of the 
                                                 
1  The collection of the data used in this paper was funded by the ESRC, RES-061-25-0244. 
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paper presents data on the relationship between political stability, cabinet change and the 
length of tenure of local portfolio-holders drawn from an ESRC research project.  
  
2. Reforming Local Political Management 
Good governance is the goal of reformers in many political systems and institutional 
redesign is often a favoured way of achieving reform. Institutional redesign is appealing 
because in theory it promises a lasting effect and, once completed, no further 
interventions are required. There are reasons to doubt this theory; institutions are much 
more complex than is implied by the reformers' story. Few deny that changing formal 
structures has an effect on organisations but organisations also exist through the beliefs 
and actions of their members, the tacit rules of institutions cannot be precisely 
engineered by legislation and they have the potential to subvert the intentions of 
reformers (March and Olsen 1984; Lowndes, 2005). In short, institutions are path 
dependent, their histories limit their future trajectories and these in turn limit the 
predictability of the effects of reforms (Pierson, 2000). Once it is also recognised that 
contextual factors can strongly influence the way that abstract models operate after they 
are implemented in real organisations, there are then reasons to doubt that the plans of 
reformers will be fully achieved (Lowndes and Leach, 2004).  
 
When it comes to English local democracy, institutional reform has often been the 
weapon of choice for national policymakers. Over the last half century there have been 
institutional re-organisations of various flavours and there is little sign that the pace will 
let up. The current coalition government's Localism Bill 2011 proposes that council 
leaders in the twelve largest English cities outside London will become 'shadow mayors' 
and referendums will be held on whether they should become directly-elected mayors.2
 
 
This represents a continuation of earlier and substantially unsuccessful efforts to 
introduce mayoral governance to English cities. At the same time the 2011 Bill loosens 
the requirement that all the larger councils must operate with a political executive cabinet 
distinct from the council as a whole.  
This paper focuses on the operation of political cabinets introduced by the Local 
Government Act 2000. These new structures were an important element of New Labour's 
modernisation agenda with respect to local government (Bochel and Bochel, 2010). The 
objectives of the 2000 Act were to create visible and effective leadership; to enhance 
                                                 
2  At the time of writing the Bill is being considered by the House of Lords 
<http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-11/localism.html> (accessed 18 July 2011). 
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democratic legitimacy; and to provide checks and balances in the construction of the new 
system (Gains et al. 2009 summarise the findings of an extensive evaluation project). 
These objectives reflected a concern that the operation of local politics in England was 
flawed (Pratchett, 2004) often failing to address issues of community concern or failing 
to ensure the quality of services. The focus on strengthening leadership through 
institutional reforms produced some criticisms, for example that its effects had been 
limited and diverse (Lowndes and Leach, 2004). Away from the English context a 
general note of caution about 'being bitten by the leadership bug' has recently been 
sounded by (Grant et al. 2011, 66) who argued that the focus on leadership may be a 
distraction from the more fundamental problems faced by local government and that 
there may be unintended consequences resulting from changes to models of leadership.  
 
The most radical of the reform options was for a council to have a directly-elected 
mayor. Traditionally, leaders have been selected by councillors from the council body 
but the directly-elected mayors were to be placed in office by the electorate as a whole, 
loosening the role of political parties in leader selection. Once elected, the mayor then 
selects a cabinet drawn from the council. Very few (initially ten) areas opted for a 
directly-elected mayor, with the vast majority of councils selecting a less radical reform 
called the leader-cabinet system (Gains et al. 2005). With this option there were three 
features that marked a formal and significant change from the previous committee 
system. The first feature was the selection of a small group of executive members from 
the main body of the councillors to form a cabinet. These executive cabinets were given 
responsibility for implementing policy across the range of council functions3
                                                 
3  With the exception of regulatory functions such as planning and licensing. 
 within a 
framework adopted by the council as a whole. They were also expected to play a key role 
in developing policy proposals, budget making and prioritisation. Under the previous 
system there was no legal differentiation between ‘executive’ and ‘non-executive’ 
councillors but even before the introduction of executive structures researchers were able 
to identify an increasing distinction between lead and backbench councillors (Elcock 
cited in Bochel and Bochel, 2004, 39). The new system formalised and to an extent 
strengthened that distinction. The second feature was that partisan membership of the 
new cabinets was not required to be proportional to the party seat share on the council as 
a whole. After the reform, where a single party holds a majority on a council the majority 
group can, and usually does, establish a single party executive cabinet. The third feature 
was the potential to give individual cabinet members delegated power to make executive 
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decisions in their areas of responsibility. This strengthening of leadership was 
accompanied by a range of features designed to ensure executive accountability, for 
example scrutiny committees, 'call-in' powers and key decision rules (Leach and Copus, 
2004). 
 
The initial response to the legislation by councils was marked by a small ‘c’ 
conservatism. The leader-cabinet councils were cautious about giving leaders all the 
powers allowed in the legislation (Gains et al. 2005) but as the system settled down more 
councils strengthened the position of their leader (Gains et al. 2009). Formal structure 
was only one influence on the way that cabinets operated and different councils found 
different ways to make their cabinets work. Some cabinets were dominated by the leader, 
others allowed individual portfolio holders greater discretion, others were more 
committed to collectivist decision-making (ELG, 2004; Lowndes and Leach, 2004). The 
story of the implementation of the Act was of continuing diversity of operation within 
the legal framework.  
 
Variety of political context is among the most important of the sources of this diversity. 
The legislation’s model of strong and effective leadership may be vulnerable to the 
operation of the local electoral system and local party systems. On local elections, 
although there is evidence of a performance-vote link (Boyne et al., 2009) it is 
undoubtedly true that in England local elections are second order elections – they are 
often strongly influenced by national factors and if the political control of a council 
changes it may have little to do with the actions of the local parties or the performance of 
local incumbents. On the influence of parties, inter and intra party rivalries may, for 
better or worse, push local political management away from the legislation’s goals. 
Perfectly competent and effective cabinet members may have to leave office for reasons 
that have little to do with their decisions or management.  
 
The legislation allowed for some variety in implementation but it seems clear that the 
Government’s preference was for a ‘strong leadership’ model. This model did not 
necessarily imply leaders monopolising decision-making, but rather their having the tools 
to select and manage their cabinets (Bochel and Bochel, 2010; Greasley and Stoker, 
2008; Greasley and John, 2011). As yet we lack even basic knowledge about how long 
local cabinet members serve and what sorts of factors influence turnover of executive 
politicians. The next section will review recent debates about why tenure of national 
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cabinet members may be important and argues that similar issues are worth pursuing at 
local level.  
 
3. Dynamics of Cabinet Governance 
Where political institutions are designed to produce collectivist decision-making and 
accountability the rate of turnover of individual politicians may not be too important. 
Collective structures may be more robust to changes in personnel because responsibility, 
relevant experience and knowledge is dispersed across a number of individuals. In 
cabinet systems, however, individual politicians play an important role in the policy 
process, they are allocated portfolios and are expected to lead the construction of strategy 
for policy and service development. If there is too much 'churn' in the occupants of 
cabinet positions then the policy process may be damaged (Huber and Martinez-
Gallardo, 2008).  
 
In research on parliamentary democracy a great deal of attention has been given to the 
termination of governments but less so to the length of ministerial careers. Recent 
analysis has however explored the relationship between government termination, cabinet 
turnover and ministerial tenure (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008). The analysis of 
national cabinets has generally approached the question from the assumption that the 
leader decides who serves, which portfolio each holds and when they will be moved or 
removed. These powers can help leaders to manage political difficulties and to deliver 
policy goals (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008). However, there are problems that are 
common to all processes of selection: how can a leader know she is getting the right 
person for a given portfolio? The problem of ministerial talent is that it may not be 
observable in advance of appointment. The leader will try to develop ways of screening 
ministerial candidates and the more successful the leader is at this the less likely it is that 
they will inadvertently appoint a weak minister. A second problem relates to whether a 
leader can monitor and manage the cabinet. Much of what is involved in the ministerial 
job is not easy to monitor, many ministerial actions will involve giving informal 
direction to officials and sending signals to, or making deals, with members of policy 
communities. Ministers will accumulate specialised knowledge and information giving 
them an advantage in negotiations with the leader and this will be a problem if ministers 
have goals that differ from those of the leader, i.e. representing departmental interests at 
the expense of the common interest of the government (Indridason and Kam, 2008).  
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Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2008) demonstrate that in national parliaments the link 
between government termination and the termination of individual ministers’ jobs is 
quite weak. Not all ministers leave office when a government ends and many ministers 
leave office whilst the government remains (2008: 171). Berlinski et al. (2010) in their 
analysis of the impact of performance on ministerial tenure, find support for the claim 
that a minister’s performance relative to the performance of other ministers is important 
for explaining when they leave office. This research starts from the assumption that the 
leader is (formally) empowered to select and remove their cabinet members. Huber and 
Martinez-Gallardo (2008) discuss the constraints that may be imposed on leaders’ 
discretion by the existence of coalition government or other factors but the general 
picture is of cabinet members serving at the invitation of the leader.  
 
From National to Local 
The key question is whether the factors that are relevant for explaining patterns of 
change and stability in national cabinets are relevant to local governments. Just because a 
local authority has a cabinet structure it does not follow that it will display the same 
dynamics as national cabinets. The low profile of local government in England is not 
helpful in identifying the reasons why a cabinet member has left office. It is often not 
easy to uncover whether a ‘resignation’ is really a resignation. However, there have been 
some high profile examples of local cabinet members resigning as a result of failures in 
the service they oversee. The case that made the national media related to the failings in 
child protection in Haringey and the resignation of the relevant portfolio holder (along 
with the leader and the sacking of a member of staff).4 Another example from Milton 
Keynes relates to a failure in a school building project.5 However, there are other reasons 
for cabinet members to leave office, for example to pursue outside interests, or because 
of personality clashes, or, in one case, a reported involvement with gun-running in the 
distant past.6
 
  
Here, I discuss four ways in which national and local politics potentially diverge: the 
motivations of politicians may be different at the different levels; local council leaders 
have a smaller pool of politicians from which to select their cabinets especially if they 
have a small majority; the level of task complexity for local portfolio-holders is lower 
                                                 
4  <http://www.communitycare.co.uk/Articles/2008/12/01/110138/baby-p-haringey-leader-and-childrens-
cabinet-member-resign.htm> 
5  <http://www.miltonkeynes.co.uk/news/local/council_boss_urged_to_resign_1_866019>  
6  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/3543467/Tory-councillor-quits-cabinet-after-
former-membership-of-IRA-disclosed.html>. 
 
GREASLEY: Cabinet Governance and Political Stability 
 
 
CJLG May-November 2011 59 
  
than in national government; and, at local level in England the electoral cycle is fixed 
which breaks the link between an administration collapsing and new elections. One of 
the key assumptions of most analysis of national cabinet politics is that, for whatever 
reason, politicians seek and wish to retain executive office (in their conclusion Berlinski 
et al. 2007 discuss whether this is always the case). Whether or not it is a safe 
assumption at national level when we move to local politics we are studying a group of 
individuals who may have careers to attend to outside local government. There are 
certainly councillors who do not seek cabinet position either because they have a full-
time job, a family or because they wish to enjoy their retirement. Nevertheless, even 
taking into account these factors, the appeal of holding or not holding cabinet position is 
likely to still be related to, for example, how much political conflict there is or how well 
the services for which a cabinet member is responsible are performing. That is to say, 
length of cabinet tenure will have some relation to politics and performance and so can 
still play a role in accountability. 
  
Another significant difference between national and local governments is that the smaller 
size of local councils gives leaders less freedom to shuffle or remove cabinet members 
(although this may also be a problem nationally, Dewan and Myatt, 2010). Local leaders 
have to find their cabinet from a small pool of politicians, the size of which depends on 
the size of the parties in the administration and the willingness of members to take up 
cabinet positions. This scarcity may limit the scope for leaders to use selection and 
removal as tools to manage cabinets.  
 
The third difference is that at national level the size and complexity of government is 
such that it may be difficult for a leader to ‘keep tabs’ on the decisions and performance 
of their cabinet. At the local level this problem is significantly mitigated. Local 
government is less complex than national politics and over the last decade the 
administrative centres of local government have been strengthened by a plethora of 
performance monitoring structures and the increasingly important role of the chief 
executive and corporate directors in the administrative structure. These changes allow 
leaders access to the type of information which may be useful in managing political 
performance. Having said all that, the monitoring problem that leaders face is not trivial. 
Local government in England is large compared to many systems, it is responsible for the 
delivery of a range of complex services and portfolio holders typically do have ‘their 
own’ officials who provide them with information and support.  
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Finally, a fourth structural difference between local and national is the relationship 
between the collapse of political administrations and the timing of elections. Elections in 
local authorities operate on a fixed timetable, there is no scope for local leaders to call an 
election, so if the cabinet loses the confidence of the council then a new administration 
has to be formed from the existing body of politicians. The electoral system of English 
local government adds a further complication because in a large proportion of councils 
the elections occur ‘by thirds’. In these authorities, the council as a whole never stands 
for election7
 
 instead a third of council seats are up for election in a given year, with one 
year out of four left ‘fallow’ when no election occurs. The implications of this are that 
the balance of the council can change more frequently where elections occur by thirds 
compared with where all out elections are held, and different politicians within a cabinet 
will be due for re-election at different times.  
In summary, a fundamental concern with the application of the research on ministerial 
careers to local cabinets is that the nature of local politics is simply different, perhaps 
less competitive, or less calculating or less ideological than national politics. The 
approach of this paper is to assume that local cabinets are political institutions like other 
political institutions and are subject to fundamentally similar pressures. There is some 
evidence that indirectly supports this position. Bochel and Bochel’s (2010: 733-4) paper 
discusses the way that council leaders in a variety of authorities think about the process 
of selecting cabinet members and allocating portfolios. Leaders are well aware of the 
importance of these powers but as Bochel and Bochel point out in the context of multi-
party coalition the leader's discretion is constrained with respect to cabinet selection and 
portfolio allocation. Greasley and John (2011) presents some evidence that where leaders 
have powers related to the management of cabinets (selection and portfolio allocation) 
the relative performance of their council as judged by citizens is improved. This finding 
is consistent with, although hardly proof of, the proposition that selection, management 
and removal of executive members plays an important role in achieving political 
accountability. However, there is remarkably little direct evidence on the careers of local 
cabinet members. The next section provides an initial exploration of cabinet stability. It 
starts with an overview of urban councils in England, exploring the relationship between 
elections, leader change and cabinet stability over a five year period. The paper then 
focuses on the experience of the London Boroughs over a single election cycle.  
 
                                                 
7  With the exception of immediately after a periodic electoral review and a redrawing of boundaries.  
 
GREASLEY: Cabinet Governance and Political Stability 
 
 
CJLG May-November 2011 61 
  
4. Cabinet Stability: An Initial Exploration  
This section explores how frequently politicians leave local political cabinets. The aim is 
to present an overview of the level of stability in local executive political leadership and 
to start to understand how much of it is driven by factors such as electoral change. If 
cabinet membership only really changes with elections or change in political control then 
that would be strong evidence that leaders are not using their powers to remove poor 
performing portfolio holders. In that case, researchers would need only to understand the 
aggregate measures of political instability: electoral change and change in administration. 
This section shows that while these aggregate factors exercise an important influence on 
executive member turnover they are by no means the whole story.  
 
The advantages of studying local governments are that there are multiple cases to analyse 
and that many factors are held constant. The downside is that the required information 
may not be available and where it is available it is often dispersed and requires 
significant work bringing it together. The data for this paper was taken from the official 
papers of local councils accessed via their websites. For each council year (normally 
running from May to April) the names of cabinet members and the leader at the start of 
the year were recorded. In many cases these names were reported in the minutes of the 
Annual Meeting of the council, failing that a second source of cabinet membership is the 
agenda of cabinet meetings which often lists the names of cabinet members. If the names 
of cabinet members could not be found using either of those methods the membership of 
a cabinet was constructed using the minutes of cabinet meetings. Where this final source 
was used, names from the minutes of the first meeting of the council year (typically in 
May) were checked against the minutes of at least the two subsequent cabinet meetings.  
 
The data relates to the English urban local authorities namely the metropolitan boroughs, 
the London boroughs and the unitary authorities.8
                                                 
8  It does not include the ‘re-organised’ unitary authorities that came into being in 2009.  
 It includes information on 114 
councils and cabinet memberships from 2004/05 to 2009/10. The primary unit of analysis 
in the data is the ‘council-year’. In this paper I am interested in stability and change, 
consequently the first year of observations for any council drops out - nothing can be said 
about the change in cabinet in 2004/05 because the information on cabinet membership 
in 2003/04 is not included in the data. The focus is on members leaving the cabinet (from 
this point forward referred to as ‘leavers’), hence the measure of change for ‘council A in 
year 2’ is the number of politicians’ names in a cabinet at the start of ‘year 1’ that do not 
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feature in the cabinet at the start of ‘year 2’. So, for example, if the 2006/07 cabinet of 
Barking and Dagenham is missing 2 names that were in the 2005/06 cabinet, then for the 
council-year ‘Barking and Dagenham 2006/07’ the value of ‘leavers’ would be 2. For 
some councils, there are gaps in data in the earlier years of the time period, in total there 
are 511 ‘council-year’ observations in the dataset for which the change data discussed in 
this section is available.  
 
On average 1.88 members left a local cabinet in a council-year, the median number of 
leavers in a council-year was 1 and in just under 31 per cent of the council-years there 
were no leavers. The maximum number of changes that can occur is 10 (the maximum 
size of a cabinet) but some cabinets have fewer than 10 members, to account for this 
variation in cabinet size the percentage of a previous year’s cabinet members that had left 
by the subsequent year was calculated.9
 
 On average just under 21 per cent of members 
were leavers in any given council-year (see Table 1 for a summary). This average is 
inflated by the cases where a council as a whole changes political hands but not as much 
as might be expected. This is because, firstly there are not that many examples of change 
of political control in the data (45 cases) and secondly, changes in political control 
frequently involve a move from ‘no overall control’ to a single party majority (or vice 
versa), in such cases it is not unusual for some of the sitting cabinet members to survive 
in office. Considering only those instances where there had been no change in the 
political control (466 cases) an average of 17 per cent of previous year’s cabinet 
members were leavers, but where there had been a political change an average of 58 per 
cent were leavers. 
The direct effect of electoral factors can be removed from the analysis by looking only at 
those cabinet-years where no election was held. There were 302 observations where there 
was no election, and on average in these cases 13 per cent of cabinet members left office 
(compared to 31 per cent where there was an election). There were also still a few 
examples where the whole of a cabinet left office even when there had not been an 
election, these cases are likely to represent the collapse of multi-party coalitions or 
minority administrations and their replacement by rivals from other parties.  
  
In one of the high profile examples of local cabinet resignation discussed earlier, both a 
cabinet member and the leader resigned. In this data the leader changed in 93 of the 
                                                 
9  Percentages are also problematic here, because the denominator is so small they are very sensitive to small 
changes. 
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council-years (approximately 18 per cent), and this was quite strongly correlated with the 
percentage of cabinet leavers in a council year (Kendall’s tau b= .36; p=.000). In cases of 
change in political control we would expect the cabinet and its leader to go down 
together although the relationship is more complicated in transitions from or to no overall 
control. Looking only at those cases where there had been no change in political control, 
although the correlation is not as strong, there is still evidence of a moderate relationship 
between change in leader and percentage of cabinet leavers (Kendall’s tau b =. 25; 
p.=.000)10
 
.  
Table 1. Average percentage of cabinet leavers per council-year, by political context  
 
 Average % 
leavers  
Overall 21% 
Change political control 
No change 
58% 
17% 
Election year 
No election year 
31% 
13% 
Leader change 
No leader change 
48% 
12% 
 
This initial look at cabinet member tenure demonstrates that political change, election 
years and leader change are quite strongly associated with an increase in the average 
proportion of leavers. Having said that, there does also seem to be a certain amount of 
change that is not associated with those factors. As Figure 1 shows, the number of 
leavers per council-year does tend to be lower when there is no election and the 
distribution for non-election years is more skew, with a large minority of cabinets losing 
no members (left panel). However, there remains a fairly substantial level of change in 
evidence.  
 
It is difficult however to understand from this analysis the substantive importance of this 
instability for councils. For example, the changes that do occur may have been 
concentrated in a few councils which had considerably greater instability than others or 
they may have been spread evenly across councils with many experiencing a relatively 
low level of change. The next subsection looks at this question by focusing only on the 
London Boroughs over a single electoral cycle. 
                                                 
10  There is little change if the no overall control councils are also taken out. 
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Figure 1. Number of cabinet-leavers, election year compared to no election year  
 
Cabinet stability in London  
There are thirty-two London Boroughs that govern the capital along with the Mayor of 
London and the Greater London Authority. On average they serve populations of just 
over 235,000 people, ranging from the smallest (Kingston-upon-Thames) at 160,000 to 
the largest (Croydon) at nearly 337,000. London Boroughs share the same election 
timetable and they have all-out elections every four years so there is an extended period 
of operation without an election looming. This makes them a useful setting to look at 
variation in cabinet stability across time. The data in this subsection starts with the 
elections of May 2006, and then measures changes in cabinet membership until the start 
of the final year in the electoral cycle in May 2009. This means that there is information 
on three rounds of possible changes (2006/07 – 2007/08; 2007/08 - 2008/09; 2008/09 – 
2009/10). As before, if a politician who was in the cabinet at the start of the 2006/07 year 
was absent from the cabinet at the start of 2007/08 then this is coded as the end of their 
tenure. 
 
Figure 2 shows how many leavers there were per council over the whole electoral cycle. 
Only four London Boroughs went through to the start of the final year without a cabinet 
member leaving: Hillingdon, Lewisham, Newham and Sutton. Figure 2 does suggest that 
the distribution of leavers across councils was not even and that cabinet instability in 
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London over this period was concentrated in a small number of authorities. The highest 
score was eleven in Tower Hamlets, with Redbridge and Southwark also experiencing a 
relatively large number of leavers. One implication of this is that, for these councils at 
least, it seems unlikely that the end of cabinet careers can be satisfactorily explained by 
personal or idiosyncratic factors, it looks as if there were certain councils that 
experienced greater instability for whatever reason. Looking at the most unstable – 
Tower Hamlets, Redbridge, Southwark – Southwark had no single party in overall 
control, Tower Hamlets had a Labour majority and Redbridge had a Conservative 
majority. Political conflict may be important in these councils, but if it was it was 
occurring within as well as between parties. A second feature to note is that the three 
mayoral authorities in London are all clustered towards the left of the figure, they had 
relatively stable cabinets and this may reflect the strength of position of the mayors in 
selecting their executive members.11
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Figure 2: Number of ‘cabinet-member terminations’ (including leaders) 2006/07 – 
2009/10, London Boroughs12
 
  
                                                 
11  This does not generalise to all mayoral authorities in England, some of which have experienced 
considerable instability. 
12  A key to council labels can be found in the appendix at the end of the paper. 
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The first part of this section showed that there were non-trivial levels of cabinet 
instability in English city councils even when looking only at council-years which did 
not experience elections or political change. Although the instability of cabinet 
membership is related to political change, elections and leader change it is also in part 
independent of these factors. The second part of this section showed that in London 
Boroughs between elections the level of instability was not evenly spread, a small group 
of councils experienced greater churn suggesting that there may be council level 
variables explaining stability and instability in local cabinets. As yet there is little that 
can be said about what may be causing instability and what the consequences of it are. 
This is an important priority for future research.  
  
5. Conclusions 
Stability of leadership can be crucial for the effective operation of democracy but 
whether it is good or bad will depend on contextual factors. If government is performing 
well then excessive churn in leadership positions may damage policy making. It may 
make strategic decision making difficult and it will give leaders the incentive to pay 
attention to the short term rather than the long term. On the other hand, where cabinet 
members hold long tenures this may indicate unresponsiveness and a lack of 
accountability in the political system. If the performance or policy making in a policy 
area is poor then changing the politician with direct responsibility for the area is one of 
the possible responses. The difficulty for democracies is that it is often really difficult to 
distinguish between these two conditions because sometimes organisational performance 
may have to dip before it can improve. For example, responsible politicians with an eye 
on the long term performance of a government may have to take unpopular decisions in 
the short term, but is it possible to distinguish them from politicians who are unpopular 
because they are bad at their jobs? The tenure of cabinet members reflects how this 
balance is being struck. The role of local portfolio holders was arguably very important 
to the success or failure of the institutional reforms under the Local Government Act 
2000 but it has received limited research attention. The analysis here explores an aspect 
of the variation in the context in which these portfolio holders have had to operate. Some 
cabinets are populated by members who can be confident that they will be in post for 
some time in other cabinets the future of its members is less secure.  
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Barking and Dagenham BD Kensington and Chelsea KC 
Barnet Bar Kingston upon Thames KT 
Bexley Bx Lambeth Lam 
Brent Brnt Lewisham Lew 
Bromley Brm Merton Mer 
Camden Cam Newham New 
Croydon Cry Redbridge Red 
Ealing Eal Richmond-upon-Thames RT 
Enfield Enf Southwark Sthw 
Greenwich Grn Sutton Sttn 
Hackney Hk Tower Hamlets TH 
Hammersmith and Fulham HF Waltham Forest WF 
Haringey Hary Wandsworth Wands 
Harrow Harr Westminster Wstmr 
Havering Hav   
Hillingdon Hill   
Hounslow Houn   
Islington Isl   
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Abstract 
Whilst many countries have been devolving power to the sub-national level England has 
moved in the opposite direction.  For the last decade English local government has been 
subjected to tight top down performance monitoring and financial controls.  The 
evidence suggests that these policies have helped to encourage significant improvements 
in performance.  However critics argue that they have been costly to implement and have 
undermined local democratic accountability. In response to these concerns the current 
government has promised to sweep away external assessment in favour of self-regulation 
by councils and in-depth scrutiny by citizens. This ‘new localism’ poses important 
questions for both policy makers and researchers. In particular how far will the 
promised reforms actually go and what impacts will they have on the service standards? 
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Introduction  
Successive governments in the UK have exerted tight control over local authority 
services and spending. Leading local government figures and commentators railed 
against what they see as the erosion of local autonomy but proved powerless to stem the 
rising tide of centralisation. Opposition parties frequently pledged to hand powers back 
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to local government only to renege on their promises once in office. All this changed 
however in the summer of 2010 when ministers in a newly elected coalition government 
moved swiftly to begin the process of dismantling the top down performance frameworks 
they had inherited from their predecessors (Grace 2010).  
 
This paper examines the impacts of the performance monitoring of English local 
authorities by central government between 1997 and 2010 and assesses the prospects for 
the very different policies that are now being pursued. It draws on an analysis of 
performance data undertaken as part of a major programme of longitudinal evaluation of 
the previous government’s policies plus an examination the key policy statements and 
legislation issued by the current government. The first section charts the loss of local 
autonomy under both Conservative and Labour administrations over the last thirty years. 
The second section examines the impacts that these policies had on local services. The 
paper then turns to the current government’s proposals. It argues that they could mark a 
decisive break with the experiences of the last thirty years but there are a number of 
problems and potential pitfalls which pose important questions for future research.  
 
The Rise of Centralism 
The hollowing out of the local state under the Thatcher and Major governments which 
held power in the UK between 1979 and 1997 has been well documented. Their policies 
were inspired by the ‘New Right’ which saw public sector bureaucracies as inefficient 
and unresponsive compared to the private sector. Compulsory competitive tendering 
(CCT) led to the externalisation of swathes of local government services to the private 
sector (Rao and Young 1995; Walsh et al. 1997; Boyne 1998; Choi 1999; Vincent-Jones 
1999). Other traditional local government functions were transferred to local appointed 
bodies controlled by unelected boards comprising local politicians, business people and 
community representatives. Council house tenants were given the right to buy their 
homes at reduced rates and remaining stocks were transferred to arm’s length companies. 
Schools were encouraged to opt out of local authority control.  
 
Local government spending was tightly controlled and its performance increasingly 
monitored by the centre. Ministers dictated how much funding local authorities received 
by capping ‘excessive’ council tax increases and ring fencing grants for use by specific 
services (Fender and Watt 2002). Meanwhile the Audit Commission was created in 1983 
to check that local councils were achieving economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
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(McSweeney 1988).  A decade later it was given responsibility for designing and 
auditing statutory performance indicators which councils had to use so that their 
performance could be compared over time and between areas (Humphrey 2002).  
 
There was fierce local opposition from public sector trades unions to what they regarded 
as an assault on their members’ pay and conditions, and many Labour controlled 
authorities sought to find ways around CCT legislation. But the lack of local fiscal 
autonomy (around 80 percent of local authority expenditure in the UK is met from 
central government grants) and the absence of any constitutional guarantees of local 
government’s roles or even its continued existence meant that ministers were able to 
abolish the largest authorities which were the most vocal critics of government policies. 
 
In some respects the ‘New Labour’ Government led by Prime Minister Blair picked up 
where the New Right had left off. But there were important differences. The 
Conservatives’ strategy had been to divest the state of responsibility for service delivery 
through privatisation. By contrast Labour promised to invest in local government so long 
as it signed up to a programme of modernisation. Blair and his advisers were reluctant ‘to 
trust their party colleagues in local government with money or functions, or even with 
the unchaperoned exercise of common party purposes’ (Walker 1998, p.4). They feared 
that the actions of what the popular press had labelled ‘Loony Left’ councils would prove 
a political liability, threatening Labour’s prospects of winning a second term in office. 
The 1998 Local Government White Paper therefore made it clear that in the 
Government’s view ‘The old culture of paternalism and inwardness’ had to ‘be swept 
away’ and local authorities were expected to embrace ‘a demanding agenda for change’ 
(Cmnd 4014). Ministers pledged to abolish CCT and ‘crude and universal capping’ of 
local authority budgets (Cmnd 4014, para 5.7). However in a speech to a conference of 
Labour local council leaders, the Prime Minister warned ‘If you are unwilling or unable 
to work to the modern agenda then the government will have to look to other partners to 
take on your role’ (Blair 1998). According to his advisers local government was 
‘drinking in the last chance saloon’.  
 
In 1999 responsibility for overseeing most aspects of local government policy in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland was devolved to newly created administrations. 
Ministers in these countries adopted a more consensual approach to their dealings with 
local authorities. There were few hypothecated grants and little enthusiasm for 
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contracting out services or top down performance monitoring (Downe et al. 2010). By 
contrast English councils became subject to an unprecedented level of external inspection 
and financial control from the centre (Lowndes 2002). Over the following decade they 
received large year-on-year increases in the level of central government grants to local 
authorities. But ministers retained powers to limit council tax rises in order to guard 
against what they regarded as excessive increases and they tightened controls on how 
councils spent the funding which they were given by increasing the number of ‘ring 
fenced’ grants, particularly in education which accounts for almost 40% of local 
authority spending (Travers 2004).  By 2010 more than two thirds of central government 
funding to English local authorities was ear marked by ministers for specific purposes; 
just 31% was given to them as a block grant (HM Treasury 2010).  
 
Labour ministers were also keen to see the private sector play an increased role in the 
provision of local public services. In their view the problem with CCT was that the way 
in which it had been implemented had ‘led to unimaginative tendering, and often 
frustrated rather than enhanced real competition’ (Cmnd 4014, para 7.22). On average 
contracts advertised between 1989 and 1992 attracted fewer than one external bid (Walsh 
and Davis 1993), and even after more than a decade of CCT internal providers were still 
winning well over half of all tenders and almost three quarters of the estimated £2.4 
billion worth of business covered by the legislation (LGMB 1997). The top-down 
imposition of market testing had, the Labour Government argued, poisoned relationships 
between public and private sectors, and the emphasis on economy had led to a decline in 
service quality as in-house and external bidders alike were forced to pare tenders to the 
bone in order to secure contracts (Walsh et al. 1997; Coulson 1998).  
 
For all these reasons CCT was replaced with a new duty of ‘Best Value’ which, far from 
doing away with externalisation, was designed to ‘create the conditions under which 
there is likely to be greater interest from the private and voluntary sectors in working 
with local government to deliver quality services at a competitive price’ (Cmnd 4014, 
clause 7.30). Section 4 of the 1999 Local Government Act required authorities to put in 
place arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the discharge of all of their 
functions. To comply with this new duty they had to submit services to a series of ‘tests 
of competitiveness’. If ‘other more efficient and effective means’ were found to be 
available services had to be outsourced (DETR, 1998 p. 20). To ensure that authorities 
complied with this new duty ministers introduced a performance management framework 
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which required every council to conduct fundamental reviews of all of its functions over 
a five year period (Ball et al. 2002) and publish annual plans setting out details of current 
performance and targets for future improvements.  
 
For the first time all local services were now subject to external inspection and the 
Secretary of State was given powers to intervene directly where authorities failed to 
conduct sufficiently robust reviews or there was thought to be a risk of serious or 
persistent underperformance (DETR 1999). To monitor improvements the Government 
devised more than 200 Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs) covering frontline 
and corporate services which came with 287 pages of guidance designed to ensure that 
data collected by councils were comparable (Boyne 2002). 
 
Within a year this highly bureaucratic regime had run into serious difficulties. Most 
authorities undertook a far larger number of much more narrowly focused reviews than 
the Government and the Audit Commission had anticipated. As a result it was impossible 
for inspectors to scrutinise them all. More importantly, senior officials had come to the 
view that inspecting services in isolation was unlikely to get to grips with the root causes 
of underperformance. The experience of early interventions in so called failing councils 
pointed to underlying problems in their corporate systems. The Audit Commission 
concluded that ‘serious and sustained service failure is also a failure of corporate 
leadership’ (Audit Commission, 2002: 19). Inspecting services in isolation was therefore 
of limited value because ‘Without clear corporate leadership for change it becomes a 
very negative task based process’ (Audit Commission, 2001: 14).  
 
As a result from 2002 onwards the Government introduced a new framework known as 
Comprehensive Performance Assessments (CPAs). These judged the overall 
performance of each council and categorised them on a five point scale - ‘poor’, ‘weak’, 
‘fair’, ‘good’ or ‘excellent’. Services were divided into seven main ‘blocks’ 
(environment, housing, culture, fire and rescue, services to children, social care and 
benefits administration) in the case of upper tier and unitary authorities, and four 
(housing, environment, culture and benefits administration) in the case of district 
councils. Scores for each of these groupings were weighted according to their importance 
to national government and then aggregated to give an overall ‘performance’ score. This 
was then combined with an assessment of the council’s ‘corporate capacity’ to provide 
an overall rating. The results for the 150 single tier and county councils in England were 
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published annually. Those for district councils and fire and rescue authorities were 
published less often. Authorities that were placed in the bottom two categories were 
subject to external intervention and support which often resulted in the removal of senior 
managers and in some cases political leaders.  
 
Over time the CPA methodology was refined to provide what the Audit Commission 
called a ‘harder test’. Assessments of the main service blocks remained largely 
unchanged, but the five point scale was replaced by a four point star rating system 
ranging from ‘no star’ to ‘three stars’. Meanwhile the criteria for assessing corporate 
capacity were broadened to include the quality of an authority’s partnerships with other 
local agencies, its effectiveness as a community leader and the way in which it managed 
resources (Downe 2008). In April 2009 CPAs were superseded by Comprehensive Area 
Assessments (CAAs) which assessed all of the key public services in a locality (Audit 
Commission 2011). CAAs were intended to provide an independent and ‘joined up’ 
assessment of the quality of life in each locality. There were two main elements. An Area 
Assessment focused on priorities set out in local area agreements which had been agreed 
with central government departments. The police, health service, local authority and fire 
and rescue services were also subject to Organisational Assessments which evaluated 
their own management and performance. Unlike CPAs, area and organisational 
assessments did not involve primary data collection. They relied on existing inspection 
reports, external audits and a slightly reduced set of 190 statutory performance 
indicators.  
 
The rationale for the introduction of CAAs was twofold. First, they were supposed to 
enable the seven different local inspectorates (the Audit Commission, Commission for 
Social Care Inspection; Healthcare Commission; HM Inspectorate of Constabulary; HM 
Inspectorate of Prisons; HM Inspectorate of Probation; and the Office for Standards in 
Education, Children's Services and Skills) to coordinate their activities and therefore 
reduce the burden of inspection on local agencies. Second, they were designed to 
encourage local service providers to work together to tackle deep seated economic and 
social issues (such as economic regeneration; care for older people; the number of young 
people not in education, employment or training; shortages of affordable housing; 
environmental sustainability; crime; violent extremism; and ill health) which were not 
the sole preserve of any of them but required concerted action by a range of different 
sectors.  
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The Impacts of Centralism 
Many observers were fiercely critical of what they saw as the Labour Government’s 
unwarranted interference in local affairs. Stewart (2003: 253) complained of ‘over-
prescription; over-inspection and over-regulation’. Wilson (2003) accused ministers of 
‘control freakery gone mad’. Davies castigated them for ‘double dealing’ – talking up 
devolution whilst doing the opposite. Top-down performance frameworks had, he 
claimed, led to an ‘intensification of managerialism at the expense of local democracy’ 
(Davies 2008: 4). As a result councillors had become ‘little more than elected managers, 
rather than local politicians able to articulate and act upon the wishes of the citizenry’ 
(Copus 2006: 5).   
 
According to its detractors, New Labour’s approach was wrong both in principle and 
practice. For them local government was closest to and therefore best placed to 
understand the needs of local communities. The imposition of external inspection 
betrayed a lack of trust in local councillors and was an insult to their local democratic 
mandate. External performance regimes were said to foster a compliance mentality 
which stifled innovation (van Thiel and Leeuw 2002: 270). Accountability was 
channelled upwards to ministers, robbing councils of the flexibility they need to be 
responsive to local priorities. Inspection was also costly. According to government 
figures, by 2005 the direct costs of the local government inspectorates in England 
amounted to £97 million per annum (ODPM/HM Treasury 2005), and research found 
that councils devoted an average of 597 staff days per annum to preparing for and 
managing inspection site visits (Downe and Martin 2007). The time taken up by this 
‘paperwork’ could, it was argued, have been better spent on the core task of managing 
‘frontline services’ (Hood and Peters 2004: 278). Some scholars also questioned the 
rigour of the performance assessment methodologies. Andrews (2004) criticised CPAs 
for failing to take account of the impact of deprivation on performance. Jacobs and 
Goddard (2007) and Cutler and Waine (2003) argued that star rating systems were 
misleading because they mask the complex and multi-faceted nature of performance and 
aggregate scores were determined largely by the weightings that were used. Maclean et 
al. (2007) showed CPA judgements to be a poor predictor of future performance.  
 
However, there is evidence that the combination of large increases in spending and top 
down performance management regimes was associated with significant performance 
improvement. Analysis of Best Value Performance Indicators showed that whilst there 
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were variations between services, most registered significant improvement and some 
(notably waste management and culture services) achieved spectacular gains (Martin 
2009a). These data need to be treated with some caution because the number of 
indicators per service is small and there were differences in the rate of change registered 
by different indicators within some services. For example two of the three indicators of 
performance in children’s social services declined slightly whilst the third increased by 
almost 100 percent. However, other sources confirm the picture of overall improvement. 
Over time CPA scores increased in nearly all services. Between 2002 and 2008 almost 
three quarters (72 percent) of authorities moved up one or more categories in terms of 
their overall performance. The proportion ranked in the top group rose from 15 to 42 
percent, whilst the numbers in the lowest two groups decreased from 23 percent to 3 
percent (Audit Commission, 2009). By 2006 almost all of the 150 unitary and upper tier 
authorities in England were judged by the Audit Commission to be improving (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Improvement judgements by the Audit Commission  
 % of authorities 
 
Not improving 
adequately 
Improving  
adequately 
Improving  
well 
Improving  
strongly 
Under  
review 
London Boroughs 0 3 72 18 6 
County councils 0 15 59 6 21 
Metropolitan boroughs 0 28 56 6 11 
Unitary authorities 2 28 55 4 5 
 
A third source of evidence about local government performance was provided by 
household surveys undertaken in 2000/2001, 2003/04 and 2006/07. Each council was 
required to achieve a minimum sample size of 1,100 residents which produced a national 
sample of over 562,000 respondents.  Results were then weighted by age, gender and 
ethnicity. Analysis of these data showed that between 2003/04 and 2006/07 there were 
increases in public satisfaction with all of the services covered by the survey except for 
household waste collection, theatres and concert halls, and museums and galleries (Table 
2).  The three services in which satisfaction went down might be considered special 
cases. Perceptions of waste collection were adversely affected by a move from weekly to 
fortnightly services in response to European Union targets designed to reduce the volume 
of landfill. Theatres, concert halls, museums and galleries are all discretionary services 
which many councils do not offer. 
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Table 2.  Percentage change in public satisfaction 2003/04-2006/07 
 District councils 
County 
 councils 
Unitary  
authorities 
Metropolitan 
boroughs 
London 
Boroughs 
Museums and 
galleries -2 -2 -1 0 -1 
Waste collection -7 N/A -6 -3 +4 
Theatres and 
concert halls -8 -3 -3 -3 -1 
Parks and spaces +1 +3 0 +1 +4 
Sport and leisure +5 +4 +1 +1 +4 
Public transport 
information N/A +3 +2 +4 +9 
Tips N/A +1 +3 +4 +10 
Libraries +5 +5 +4 +4 +6 
Recycling +1 N/A +3 +4 +10 
Local buses N/A +6 +5 +4 +11 
Cleanliness +6 N/A +7 +7 +13 
 
Research on the reasons for these performance improvements suggests that external 
inspection was an important stimulus for change. Local government managers and 
national policy makers reported that CPAs had been a particularly effective driver of 
change (Downe and Martin 2006).  Similarly, although local authorities, police and 
health bodies were critical of the burdens which CAA placed on them, most believed that 
it had encouraged better joint working and focused attention on important public service 
outcomes (Hayden et al. 2010). Comparisons with Wales and Scotland, which eschewed 
the kinds of hard edged performance frameworks adopted in England, paint a similar 
picture. They suggest that local government performance has not improved as rapidly in 
these countries (Martin et al. 2010; Andrews and Martin 2010), a finding which is 
consistent with research in the health services which also shows that top down targets in 
England led to more rapid improvements than was achieved in other parts of the UK 
(Bevan and Hood 2006). 
 
The Prospects for ‘Localism’ 
Given the evidence of performance improvement under New Labour it is perhaps 
surprising that in the run up to the 2010 General Election all three main political parties 
promised to shift power away from central government and back to localities. In truth 
Labour ministers had already started to pull back from top down performance 
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management and to emphasise the importance of engaging with local communities 
(DCLG 2008). They argued the improvements that had taken place meant that some 
controls could now be relaxed. The former head of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit 
suggested that inspection became less necessary and less productive as public services 
moved performance levels which he described as ‘awful to adequate’ (Barber 2007). 
More importantly local government faced tough new challenges.  Spending cuts meant 
that they were going to have to transform the way they delivered services in order to 
make huge efficiency savings (Davis and Martin 2008).  Meanwhile the main opposition 
parties saw top-down performance assessments as emblematic of all that was wrong with 
the approach to public services reform pursued by Prime Minister Blair and his 
Chancellor (and successor) Gordon Brown. The Liberal Democrats were long standing 
champions of decentralisation, whilst Conservative shadow ministers pledged to wage 
war on ‘Labour’s culture of control’. They would, they said, take power away from the 
bureaucrats (including inspectors) in order to ‘make local councils accountable to local 
people’ and give them ‘the freedom to respond to the demands made by those local 
people’ (Conservative Party 2009). 
 
The early indications were that the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government 
which came to power in 2010 intended to act on these promises. One of the first acts of 
the new Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government was to instruct the 
inspectorates to stop all work on the next round of CAAs. Then within three months - 
without any prior warning or consultation - he announced the abolition of Audit 
Commission, accusing it of having ‘lost its way’. Responsibility for external auditing of 
local authority accounts is to be transferred to the commercial sector with accounting 
standards overseen by the National Audit Office.  Standards for England, a body created 
by Labour to oversee a framework designed to ensure that local politicians maintain good 
standards of conduct, was also abolished. The Department of Health subsequently 
announced an end to annual performance assessments of councils by the Care Quality 
Commission and the schools inspectorate began to phase out its annual assessments of 
children’s services.  The Government explained that its actions were intended: 
 
to free up local authorities to enable them to be innovative in the delivery of 
services, rather than merely seeking to raise performance against centrally 
established criteria to achieve good inspection results. Local authorities will have 
the freedom to deliver services in ways that meet local needs, and will be 
accountable for those services to their electorates. These principles are key 
elements of localism (DCLG 2011: para 22).  
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Government departments will continue to have a role in specifying and aggregating 
information which is ‘of national importance’ or required to ensure accountability to 
Parliament. But ‘the principal aim is to reduce the burden of data collection on local 
government’ (DCLG 2011: para 25).  
 
In line with these proposals, the budget of the Department of Communities and Local 
Government has been cut by about a third, diminishing its capacity to monitor local 
government and the Government’s regional offices, which played a key role in 
performance management of local government under Labour, have been closed. 
According to ministers, the emphasis will now be on providing citizens with the 
information that they need to hold councils to account and it will be up to local 
authorities to decide what data to release and how to make them available. A ‘Localism 
Bill’ introduced in Parliament in December 2010 (House of Commons 2010) proposed a 
number of changes which apparently give councils more autonomy. They will be granted 
a general power of competence and can choose revert to the traditional committee system 
that was abolished by Labour. However, other changes will be imposed on local 
authorities. Twelve of the largest English cities will be forced to install directly elected 
mayors and all councils will be required to publish details of their senior staff pay. The 
Localism Bill therefore sends out mixed messages which can be read in at least four 
different ways.  
 
One interpretation it is a sham. Critics have been quick to point out that ministers retain 
the powers which their predecessors took to intervene in authorities. The Society of 
Local Authority Chief Executives complained that the bill has a distinctly ‘Orwellian 
quality’. It asked ‘how on earth can we maintain the fiction that this is a Localism Bill 
when it has 142 new regulatory powers for the Secretary of State?’ and concludes that 
‘This is centralist, not localist, and does nothing in pursuit of the government's desire to 
usher in a “post-bureaucratic age”’ (SOLACE 2011).  
 
A second interpretation is that the Bill is a genuine attempt by the Department of 
Communities and Local Government (which has been responsible for drafting the 
legislation) to devolve power but that other departments are less committed to this 
agenda.  In particular it remains to be seen whether the Departments for Education and 
Health, which oversee the largest spending local authority services, will follow its lead. 
Some commentators see the absence of any fundamental change in local authority 
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funding as the ‘acid test’. There has been a reduction in the amount of ring fencing, but 
ministers will continue to determine how much funding is available to each council. 
There are proposals to localise control over non-domestic rates but even if this does 
eventually happen English local authorities will still not have the same degree of fiscal 
autonomy enjoyed by their counterparts in many other parts of the world. 
 
A third interpretation is that ministers are serious about devolving power but not to local 
authorities. According to this view the government wants to hand control to local 
communities than to local councillors. The aim would be to empower citizens in line 
with the Prime Minister’s vision of creating a ‘Big Society’ where people take more 
responsibility for their own well being and the state does and spends less (Cabinet Office 
2011). This would mean that local groups take over the running of services from local 
authorities and play a more active part in local decision making. Whilst the Local 
Government Association (the main representative body of local authorities in England) 
has repeatedly argued that councils should regulate their own performance (De Groot 
2006; IDeA 2009; LGA 2011), the Secretary of State has emphasised the importance of 
enabling local people to keep local authorities in check, even though evidence from 
household surveys suggests that few citizens have any real appetite for doing so (Martin 
2009b).  As a senior civil servant explained it to me, ‘We’re looking to leap frog over 
local government and empower local people’. 
 
Fourth, it could be argued that the ‘new localism’ is being used by ministers as a cloak 
for spending cuts.  Between 2011 and 2014 local authorities will be asked to reduce their 
spending by around a quarter. With much of the pain being ‘front end loaded’, councils 
are being forced to shed staff and reduce services and in this context localism might be 
seen as a way for ministers to put some distance in the voters’ minds between themselves 
and reductions in local services. Whereas the Blair/Brown governments handed local 
authorities additional funding in the expectation of significant improvements in 
performance, Prime Minister Cameron is offering local government freedom from central 
controls in return for doing the dirty work of cutting services. 
 
The eventual scope and significance of the coalition government’s localist agenda is 
difficult to predict. However whatever course it takes, two things are clear. First, English 
local authorities face a different and difficult future and a range of new challenges. 
Second, the sharp break with the central government policies of the past presents new 
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opportunities for scholars, opening up an intriguing research agenda on the impacts of 
the ‘hands off’ approach promised by the current crop of ministers. 
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Abstract 
Local Economic Development (LED) is a contested concept in southern Africa, and has 
become synonymous with delivery of generic job-creation projects, often grant-dependent 
and unsustainable. Municipal LED has followed this pattern in South Africa since 1994, with 
little lasting success. Each local economy is unique, and has its own problems and 
opportunities. The ’Plugging the Leaks’2
 
 method recognizes that communities themselves 
know best how money enters and exits their area. By asking people to analyse their local 
economy as a 'leaky bucket', the method puts control back in the hands of local people, 
rather than external experts, and allows them to analyse their own local economy to identify 
gaps and opportunities for enterprise. By better networking and working collectively to 
improve their local economy, local communities are able to re-circulate cash internally. This 
circulation of cash is explained as the local multiplier effect in the workshops. 
                                                          
1  Funded by the European Union and the Swedish International Development Agency 
2  As developed by the New Economics Foundation. For more information visit <www.pluggingtheleaks.org> 
Lucienne Heideman 
P3 Project: Partnership-Participation-Progress1
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A pilot process of running ‘Plugging the Leaks’ workshops in low income communities in 
South Africa and Namibia revealed that spending choices in these communities are severely 
limited in a context where there is no effective welfare state. Therefore, empowerment with 
this method came from the discovery of collective action and networking, rather than from 
individual spending choices. Local start-up business tends to be limited to survivalist and 
copy-cat one-person ventures, and are a last resort when formal employment is absent. In 
this context collective enterprise offers the necessary empowerment for people to attempt 
financially sustainable ventures that respond to a gap in the local economy. The pilot project 
is attempting to show that municipal LED staff can play the role of facilitator for initiating 
the enterprise-identification process and further mobilise state enterprise support agencies 
around the locus of LED, without crossing the line between facilitation and implementation 
of ’projects’. 
 
1. Introduction 
During 2010 the P3 Project (which focused on local economic development in twenty four 
municipalities across South Africa, Namibia and Botswana), began piloting a local economic 
development (LED) tool based on the Keynesian multiplier model or local multiplier effect 
(LM3). As an innovate approach to community enterprise identification, Plugging the Leaks 
had been used in South Africa in only two locations,3
 
 and was entirely untested in Namibia 
and Botswana. Evidence based on the initial series of workshops held in two municipal areas 
of the Western Cape, South Africa and the Erongo region of Namibia is proving its value to 
municipal LED practice as a viable instrument of policy implementation sympathetic to local 
conditions. This paper attempts to locate Plugging the Leaks as an LED tool within the 
policy and socio-economic context of Namibia and South Africa and, based on the initial 
findings, reflects on the prospects for broader up-take in municipalities across Southern 
Africa. 
2. The P3 Partnership 
The P3 project is a partnership between four municipal associations. The Association of 
Swedish Local Authorities and Regions is the lead partner and in southern Africa, where 
implementation takes place with municipalities, the partners are the South African Local 
                                                          
3  Ncera village in the Eastern Cape, and the Waterloo township in Durban, Kwazulu-Natal.  
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Government Association (SALGA), the Botswana Association of Local Authorities (BALA), 
and the Association of Local Authorities in Namibia (ALAN). The three-year project started 
in early 2009, and is funded by the European Union (75%) and the Swedish International 
Development Agency (25%). 
 
The project aims to support municipalities through providing mechanisms to promote 
transparency and improved relations between local government and citizens. It does this 
through the application of a set of tools to improve municipal functions in the areas of LED, 
Financial Management & Transparency. The project has offices in all three southern African 
countries, and works in 24 municipalities spread across the countries. These municipalities 
form the pilot phase of the project in which tools are tested and developed for further roll-out 
through the municipal associations. 
 
The P3 project was conceived in three phases. The inception phase involved selection of 
municipalities, assessment of these, and adaptation of tools to the local context. The second 
phase was implementation of selected tools, adjustments, evaluation and product design for 
further dissemination. The final phase is the institutionalisation where partner associations 
promote further uptake of the results. The LED part of the project is currently nearing the 
end of the implementation phase, with a project end date of February 2012. 
 
The LED component of the project started from the premise that municipalities impact 
directly on the business-enabling environment in their locality. Municipalities can facilitate 
LED by creating the enabling environment that leads to private-sector job creation. Thus the 
programme was mindful of the contestation of meaning around LED, especially in South 
Africa, and tried not to create expectations within municipalities that the programme would 
bring ‘projects’ to bear. Instead the P3 staff offered municipalities LED tools as systematic 
processes, aimed at improving the business-enabling environment. If projects emerged along 
the way, these were not the core focus of the LED endeavour but were added bonuses. 
Nonetheless some P3 municipal councillors have tried to push for more tangible job-creation 
projects which satisfy constituents' demands for quick-fix subsidized employment. As a 
donor-funded programme P3 has had to dispel municipal expectations that it offers grant 
funding for employment ‘projects’. 
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P3 offers supply-side LED interventions that build capacity within the municipality to 
partner civil society and manage economic development within their means. As a donor 
funded programme it is fairly unusual in its selection of targeted municipalities. Instead of 
aiming the support at the weakest municipalities, the P3 project set criteria for selection that 
sought to attract municipalities with some stability, LED staff in place and the potential to 
capitalise on satisfactory performance. P3 looked for potential in small to medium 
municipalities where existing capacity would make it possible for the LED offerings to be 
absorbed into the institutions. The idea was to help municipalities improve what they were 
already doing. Inevitably not all the 24 municipalities turned out to be as stable as had been 
hoped, but the majority kept pace with the programme of activities. The more engaged 
municipalities have been able to gain a lot of value from the LED tools. 
 
All 24 municipalities were introduced to the LED Roundtable concept which was adapted 
from work done in Bosnia Herzegovina. An LED discussion forum was not entirely new in 
South Africa, but was novel in Namibia and Botswana. The P3 Municipalities hold quarterly 
LED Roundtables with a strong emphasis on business stakeholders, where the agendas 
include reports on progress in implementing LED tools between meetings and a platform for 
information sharing. 
 
P3 Municipalities were offered three elective LED tools. Red-tape reduction focused on 
process or regulatory review, improvement and internal efficiency particularly impacting on 
business. Business retention and expansion (BR&E) was designed to develop better feedback 
loops, partnership formation, recognition and encouragement of responsible business. 
Municipalities recognised that job retention and creation is more likely to occur through 
business expansion than by new start-ups, with about 70% of P3 municipalities choosing this 
option. Plugging the Leaks in the local economy was seen as a way of stopping cash 
outflows and enhancing local circulation of cash within municipal boundaries. Almost all 
municipalities asked for this option, making it the most popular of the P3’s elective tools. 
 
In addition to the elective tools, all municipalities did business-enabling environment surveys 
at the start of the project to lay down a baseline of qualitative information (Swinburn, Goga 
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& Murphy 2006). The survey will be repeated at the end of the implementation period in 
June 2011 and will then be able to show changes over time. 
 
3. What is ‘Plugging the Leaks’? 
Plugging the Leaks was developed in 2002 by the New Economics Foundation (NEF). It was 
initially tested over four years in thirteen low-income communities in the East Midlands of 
England. Since 2007 it has been tested by international partners in Brazil, Honduras, Israel, 
Mozambique and South Africa. It has been rated as unusually effective by international 
partners in various settings and contexts. 
 
The New Economics Foundation is an independent ‘think and do’ tank that explores 
alternatives to mainstream economics. At NEF they believe that the problem in low-income 
communities is not so much what is missing from the local economy, but rather how wisely 
people utilise what is already there (Pienaar 2010, personal communication 9 Oct). 
 
Plugging the Leaks uses the analogy of a local economy as a leaky bucket. It enables people 
to identify the in and out-flows of cash, and find local means to plug these leaks. It is based 
on prioritising local enterprise, and emphasises local value-addition and innovation. It looks 
for activities with strong multiplier effects, and increases the interconnectedness of elements 
within a local economy. At its simplest, the local multiplier effect is the observation that the 
more a unit of currency circulates in a local economy before leaving, the more wealth it 
creates. 
 
Typically this method identifies ways to stop value leaving the locality, improves the 
circulation of cash within the local economy, and improves the quality of life of residents. It 
also reduces the environmental footprint of a local economy as transport is reduced, and is 
thus a green LED approach. It tends to build community pride in a locality, and improve 
cooperation among business. 
 
Plugging the Leaks is about interconnectedness in local economies, however using the 
analogy of the leaking bucket allows communities to engage with concepts of the local 
multiplier effect without the use of intimidating and exclusionary jargon. The method does 
not advocate isolation of local economies, which would lead to protectionism. Import-
substitution has a role to play in ensuring greater circulation of cash, but it should not lead to 
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reduced choices for consumers, or higher prices, or lower quality. Instead, Plugging the 
Leaks advocates increased interconnectedness within local economies that increases the local 
multiplier effect. 
Traditional approaches to LED have seen municipalities competing against one another to 
attract inward investment, seen as a panacea for unemployment. The competition between 
places can lead to the offering of incentives that outweigh the benefits to local communities. 
This is often referred to as the “race to the bottom”. Municipalities may offer rates rebates, 
cheap electricity and water, subsidised industrial sites, etc. These lost revenues sometimes 
outweigh the benefit of the often low quality, poorly paid jobs created locally (Bond 2002). 
The era of the so-called Washington consensus of export-led growth and ruinous competition 
has failed to deliver in Southern Africa, and this demands more creative approaches to 
stimulating economic growth. 
 
Plugging the Leaks is a bottom-up approach to economic development, and does not rely on 
experts. Experts typically do not live in the area where they plan economic development, so 
they do not have to live with the consequences of economic decisions (Ward and Lewis 
2002). Plugging the Leaks is a method of harnessing local knowledge and garnering people 
to take action to analyse and intervene in shaping their local economy to suit their needs. It is 
premised on the notion that local development is enacted by the people concerned, on the 
basis of their own knowledge, experience and culture (Escobar 1997). 
 
4. Why ‘Plugging the Leaks’? 
Plugging the Leaks as an implementation tool for local economic development falls within 
the developmental LED approaches rather than the more familiar orthodox approaches 
(Pieterse 1999). It is a community-based strategy that emphasises working directly with low-
income communities. While the South African government implied support to this kind of 
strategy as far back as 2002, arguably very little piloting of comprehensive implementation 
tools, directly working with low-income communities through municipalities, has taken 
place to date. 
 
Bond noted in 2002 that “sometimes it is crucial to stem the outflow of money from poor 
areas by encouraging people to buy local, supporting and building periodic markets, funding 
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special events and festivals, providing infrastructure using local labour and locally 
manufactured material, promoting employee training, and networking enterprises of all sizes 
in the local area” (2002, p. 11). At the time he lamented the residual attraction in government 
to the more traditional place-marketing, smokestack-chasing and urban-entrepreneurial 
approaches. Another author states: “While there is growing consensus about what does not 
work in LED (such as government-led ad hoc projects) there is much less appreciation of 
‘good practice’ in LED” (Rogerson 2010, p. 488). Could Plugging the Leaks be one such 
good practice? The P3 project argued it could be, and started working toward running 
Plugging the Leaks workshops in its partner municipalities in 2010. 
 
5. LED as a Contested Concept in South Africa 
Local Economic Development is a teenager in South Africa. Policy on this priority mandate 
has been hotly contested, with the first ten years of democracy given over to community 
development projects with dubious economic sustainability and limited meaningful 
stakeholder partnership (Hindson & Vicente 2005). 
 
At its most extreme, the policy community polarised around LED as a form of poverty 
alleviation with strong state intervention to create jobs directly through projects, as opposed 
to the facilitation of economic growth through improving the enabling environment. 
Rogerson has characterised this debate on the meaning of LED in South Africa as the social 
welfare approach versus the competitive approach (2010, p. 483). For the purposes of 
sketching the broad policy context in this paper his terminology will suffice. It is important 
to place the practice of Plugging the Leaks against this policy backdrop as an instrument of 
policy implementation. Plugging the Leaks can be categorised as a community-based 
strategy working directly with local-income communities (Pieterse 2000). 
 
The key focus of this paper is anticipating how a broader uptake of the Plugging the Leaks 
toolkit as a municipal approach to LED might offer a workable method for bringing 
enterprise development back into the municipal sphere without crossing the line of job 
creation through projects. The danger is that LED can be perceived as a set of projects all 
over again, instead of a series of systematic processes or tools to improve the business 
enabling environment. 
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Historical evolution of LED policy 
In 1996 the South African Constitution made local economic development an obligation for 
local authorities, and in 1998 the White Paper on Local Government introduced the notion of 
developmental local government and LED as a key mandate. The 2000 Municipal Systems 
Act legislated municipal LED functions as part of Integrated Development Planning 
(Rogerson 2010, p. 481). However, studies show that municipalities remained unclear on 
what LED means, how to organise it, and what to do in practical terms (Meyer-Stamer 
2002). Until there is consensus among practitioners in local authorities on what LED is, 
progress will inevitably be slow (Sibisi 2009). 
 
The poverty alleviation model emphasised strong state intervention and municipalities 
leading from the front, with LED as a set of municipal projects to create jobs. The social 
welfare elements of this approach are all too clear. The South African government created a 
Local Economic Development Fund to support poverty-reducing LED projects in 1999, 
housed under the national department responsible for local government (Department of 
Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), renamed the Department of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) in 2009). After a damning review of the Fund 
in 2003, the government reconsidered its approach to LED and in 2006 released new 
guidelines on LED. 
 
Direct funding for community projects had failed to create sustainable enterprises, often due 
to a lack of consideration for the key question of local markets. Weaning projects off grant 
funding proved almost impossible, and many talented people found themselves with no 
market for the goods they were producing. Municipal LED staff found themselves trying to 
run local projects as businesses, having little or no training in business-related fields to fall 
back on. “The limited success of LED projects with a welfare focus has undermined the 
credibility and significance attached to LED by many local authorities” (Rogerson 2010, p. 
489). 
 
National oversight of LED and state-funding mechanisms in South Africa are spread across 
numerous ministries and agencies. This may have created the conditions for contestation of 
the meaning of LED within government itself. The two key players in the contest for 
defining LED, leading up to the new guidelines in 2006, were the Department of Provincial 
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and Local Government (DPLG) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 
Interventions made by the Department of Trade and Industry focused on “competitiveness, 
comparative advantage, SMME’s and co-operatives development; as opposed to DPLG’s 
focus on governance” (Rogerson 2010, p. 484). To date, the fragmentation of support and 
finance functions for LED present the municipal LED official with an array of confusing 
choices. 
 
The international trend away from the role of the state in LED, and from direct intervention 
to ‘enablement’ where government creates a favourable environment for LED, is the context 
into which the P3 project was born. In South Africa shifts in LED practice have been a case 
of “learning through doing, and even learning from mistakes” (Rogerson 2010, p. 487). By 
partnering with Botswana and Namibia in the P3 Project, South Africa has a unique 
opportunity to help these countries not to make the same mistakes in the first democratic 
decade of their LED experience. The relative LED policy and regulatory vacuum in 
Botswana and Namibia presents space for sharing of experience. 
 
Emerging LED practice in the context of municipal size 
Although the current policy approach to LED in South Africa is swinging away from project-
driven LED, LED strategies, especially in smaller local authorities, still tend to be project 
focused (Van de Heijden 2008, in Rogerson 2010): 
LED initiatives in smaller centre’s tend to be project-based, while those in larger 
centre’s are increasingly focused on creating appropriate institutional market enabling 
frameworks (Rogerson 2010, p. 485) 
 
In larger metropolitan areas, LED focuses on creating a supportive and competitive business 
environment, emphasising business sectors or clusters, business retention, red-tape reduction 
and sometimes investment incentives. In smaller centres, LED focuses on better basic service 
delivery, public works and SMME development (Rogerson 2010). This may well be why 
Plugging the Leaks is perceived as an enterprise-development model appropriate for smaller 
centres, especially those that compete directly with neighbouring larger settlements for a 
finite pool of cash. 
 
Limited capacities of LED staff have led to smaller municipalities focusing on compliance 
with statutory requirements rather than proactive management of economic opportunities 
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(Lawrence and Hadingham 2008). In general, the smaller the municipality in South Africa, 
the lower its investment in human resources in the LED section. The positioning of the LED 
function in the municipal organogram also appears to have a direct bearing on its ability to 
mobilise municipal departments behind common economic objectives (Provincial Local 
Economic Development Support Programme Eastern Cape 2005). 
 
Rogerson argues for a differentiated approach to LED in smaller versus larger municipalities. 
He argues that most municipalities are just “too busy to focus on economic potential because 
of the imperatives of addressing basic needs” (Rogerson 2010, p. 486). Policies typically use 
a one-size-fits all approach, which is an inherent weakness of generic policy. It is more the 
policy instruments that give expression to differentiation, and the P3 project has focused on 
smaller municipalities for Plugging the Leaks. However, there is no reason why smaller units 
of targeted communities within larger urban centres should not yield similar results, such as 
those emerging out of Waterloo Township in Durban where an NEF-supported Plugging the 
Leaks project is more advanced. The Industrial Development Corporation in South Africa 
funds Local Economic Development Agencies (LEDAs) as a way of delivering economic 
development, especially in smaller municipalities where LED competes for municipal 
resources with pressing issues such as provision of clean water to impoverished communities 
(Thina Sinako 2007).  
 
6. LED in Namibia 
In contrast to South Africa, Namibia has a different experience of municipal government and 
local economic development. The country has a population of under two million compared to 
South Africa’s forty million plus, however Namibia does share some common socio-
economic characteristics with South Africa due to previous links with its neighbour to the 
south. Since independence in 1990 the policy and regulatory environment for LED in 
Namibia has not been the subject of intense focus in the way it has been in South Africa. 
Multiple pieces of legislation have a bearing on municipal development plans in Namibia, 
which include local economic development without elevating LED to a core municipal 
mandate. The support environment for LED in Namibia, including that usually occupied by 
donors, has been under-subscribed until very recently. 
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Namibia adopted a White Paper on Local Economic Development in 2009, the production of 
which was supported by GTZ (German Technical Cooperation). GTZ is also behind the 
Local Economic Development Agency (LEDA) being set up within the ministry to support 
municipalities in developing LED strategies and processes going forward. This process is 
still in its infancy. Namibia inherited much of the land-use planning approaches from its 
former colonial apartheid era, and consequently faces many of the same spatial legacies 
confronting South Africa. 
 
The vision for LED in the White Paper on LED in Namibia acknowledges that national 
efforts are geared towards enhancing the conditions for greater global competitiveness in the 
country. The White Paper asserts that it is at the local and regional levels that opportunities 
are identified and harnessed. The document asserts that each local area is different and that 
initiatives rest on the active involvement of local people and the responsiveness of public and 
private actors. It does not prescribe any specific action to local players but aims to create a 
common understanding of regional and local economic development as a concept, and 
provide practical examples of initiatives which are drawn from local and international LED 
practices. The White Paper then provides a framework for local and regional development, 
and adds value to national development initiatives without being prescriptive (GTZ 2008).  
 
7. Adapting ‘Plugging the Leaks’ 
At the start of the P3 project, research into different tools was undertaken to select 
appropriate offerings for the municipalities in the project. The commitment to people 
development prioritised by the project donors meant that concrete instruments that 
‘empowered’ state and non-state actors in partnership to improve their local economy were 
attractive. While the term ‘empowerment’ might be over-used (Cook 1994), it has been an 
effective label for the longer term social sustainability of actions undertaken in the project 
which need to remain within the institutional fabric of partner institutions.  
 
The NEF-developed Plugging the Leaks workshops stood out as a unique offering. The other 
LED tools selected were process-orientated, and did not focus on enterprise identification. 
Instead they focused on municipalities reaching out to existing business stakeholders to 
improve the business enabling environment. Plugging the Leaks is different in that it is a 
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bottom-up approach that taps into local knowledge to provide analysis of gaps in the market. 
It pushes LED back in the direction of enterprise development. While this may be dangerous 
in a context where municipalities still sometimes regard LED as a ‘project’ or set of 
‘projects’, the more nuanced municipalities are able to draw a clear line where their role as 
facilitator ends, and that of enterprise support institutions (business services, finance 
provision etc.) begins. 
 
The method was initially tested over four years in thirteen low-income communities in the 
East Midlands of England. Some of the examples in the British developed handbook 
reflected their context, for example illustrations using housing estates familiar to the original 
domestic audience. These had to be changed for southern African. P3 Process Facilitators 
tailored the workshop format to take account of local dynamics, including language 
differences. The overall intention remained the same however, to build economic literacy 
and empower communities to utilise existing resources toward local enterprise. Donors 
increasingly expect participation of beneficiaries in development programmes, but very often 
this participation is merely a means to an end, the end being project efficiency, effectiveness 
and lower costs. Where there is a more fundamental power shift, the participation becomes 
the end in itself so that the community or group sets up a process to control its own 
development (Nelson, N &Wright, S 1995, p. 1). This was a guiding principle behind the 
method. However this requires a shift in power between the participants.  
 
NEF were very supportive of P3 interest in their handbook and connected practitioners 
around the world. Where Plugging the Leaks was being run in the Waterloo township of 
Durban in Kwa-Zulu Natal (South Africa), a comprehensive programme around the 
community workshops was set up, including a full-time coach to assist workshop 
participants to take their enterprise ideas forward to fruition. In Waterloo the programme 
included a micro-finance organisation ready to back viable business plans with small loans. 
These two elements of a Plugging the Leaks programme (a coach and micro-finance) 
required planning support and resources which the P3 project did not have immediate access 
to. Nonetheless the potential in the basic approach was clear, and the existence of multiple 
state agencies tasked with enterprise development and funding in South Africa especially 
encouraged P3 to test the workshop approach in interested municipalities. 
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8. Preparing for ‘Plugging the Leaks’ Workshops  
When P3 embarked on running the Plugging the Leaks workshops, a few key goals were 
drawn from the NEF handbook. P3 hoped to improve economic literacy, encourage local 
networking and cooperation, identify markets, and create spending impact awareness. 
Expectations were that each of these objectives would be equally well received.  
 
Workshop preparations took place in a number of stages. The first task was to elaborate the 
process to P3 partner municipalities so that they might make an informed selection. 
Municipalities seemed to identify with the problem of competition between settlements for 
circulation of cash. Discussions around the target audience followed, with some 
municipalities wanting to involve more established business. However, the NEF noted that 
established business often tend to bring sceptical voices to bear, and can actually act as a 
barrier to entry for smaller new business. Municipalities wanting to prioritise existing 
business were steered in the direction of BR&E as an alternative to Plugging the Leaks. In 
the absence of a full-time coach the need to mobilise other entrepreneurial support was 
evident. 
 
P3 staff worked with municipal LED staff to identify the local players providing support 
services such as business advice and enterprise finance, and ensured they were briefed and 
invited to the workshops. A concerted effort was made to set municipalities in the role of 
facilitator and coordinator of multiple agencies all working toward the same goal of 
supporting local enterprise. Invitations to participants went out on the letterhead of the 
municipality, using existing networks and communications channels to reach entrepreneurs 
and potential entrepreneurs. Not all municipalities were diligent about getting the word out 
into communities which resulted in varying numbers of participants at workshops. The 
highest turnout of receptive participants occurred where existing enterprise-support agencies 
used their database of ‘clients’ to disseminate the invitation. 
In preparation for the first workshops the team of Process Facilitators rehearsed an 
illustrative story showing the local multiplier effect and the orchestrated bucket 
demonstrations showing cash flow. The Process Facilitators acquired all the props and 
rehearsed the bucket sequences with water. A story about a travelling salesman was 
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developed to demonstrate the local multiplier effect. The story begins with a travelling 
salesperson that comes to a town and needs to stay overnight. 
The travelling salesperson comes into the local hotel and asks at the reception if they 
have a room for one night. The hotel owner replies that there is a room available on 
the fourth floor and offers him the key to go and inspect the room for himself. The 
travelling salesperson pays a deposit of R100 cash and walks upstairs to go and look 
at the room. The hotel owner walks into the back office where the plumber has been 
doing repairs in the hotel, and pays the plumber the R100 note owed for services 
rendered. The plumber is pleased and upon leaving the hotel pays a woman who rents 
a room in the hotel R100 he owes her for a jersey she knitted for his son recently. The 
woman takes the R100 note and gives it back to the hotel owner for the rent she owes. 
The travelling salesperson comes back down to the reception and explains that the 
room is not suitable for his needs so he will look elsewhere for accommodation. The 
hotel owner gives him back his R100 note which he leaves with. 
 
This simple story shows how circulation of a single note of cash leaves value in its wake, 
increasing each time it changes hands. This story prompts workshop participants to think 
about the impact their spending choices have on their local economy.  
 
9. Making Sense of Responses to ‘Plugging the Leaks’ 
In the first two months of rolling out the first Plugging the Leaks workshops events were 
held in the towns of Grabouw, Caledon (Theewaterskloof Local Municipality), Napier, 
Bredasdorp (Cape Agulhas Local Municipality) in South Africa (Western Cape), and  in 
Arandis and Walvis Bay (Namibia). Despite spanning two countries with different 
languages, cultures and local government systems, the audience response to the approach 
was similar. The socio-economic profile of the four municipal areas reveal some common 
characteristics that may go some way toward explaining common responses. 
 
Socio-economic context: Namibia: Walvis Bay and Arandis 
Walvis Bay (meaning whale bay) lies on the western edge of the Namib dessert. The setting 
is spectacular as the dessert dunes roll out to meet the sea. The town has a deepwater sea 
harbor which provides its main source of employment. Namport is an important access point 
for landlocked SADC countries like Zimbabwe and Botswana, and also services oil rigs 
positioned off the Angolan cost to the north (Walvis Bay Biodiversity Report 2008). 
 
The main exports are diamonds, minerals, fish, livestock and their by-products. These are 
exported largely to South Africa and the EU. The principle imports are food and beverages, 
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vehicles and machinery. The economy of Namibia is heavily dependent on its natural 
resources: diamonds, uranium, fish, wildlife and marine resources. This lack of 
diversification out of the minerals/energy complex places it in a precarious position. Walvis 
Bay does however benefit from a more diversified local economy than most in Namibia as it 
has comparatively significant business, industry and tourism sectors (2003 Walvis Bay Local 
Council). 
 
The small town of Arandis lies 94km inland from Walvis Bay in the Namib dessert. It was 
created in 1976 by the Rossing Uranium Mine to settle the workforce. The entire town was 
owned and run by the mine until 1992, when it was given to the Namibian government on 
independence from South Africa (Hoadley, Atkinson, Limpitlaw & Tarr 2005). 
 
Unemployment in Arandis and Walvis Bay stands at 34% (Census 2001).4
 
 Fifty percent of 
Namibians are estimated to live below the poverty line, and income distribution in Namibia 
is highly unequal.  Ten percent of households with the highest income account for almost 
half the total income, the GINI coefficient for Namibia is 0.6; and unemployment, poverty, 
HIV/AIDS and gender inequality are prioritised as key development issues in Namibia. 
Walvis Bay has an estimated population of 60,000 (Census 2001), while Arandis has an 
estimated population of 6,000 and Namibia has a total population of 1.83 million. Walvis 
Bay and its neighbour Swakopmund are the largest urban centres outside the capital, 
Windhoek, and they both fall within the Erongo region, which had a population of 107,663 at 
the 2001 Census. Arandis is heavily dependent on the Rossing Mine and mineral deposits, 
and suffers from lack of economic diversification. Scarcity of water is also a major 
constraint, and water has to be piped over ground across the dessert from the coast to supply 
the large mine. Arandis is an outlying mining community that struggles to compete with its 
larger neighbours on the coast, namely Walvis Bay and Swakopmund (Hoadley et al. 2005). 
 
Household income in the Erongo region which covers both Walvis Bay and Arandis, in 
2001, was made up mostly of salaried/waged employment (67%), with only 8% of income 
derived from self-employment and business income (2006 Central Bureau of Statistics, 
                                                          
4  Both Namibia and South Africa last released reliable Census data in 2001. While these datasets are out of date, 
they are at least universal and therefore comparable. 
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National Planning Commission, Windhoek). Unfortunately the census in Namibia does not 
break down the sectors from which salaries and wages are derived. 
 
Western Cape, South Africa: Theewaterskloof and Cape Agulhas 
The municipality of Theewaterskloof is made up of numerous small towns and their 
surrounding rural hinterland. The key towns are Caledon, Grabouw, Riviersonderend, 
Villiersdorp, Genadendal, Greyton and Bot River. The total population is around 107,000 
(Theewaterskloof LED Strategy 2009). 
 
The area is within 1.5 hours drive from Cape Town along the N2 road and is separated from 
the Cape peninsula by a mountain range. The local economy of Theewaterskloof is based 
mainly on agriculture, followed by trade and community services. The tourism sector is 
significant, and is captured under ’trade’ in terms of Census data. Unemployment - as 
narrowly defined in census data - shows the figure for Theewaterskloof at 11.6%, which has 
increased steadily since 2001. The largest number of jobs is in the agricultural sector, 
although many are seasonal as the area is centre for fruit-growing, particularly apples . At 
2001, 52% of households in Theewaterskloof earned below R 1,600 (US$ 192) per month, 
(Theewaterskloof LED Strategy 2009). 
 
The municipality of Cape Agulhas further up the coast from Theewaterskloof is also made 
up of numerous small towns and their surrounding rural hinterland. The key towns are 
Bredasdorp, L’Agulhas, Napier, Arniston and Struisbaai, with a municipality population of 
27,000 (Cape Agulhas LED Strategy 2009). The area is within 2 hour’s drive from Cape 
Town. The local economy of Cape Agulhas is based on trade, followed by community 
services and agriculture. The tourism sector is significant, and is captured under ’trade’ in 
terms of Census data. Cape Agulhas is the southern-most point in Africa, but is not 
particularly well developed for its tourism potential. 
Unemployment as narrowly defined in census data shows the figure for Cape Agulhas at 8%, 
which has also increased since 2001. The largest number of jobs are in the trade sector. 
Household income in the Cape Agulhas at 2001 was made up mostly of salaries and wages 
(30%), with 3.2 % of people self-employed and only 0.3% of people employers. For 66% of 
the sample, work status figures are not applicable (unemployed or not participating in the 
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economy). At 2001, 44% of households in Cape Agulhas earned below R 1,600 per month 
(US$ 210a low-income wage (Cape Agulhas LED Strategy 2009). 
 
Contextual south-south characteristics setting it apart from the north 
All four of the P3 municipal areas where Plugging the Leaks workshops were first run suffer 
from high levels of unemployment and significant poverty. Inequality inherited from the 
apartheid legacy which both regions share have endured in the form of race-class 
correlations:  
The inherent tensions between the public and private sectors are compounded by the 
need to transcend the apartheid legacy of a largely white-owned and controlled private 
sector and a predominantly black public sector (Rogerson 2010, p. 488). 
 
Socio-economic challenges are not limited to the legacy of racism. Neither South Africa nor 
Namibia offers an effective social welfare net for people living below the poverty line. 
Unemployment insurance pays out for a number of weeks depending on the number of years 
contributed to the system, leaving the unemployed without income within 6 months. No 
universal income grant exists in either country, although there has been unsuccessful 
lobbying for such a grant in both South Africa and Namibia5
 
. Namibia has a Social Security 
Commission under the Ministry of Labour working on proposals to improve the system, 
although the country lags behind South Africa. 
Poverty is not limited to the unemployed in either country. As well as low wages implied by 
low average household incomes, many economic survival strategies involve informal sector 
activities, or the so-called ‘second economy’, which is particularly vibrant in South Africa. 
Profiles of workshop participants revealed that local start-up business tend to be limited to 
survivalist and copy-cat one-person ventures, and were a last resort when formal 
employment was absent. Many small scale entrepreneurs complained during workshops of a 
lack of markets for their goods, a complaint symptomatic of inadequate prioritisation of local 
demand when selecting economic activity. Workshop participants explained that when they 
found themselves out of wage employment, they drew on their existing skills and talents 
hoping that sustainable enterprise would follow. Numerous enterprise support agencies such 
as the Elgin Foundation and the Western Cape Provincial Government’s Red Door 
                                                          
5  The Basic Income Grant (BIG). 
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programme complain that one of their biggest challenges is to get potential entrepreneurs to 
analyse local markets first and respond strategically.  
 
P3 workshop audiences were largely made up of people who worked in the second economy 
because they had no wage employment opportunity. Most would prefer wage employment 
and were forced into the second economy by necessity rather than active choice. This 
condition, when combined with an inadequate social welfare system, has meant that most 
workshop participants felt excluded from the first economy and had very little regular 
reliable cash income. This is the most likely explanation for the most disappointing aspect of 
the audience traction on Plugging the Leaks: failure to fully realise the impact of individual 
spending choices as a local multiplier effect. While the travelling salesman story got the 
message across in terms of keeping money circulating within a local economy, the 
disempowerment of people excluded from the cash economy was clear as the comparatively 
limited number of spending choices made became obvious. Inequality in both Namibia and 
South Africa is staggering, South Africa having one of the highest GINI coefficient in the 
world: 0.72 in 2005 (Stats SA) (0 represents total equality and 1 total inequality). Namibia 
stood at 0.6 for 2005. 
 
Limited individual spending choices 
The generic strength of the Plugging the Leaks method is threefold: identifying gaps in local 
markets, changing spending patterns, and encouraging networking and collaboration for 
competitiveness. In the pilot workshops in Namibia and South Africa, two of the three 
objectives were highly successful: analysing markets and networking. From a resident 
perspective, the workshops did not yield the level of engagement and traction on individual 
spending choices as in England. This may be explained by the lack of social welfare funding, 
which leaves low-income communities with less cash and therefore fewer direct spending 
choices to be made. Instead, participants latched onto the gap/market analysis aspects as a 
way of finding an income. High unemployment rates leads to survivalist businesses in 
southern Africa, the vast majority of which statistically never expand to employ more than 
one person (Devey, Skinner & Valodia 2003). In places like the UK it is arguably possible to 
survive on social welfare, taking away some of the impetus to start an enterprise out of 
desperation.  
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The changing of spending patterns was received with less enthusiasm possibly due to the 
limited cash spending choices available to workshop participants that were commonly 
engaged in survivalist businesses. Nonetheless, the value of Plugging the Leaks workshops 
in South Africa and Namibia is that is showed that LED need not depend on large investment 
from outside a local economy. It shifts the focus from the supply to the demand side of local 
economics, showing that whole communities as consumers can contribute to LED by 
supporting local businesses. But how local is local? In Namibia, South Africa is seen as 
local, so there are degrees of “localness”. 
 
How local is local?  
By encouraging buying local, P3 opened up a discussion about different levels of ‘localness’ 
and participants asked questions about chain-stores versus locally-owned franchises. A kind 
of local-value hierarchy started to emerge out of the collective analysis. The complexity of 
calculating the value of local procurement in a workshop made it impossible to explore in 
more detail at the time, but the NEF does offer tools for organisations to calculate their 
impact. Ideally P3 should also be running this in municipalities and reviewing procurement 
policies and procedures. 
 
The localness question also opened up potential xenophobia in the very first workshop in 
Grabouw, with ‘Insider-Outsider’ dynamics emerging. Participants pointed to examples of 
successful Somali or Chinese shopkeepers in the community, who work long hours and offer 
low prices, undercutting other local shops. The issue is how communities and local business 
people deal with this situation. Do they drive them out (xenophobia) or emulate the survival 
strategies that cooperation offers? Placing value on ‘localness’ can quickly cast a shadow of 
‘us’ and ‘them’, or ‘insiders’ versus ‘outsiders’. While it might be encouraging to see how 
race is less an issue in communities in South Africa than ever before, xenophobia is a new 
division which threatens some areas where workshops were held. This required skilled 
facilitation to manage crowd sentiment and debunk the notion that foreigners don’t 
contribute to local economies. 
 
Finance and facilitation support 
In terms of financing, a comprehensive approach is needed to enterprise development 
including a variety of stakeholders and access to micro-finance; stakeholders are generally 
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regarded as parties who are affected or can affect actions and policies (Nelson, N & Wright, 
S. 1995, p. 5). 
 
How funding comes into a community for enterprise development is important. Grant 
funding can undermine sustainable business development, as happened with the LED Fund 
set up in the late 1990s in South Africa, where cooperative projects mostly folded when grant 
money was exhausted. Projects never became economically viable because they were over-
subsidised with ‘free’ money, and sometimes included too many beneficiaries. Individuals 
who take commercial loans subject to market conditions often have to ‘go it alone’, working 
hard to pay them back with interest. This increases ownership and commitment by 
introducing the element of risk, whereas grant funds used for private goods can distort the 
market, and lead to unfair competition between enterprises (Philips 2000). 
 
Once workshop participants have identified needs and come up with ideas during the 
Plugging the Leaks workshops, they need support to plan and realise their ideas. Facilitation 
and support are essential at this stage in terms of connecting them to resource organisations 
and people that can provide skills training, coaching and micro-finance. Mediating and 
brokering to reduce barriers is also valuable. The role of coach is therefore part of the 
method developed by the NEF. The P3 project did not have the resources to provide a coach 
for each of the twenty four municipalities in the programme, and therefore had to explore 
alternative methods for support. This has culminated in two questions. Can municipalities 
change the way LED officials work to incorporate coaching activities for enterprise 
development and, relating to the history of LED policy development in South Africa, can 
municipalities facilitate enterprise development without becoming project implementers?  
 
From the piloting of Plugging the Leaks workshops in South Africa and Namibia it can be 
concluded that it is viable to build groups of passionate, aspiring entrepreneurs to support 
each other and find resource organisations and mentors for themselves. For example, groups 
of people who met at the workshops for the first time have started buying goods together 
from big wholesalers to get better prices. Utilising economies of scale is a very simple action 
that greatly increases their efficiency and forms a basis for understanding competitiveness in 
a more nuanced way. This evolution of cooperation has lead in the direction of revitalised 
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business chambers in some towns, and even the mooting of business clusters in others. 
Although the tools are in the early days of implementation, the positive responses point to 
significant potential of Plugging the Leaks in a myriad of different contexts. P3 staff 
occasionally encountered more established business people at the workshops who were 
sceptical about the method, but they were managed by grouping sceptics together so as not to 
disrupt other break-away groups. 
 
The Plugging the Leaks approach calls for talented facilitators that are able to guide 
participants in a fashion that enables rather than dictates; the method is challenging and 
needs to be managed carefully. It became clear in the first workshop that the ‘plugs’ 
identified by groups were only as good as their ‘leaks’ in the sense that analysis has to be 
specific and disaggregated in order to contain the seed for concrete solutions. During the 
group work it also became obvious that if the leaks were not specific, and within the control 
of the participants, the proposed plugs would be compromised. For example, a leak identified 
in one group was crime; this was too generic and needed to de disaggregated before any 
useful plug could become evident. Much clearer leaks – like the lack of a local dry-cleaner – 
yielded much clearer plugs. 
 
Measuring success through change 
Perhaps the greatest change after each workshop was awareness of markets. Participants 
seemed to develop a new understanding of the importance of identifying markets before 
starting a business. The norm in low-income communities is for copy-cat businesses, people 
see others succeed and start a similar business thereby saturating the market, resulting in 
survivalist businesses that lead a perilous existence. Understanding markets can lead to more 
financially sustainable businesses that match goods and services with real market gaps. 
Enterprise support agencies present at the workshops commented on the strength of the 
method in raising market awareness. 
 
The second visible change was empowerment through joint action, and a new understanding 
of competitiveness. Participants quickly embraced action-planning in groups, and resolved to 
follow-up using their own initiative. They also saw the need for collective cooperation in 
activities like bulk-buying, advertising and referral networks, where small businesses support 
each other. This revealed a new understanding of competitiveness being not about individual 
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competition leading to winners and losers, but rather about cooperating for collective benefit. 
The method lends itself toward community enterprise because of its structure of collective 
analysis and problem solving.  
  
Many participants left the workshop feeling passionate about developing their dreams, and 
inspired by the opportunities which working together offered. The challenge however is to 
sustain this passion. While the facilitation approach deliberately broke down the perceptions 
that external forces held the answers and/or resources to solve participants economic 
problems, the dissolving of the conceptual barriers leading to expressions of ‘empowerment’ 
may be temporary. Empowerment implies that “some can act on others to give them power 
or enable them to realise their own potential” (Nelson and Wright 1995). This leads to the 
question: can development practitioners effectively transfer power in a workshop without 
addressing longer term structural power relations outside the workshop event? Developing 
participants' confidence and abilities may be temporary, and the sense of ‘empowerment’ 
reported illusory. 
 
Participants reported feeling empowered by being inspired to take the initiative rather than 
waiting for a solution to come from elsewhere. This is particularly significant in rural areas, 
where communities may otherwise become dependent on the larger cities as a source of 
income, rather than create value locally. The workshops encouraged people to look inward, 
find value in their familiar surroundings, and take control of the sphere that lies within their 
influence. If facilitated skilfully, this process can be empowering, and for the long-term 
unemployed, empowerment can be fundamentally life-changing. Treating local people as 
experts in understanding their economy offers a break from the all-too familiar donor/grant 
dependent syndrome which exists in southern Africa. However, the phenomenally high 
levels of inequality in both Namibia and South Africa mean that power relations in these 
societies mitigate against the poor participating in the formal economy. Changing these 
structural power relations is an enormous task not achieved through a few workshops.  
Municipal officials like the LED Managers did report benefits from the workshops, being 
exposed to the daily challenges of SMME’s during the P3 workshops was novel. Business 
stakeholders interacting directly with municipalities in South Africa and Namibia tend to be 
the larger established businesses, which may have a different set of challenges.  
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Municipalities showed their potential to play the role of facilitator and coordinator of 
multiple agencies for enterprise support, and their relationships with locally-present 
organisations were valuable in setting up workshops. While the Constitution of South Africa 
casts municipalities in a facilitator role with regards to development and LED, the mechanics 
are not well developed or understood. Sustaining the network of support providers has 
proved a challenge in the municipalities, and the enthusiasm has waned somewhat. Without 
continuous encouragement the old habits return, and the sense of empowerment is lost. 
 
The character of each Plugging the Leaks workshop was unique; something which 
underscores the notion that LED is about finding local solutions to local problems. The 
potential in the method is evident, the challenge seems to be in finding resources for 
sustained action. For municipalities the potential for changing the way LED officials work 
with communities to facilitate enterprise is exciting, and at the same time the boundaries 
between facilitation of processes and implementation of projects is a dangerous line that 
municipalities in South Africa have crossed before. 
 
10. Prospects for ‘Plugging the Leaks’ as a Municipal Application of LED in 
Southern Africa 
In the absence of networks and little interaction between the local authority and the private 
sector, the local authority interprets its role as a participant in, rather than facilitator for LED, 
adopting an ad hoc project-based approach (Sibisis 2009). Plugging the Leaks offers a model 
for this facilitation of stakeholders that holds considerable promise, but the resources 
required for sustained action to keep beneficiaries buoyed beyond the workshops (such as 
full-time enterprise coaches) may be too onerous for municipalities. In addition, cooperation 
between participants such as collective procurement (buying inputs) requires a level of trust 
between and across social divisions that cannot be assumed. 
 
“Deep divides remain between predominantly white and conservative business interests and 
the local authority, which are not conducive to partnering for effective LED strategies” 
(Rogerson 2010, p 486). This emerged in Namibia as well as South Africa during the pilot 
Plugging the Leaks workshops. Throughout much of southern Africa, the private sector has 
either been “left out or has chosen not to be involved as a result of the mutual suspicion 
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between the public and private sectors that makes dialogue between the two groups 
extremely difficult. The public sector believes business is anti-poor and business believes 
that government is welfarist and anti-profit in its outlook” (Rogerson 2010, p. 488). The P3 
Project has used Business Retention & Expansion (BR&E) as a tool targeted at more 
established businesses, and Plugging the Leaks more targeted at the ‘second economy’ and 
community groupings as aspirant entrepreneurs. Plugging the Leaks is a more broad-based, 
bottom-up approach than BR&E, but empowering people to embrace a bottom-up approach 
is not without its critics. Rowlands argues that the bottom-up concept can be used to 
perpetuate and disguise continued top-down attitudes because ‘empowerment’ is initiated by 
those who have power over others, and continue to exercise that power over others. The 
privileged development workers or donors leave the workshop as they arrived. Thus there is 
no real transfer of power, only the illusion (Rowlands 1992, p. 52, quoted in Nelson & 
Wright 1995). Using the distinction between ‘power to’ and ‘power over’, it becomes 
apparent that while any group or individual maintains ‘power over’ another group or 
individual, there has been no complete transfer of ‘power to’. At best there has been a 
diluting of that power, which was perhaps never theirs to give away. Nelson and Wright 
suggest addressing this problem by “institutionalising processes whereby those with newly 
acquired ‘power to’ can negotiate with those with ‘power over’ in the community and in 
agencies in ways which are ‘unpickable’ and sustainable when the outsider researcher or 
development worker has left” (1995, p. 13).  
 
What then have participants learnt from Plugging the Leaks that is difficult to undermine or 
reverse? Interestingly, BR&E steering groups in P3 municipalities have watched Plugging 
the Leaks groups with interest and even envy in places like Cape Agulhas, and are being 
pushed to “up their game” and to co-operate more effectively as established business 
organisations, better emulating mobilised and internally networked communities running 
with Plugging the Leaks. 
 
The emphasis Plugging the Leaks places on local knowledge instead of external ‘experts’ is 
perhaps its greatest value to southern African municipalities looking for meaningful 
participatory LED strategies. Participation as a transformative rather than an instrumental 
approach is increasingly required by donors, even if only to deflect criticism of dependence 
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in donor-beneficiary power relations. As a concrete tool to harness ‘indigenous’ knowledge, 
Plugging the Leaks is accessible to skilled development workers. The conditions “under 
which people may decide to ’disclose’ their ’knowledge’, and make their needs explicit, are 
very difficult to create” (Novellino 2003, in Pottier, Bicker, and Sillitoe 2003). The tools 
offer a systematic means to create the conditions for harnessing untapped knowledge to solve 
contextual problems in workshop situations, and through continuous coaching afterwards. 
However, can they create long-term change in the fabric of society in which beneficiaries are 
located? Surely a critical mass is required before a more fundamental transformative shift 
can occur? 
 
Rose (2004) and others have argued that voluntary policy transfer occurs through various 
processes of copying, emulation, hybridisation or inspiration across contexts (Rose 2004, 
Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, Evans & Davies 1999, Stone 1999, Evans 2004). Rose’s concept of 
lesson-drawing as a method of learning from past and/or extra-organisational experiences, 
emphasising the role of the bureaucrat and the programme itself in the process of policy 
learning in developed countries, underlines how policy as received wisdom without concrete 
instruments for implementation, such as LED policy in South Africa and Namibia, is 
incomplete. 
 
Rogerson argues that to build competitive local economies in South Africa, LED officials 
need more effective analytical tools, including accurate economic data (2010). The NEF 
argue that such quantitative data do not provide the full picture, and analytical tools need to 
be placed in the hands of local “experts”; the people who live with the consequences of 
economic choices on a daily basis. This emphasis on people at the centre of economic 
development sits well in southern African where solutions from external “experts” have yet 
to yield sustainable economic growth. Municipalities in South Africa have struggled to make 
sense of what statistical economic data exists. By 2008 most municipal Integrated 
Development Plans in South African municipalities used an economic profile based on the 
2001 Census which is both outdated and ill-focused on individuals as the unit of analysis 
rather than enterprises (Rogerson 2010). Centrally managed sectoral data in Namibia is not 
effectively disaggregated and is also out of date. 
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The Industrial Development Corporation6
 
 in South Africa (IDC) notes that LED projects 
have often failed due to insufficient involvement of local people as participants and 
beneficiaries. Rather than owners of projects, locals have been relegated to being workers or 
labourers (Rogerson 2010). This points to a lack of ‘empowerment’ of local beneficiaries, a 
critical factor for longer term sustainability. Plugging the Leaks is based on local 
empowerment as the primary driver of initiative toward community enterprise. Rogerson 
argues that the need to leverage support for community empowerment is critical to unleash 
local creativity and innovation: “Advocating the expansion of local multipliers to assist the 
second economy is a logical policy foundation for future support of the second economy” 
(Rogerson 2010, p. 493). He advocates for pursuing interventions aimed at the second 
economy, which is where Plugging the Leaks seems to work best. 
While Plugging the Leaks has been delivered primarily through non-governmental and 
community-based organisations around the world to date, it offers the promise of 
institutionalising policy instruments for the local state to work directly with low-income 
communities in the future, assuming resources are channelled into wider implementation. 
The exact institutional architecture of delivering Plugging the Leaks through municipalities 
requires some work, but it is not inconceivable that municipalities employ enterprise coaches 
trained in the approach to give real expression to their mandate to better facilitate and 
coordinate development within a locality. Alternatively, existing LED staff could be trained 
in the continuous coaching method, leaving ‘unpickable’ skills in enduring institutions of 
government. 
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Abstract 
Effective climate change actions demand collaborative action from public bodies at all 
levels, placing local governance at the forefront of delivery. Scottish legislation imposes 
some of the most demanding legally-binding requirements for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions currently to be found anywhere in the world. The new climate change 
obligations on Scottish local government are reviewed in the context of current Scottish 
emissions and UK energy policies. Analysis indicates that the pattern of carbon 
consumption rather than its production must be targeted, and that local government is 
well-placed to deliver many of the policies to this end. Case studies of Fife and Highland 
Councils show how Scottish local authorities (SLAs) are planning to discharge their 
climate change mitigation and adaptation responsibilities. Energy efficiency is driving 
the mitigation of carbon consumption, while new techniques for measuring carbon 
footprints are being used to adapt the development process to a low carbon mode. SLAs 
must pursue low-cost local climate change solutions not just to enhance the resilience of 
Scottish communities but also to demonstrate the feasibility of such approaches for local 
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governance systems elsewhere in the face of growing financial constraints. Recent 
changes in Scottish waste management practices indicate the potential in this respect.  
 
Keywords 
Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, Scottish local government, climate change 
mitigation and adaptation policies 
 
1. Introduction: Climate Change and the Role of Local Governance 
Climate change driven by anthropogenic actions cannot be constrained solely through the 
operation of market forces. Sustainable management of global common-pool resources 
such as the atmosphere requires multilateral environmental agreement between sovereign 
States to provide a framework for concerted actions to supplement the workings of the 
market (Mabey et al, 1997). Local councils must then assume responsibility for 
delivering their share of any State’s international commitments on climate change, 
serving as arbiters of competing demands from their own inhabitants for access to these 
shared resources. In practice, this places systems of local governance at the forefront of 
efforts to tackle global warming. 
 
Local public services (such as land use controls, local transport systems, social housing, 
water supplies, education, health, local welfare and recreational facilities, sewerage and 
waste management, libraries and information systems, protective services and emergency 
planning operations) play a major role in shaping the demands placed by local 
communities on the atmosphere and in determining their resilience to climate change. 
This paper reviews the implications of climate change for one jurisdiction’s local 
government sector. It considers how Scottish local authorities (SLAs) are responding to 
some of the world’s most demanding statutory obligations for delivering a low carbon 
economy, set out in the Climate Change (Scotland) Act (CCSA) 2009 (SP, 2009), and 
identifies some of the lessons that can be drawn from Scottish experiences for local 
government practitioners in other jurisdictions.  
 
The argument of the paper is delivered in five parts. The next section provides a brief 
overview of Scottish greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the measures being taken at 
UK level to stimulate a low carbon energy market. This allows the main policy 
implications of addressing climate change to be identified, and the statutory powers taken 
by the Scottish Government for this purpose, including the climate change duties now 
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imposed on SLAs, to be outlined. We then examine some initial SLA responses to these 
new duties, focusing on two sets of policy interventions. The primary set consists of 
mitigation actions, targeted at substantial reductions in GHG emissions. The secondary 
set involves adaptation measures, which ameliorate the inescapable impacts of ongoing 
climate change. A concluding section evaluates the opportunities and threats climate 
change presents for SLAs. 
 
2. The Current State of Play: Trends in Scottish GHG Emissions and 
Reform of the UK Energy Market 
 
Current trends in Scottish GHG emissions 
Table 1 indicates recent trends in the level of GHG emissions attributable to Scottish 
sectors of production. Total emissions calculated on this basis are shown to have fallen 
by 18.7% between the baseline average over 1990-95 and 2007. Business and industry, 
followed by waste management, made the largest absolute reductions, together 
accounting for 60% of the total fall. Energy supply’s smaller reduction was 
counterbalanced by an increase in emissions from transport, allowing the total share of 
Scottish emissions generated by these two sectors to rise from a baseline contribution of 
just over 50% to 62% in 2007. Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) 
activities serve as a carbon sink, and their offsets rose appreciably over this period. In 
2007 Scottish LULUCF offsets were far larger than those for the UK as a whole, 
reflecting the importance of the Scottish forestry sector. 
 
The data in Table 1 require a small adjustment to take account of the effects of the 
Emissions Trading System (ETS) over this period. Introduced in 2005, this sets a cap on 
the emissions of major energy intensive undertakings within the European Union (EU). 
In Scotland nearly one hundred large industrial installations, including electricity 
generators, refineries and heavy industry, which account for around 40% of total Scottish 
GHG emissions, are allocated allowances under the ETS which can be traded to make up 
shortfalls or realise surpluses. Over the past few years, Scotland has been a small net 
purchaser of ETS allowances, and this has slightly reduced its net attributable GHG 
emissions below the actual ones reported. 
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Table 1. Scottish GHG emissions, change from base (1990-95 annual average) to 2007 (not 
adjusted for trading in the EU ETS).  
 
Sector 
Baseline 
annual average 
(1990-95) Mt CO2e 
2007 
Mt CO2e 
Change 
(baseline to 
2007) 
Mt CO2e 
Change 
(baseline to 
2007) 
% 
% of Scottish 
net 
emissions 
2007 
% of UK net 
emissions 
2007 
Energy supply 22.35 20.59 -1.76 -7.9 36.2 9 
Transport (including 
international aviation & 
shipping) 
13.21 14.73 1.52 11.5 25.9 8 
Business & Industry 12.46 7.68 -4.78 -38.4 13.5 7 
Agriculture 9.72 7.69 -2.03 -20.9 13.5 16 
Residential 7.79 7.20 -0.59 -7.6 12.7 9 
Waste management 5.77 2.64 -3.13 -54.2 4.6 12 
Public 1.24 0.81 -0.43 -34.7 1.4 8 
Land use, land use 
change & forestry* -2.52 -4.44 -1.92 76.2 -7.8 249 
Total Scottish net 
emissions 70.01 56.90 -13.11 -18.7 100.0 8 
*negative. Source: SG, 2010d 
 
A more fundamental issue confronting policy-makers relying on these statistics as a 
management tool for monitoring Scottish climate change performance is that they only 
record the GHG emissions attributable to a jurisdiction’s production of goods and 
services. They do not indicate what contribution its consumption of goods and services 
makes to GHG emissions, since a proportion of Scotland’s domestic needs are met by 
imports while part of its output is exported. To convert the data from a production to a 
consumption base, GHG emissions attributable to imports must be added, those 
attributable to exports deducted, and LULUCF offsets disregarded (Helm et al, 2007). 
When these adjustments are made using one of the growing number of multi-regional 
input-output (MRIO) packages being developed to model global GHG emissions (see, 
for example, Dawkins et al, 2010), Scotland’s GHG emissions measured in terms of 
consumption are shown to have risen by 14% between 1992 and 2006 (SG, 2010d: 
para.5.5). The difference in these two trends over the fifteen year period, which has seen 
an 18.7% fall in GHG emissions generated physically within Scotland converted into a 
14% rise after taking into account domestic consumption of goods and services obtained 
from all sources, provides a clear indication of the significance of the problem of carbon 
leakage in addressing climate change. 
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This phenomenon first came to prominence during multi-lateral negotiations over 
proposals for binding agreements on GHG emissions embodied in the Kyoto Protocol 
(Barker & Johnstone, 1998). A number of parties to the negotiations raised concerns that 
an agreement restricting the GHG emissions of developed countries might lead to a loss 
of business to jurisdictions without emissions controls. If such effects became 
widespread after the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the net change in global 
GHG emissions might prove far smaller than the gross reductions in developed countries. 
Businesses would be tempted simply to switch the location of their production to 
uncontrolled jurisdictions, continuing to sell the same products to their consumers as 
imports rather than as domestic output, creating what came to be termed carbon leakage. 
 
As the Scottish situation demonstrates, carbon leakage exists without the assistance of 
asymmetrical international GHG emission controls. Divergent trends in the production 
and consumption metrics of GHG emissions are an integral aspect of mature open 
economies (Brinkley & Less, 2010). They arise from structural changes within these 
economies as their product mix is modified in response to long-term shifts in global 
market parameters. Rising energy costs and widespread improvements in energy 
efficiency have been accompanied by ongoing de-industrialisation and a switch to 
service sector activities, with many previously domestically manufactured goods now 
being imported. Globalisation of trade allows the level of GHG emissions generated by 
productive activities within a mature economy such as Scotland to be decoupled from the 
carbon footprint created by its consumers. This footprint continues to rise in line with the 
higher living standards that stimulate increasing domestic consumption of goods and 
services, the sourcing of which is not confined to Scotland but met from the most 
competitive location. 
 
The ease with which a mature economy is capable of decoupling the linkages between 
the emissions generated by its pattern of consumption from those generated by its 
production base indicates that strategies for delivering a low carbon economy must 
modify the behaviour of consumers as well as producers. Furthermore, the scale of 
carbon leakage that international trade already facilitates, far from serving to discourage 
international climate change agreements, should instead confirm the need to address the 
problem on a global basis rather than through an uncoordinated set of individual 
initiatives. In this respect, the EU Single Market provides a helpful halfway house, 
setting broadly comparable climate change policy parameters for businesses operating 
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within its Member States and in return allowing them free access to its 501 million 
consumers (Schreurs et al, 2009). 
 
Reform of the UK energy market 
In choosing an optimal mitigation pathway, the policy-maker’s initial task is to estimate 
under conditions of uncertainty the basic shape of two critical functions: the benefit 
function that measures the damage avoided by mitigating anthropogenic GHGs; and the 
cost function which measures the amount of resources required to deliver various levels 
of abatement. The sensitivity of either function to different mitigation targets should 
condition the type of strategy favoured (Helm, 2010a). If policy-makers envisage that the 
marginal damage function is liable to rise steeply in the absence of effective abatement 
measures whilst the marginal costs of policies to this end remain relatively insensitive to 
the scale of mitigation required, they should favour quantitative GHG targets delivered 
by policy instruments such as the emissions caps embodied in the EU ETS, and accept 
the implicit carbon prices resulting. Conversely, if they consider that marginal costs are 
liable to rise precipitately as the scale of mitigation increases, whereas the marginal 
damage function appears fairly flat over feasible target ranges, it makes more sense to 
select an acceptable price for carbon externalities which can then determine the 
affordable level of abatement and identify the mitigation options that remain viable. 
 
Recent UK and Scottish Government policy choices in this respect have been driven by 
the Stern Review (2006), commissioned by the UK Treasury to consider the economics 
of climate change. Stern’s findings have convinced British policy-makers of the need for 
early and substantial climate change interventions based on quantitative targets. Arguing 
in favour of such an approach, the previous UK Labour government stated: 
 
if left unchecked, climate change presents an increasing threat to our security and 
prosperity. Lord Stern has shown that if we do not take action, the longer term 
costs of climate change will vastly outweigh the costs of early movement to a 
low-carbon, climate resilient economy (DECC, 2010a:10). 
 
Stern’s analysis has been challenged (for example by Helm, 2008), but the current UK 
and Scottish administrations still favour the use of statutory emissions targets rather than 
explicit carbon prices for their mitigation strategies. 
 
The UK fiscal instruments supporting a shift towards a low carbon energy market reflect 
this emphasis on quantitative goals rather than cost-effective options. Table 2 ranks them 
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in terms of their marginal cost per tonne of carbon savings. The range of implicit carbon 
prices so calculated lends weight to claims that this approach to mitigation facilitates rent-
seeking behaviour on the part of generators (Helm, 2010b). The costs of saving carbon 
range from £3.26 per tonne of CO2 equivalent for the Climate Change Levy on Fuel Oil 
up to £460 for Feed-in Tariffs for Microgeneration and possibly more for the Renewable 
Heat Obligation. These huge differences are compounded by the fact that some of the 
more expensive measures serve as potential substitutes for much cheaper alternatives. 
Thus, the carbon savings delivered by the Renewables Obligation and the Feed-in Tariffs 
for Microgeneration “may result in cheaper carbon reductions elsewhere in the EU not 
happening, since all emissions are under the ETS cap” (McIlveen, 2010: 47). 
 
Table 2. Implied Carbon Prices of UK Fiscal Instruments Used for Carbon Mitigation 
 
Policy Price (£tCO2e) Who pays & how? 
Climate Change Levy: Fuel Oil 3.26 Business customers through energy bills 
Climate Change Levy: Coal 5.03 Business customers through energy bills 
Climate Change Levy: Gas 8.63 Business customers through energy bills 
Climate Change Levy: Electricity 10.93 Business customers through energy bills 
Carbon Reduction Commitment 12 (fixed for 3 yrs) Non-energy-intensive large businesses 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme 14 approx. (variable) Power companies and other energy-intensive industries, passed through to all customers 
Air Passenger Duty 25-320 All passengers, on ticket 
Fuel Duty - Red Diesel 41.79 Agricultural businesses 
Renewables Obligation 130.25 Power companies, passed to all customers 
Fuel Duty - Diesel 217.45 All drivers, at pump 
Fuel Duty - Petrol 248.65 All drivers, at pump 
Feed-in Tariffs for Microgeneration 460 Consumers through bills 
Renewable Heat Incentive Not clear: very high Consumers through bills 
Carbon Capture and Storage Levy Not clear Consumers through bills 
 
Source: McIlveen, 2010 
 
Some rationalisation of these arrangements is underway (DECC, 2010b). A floor price 
for carbon is being introduced, offering power utilities greater incentives to switch from 
carbon-intensive forms of generation than provided by the current ETS traded price. 
Other measures include employing a ‘contract for difference’ system for feed-in tariffs 
that should offer a more cost-effective way of stimulating low carbon capacity from 
generating sources of widely differing scale; further incentives to encourage the 
additional capacity needed to ensure security of supply as the National Grid becomes 
more dependent on intermittent power sources such as wind farms; and the use of an 
emissions performance standard to limit the amount of carbon that coal-fired generating 
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stations can emit. Even with these measures, the UK Government still expects the price 
of electricity to rise in real terms by 52% over the next twenty years, from £118 per 
megawatt hour to £179 (Lea, 2011). 
 
3. Implications for SLAs of the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 
 
Policy implications for SLAs of adopting a low carbon strategy 
The analysis in the previous section offers some pointers on how SLAs should discharge 
their climate change responsibilities. Firstly, it must be apparent that mitigation at any 
price cannot be an end in itself. Use of atmospheric resources is characterised by the 
allocative problem of global commons. Individual States cannot be excluded from 
accessing such resources, while their actions impose consequences for all users. This 
creates a free-rider hazard. Irresponsible States cannot be prevented from sharing the 
benefits delivered by the actions of responsible States, nor can the costs of selfish 
behaviour be confined to the perpetrators (Barkin & Shambaugh, 1996). 
 
This means that Scottish efforts to reduce its GHG emissions will do little to ameliorate 
the effects of global warming for Scotland or for the rest of the world, unless the 
strategies deployed are sufficiently cost-effective to make similar abatement measures 
attractive to others (Mabey et al, 1997). A jurisdiction pioneering a path-breaking 
mitigation strategy must justify this in terms of the effect its successful implementation 
would create, by demonstrating to others that a low carbon economy is feasible and 
worthwhile (rather than expensive and difficult). Uncommitted jurisdictions need to be 
convinced of the logic of Scotland’s approach in order to create the momentum favouring 
collective actions to realise mutual benefits. Failure to deliver a viable strategy would 
simply reinforce free-rider arguments. 
 
Secondly, the key variable for measuring the performance of a mitigation strategy should 
be its impact on the consumption of goods and services generating GHG emissions, not 
their production. Delivering zero carbon outcomes for a jurisdiction’s productive 
activities would do little to reduce global warming if its consumers respond to any 
resulting domestic price hikes simply by meeting their needs through additional imports 
from unconstrained cheaper sources. Mitigation policies should instead be focused on 
modifying the choices made by a jurisdiction’s commercial, industrial, voluntary and 
public sectors and by its individual households in their capacity as consumers of carbon-
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emitting goods and services rather than as their producers. Such policies already apply to 
energy and fuel usage, which as Table 1 indicates currently account for 62% of Scottish 
GHG emissions. Table 2 confirms that consumers ultimately bear the cost of reducing 
the carbon profile of these sectors. 
 
There is evidence that extending such an approach to the rest of the economy would 
prove cost-effective. In their MRIO modelling of the UK economy which considers all 
the linkages between resource flows and usages, Dawkins et al (2010) review alternative 
production and consumption strategies offering quick-win carbon savings up to 2020. 
They conclude that “overall, the consumption or resource sufficiency strategies delivered 
a much greater decrease in GHG emissions than the production based strategies” 
(Dawkins et al, 2010, para.5.2). Research commissioned by the Scottish Government 
(AEA, 2008) identifies carbon capture and storage (CCS) and improved vehicle 
technologies as offering potentially the largest carbon savings for Scotland, followed by 
banning biodegradable waste from landfills and promoting further afforestation. Only 
CCS amongst these preferred options counts as a production strategy and this was not 
considered by the Dawkins et al (2010) study because the technology supporting it 
remains unproven. 
 
Statutory climate change duties for SLAs  
Scotland retained its own legal, religious and education system following the 1707 Act of 
Union, and the past century has seen increasing administrative devolution of other areas 
of governance. This culminated in 1999 in the creation of an elected Scottish Parliament 
and Government able to exercise a wide range of devolved legislative and executive 
powers. Although energy policy is one of the reserved powers retained by the United 
Kingdom (UK) Government, Scottish Ministers exercise devolved authority over 
statutory land use policy and share authority over transport policy with their UK 
counterparts. They also have full responsibility for funding and overseeing Scottish local 
government services, meeting 80% of their cost through grants to SLAs. In practice this 
means that the Scottish Government can use its legislative powers, as demonstrated by 
the CCSA, to inform, guide and regulate most public sector activities relating to climate 
change within its boundaries, even where certain governmental powers are technically 
exercised either at a UK or a European Union (EU) level. 
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Part 1 of the CCSA creates a statutory obligation to reduce Scottish GHG emissions by 
80% in 2050, with an interim reduction target of 42% by 2020 (SP, 2009). To enable 
these goals to be realised, Scottish Ministers are required to use secondary legislation to 
set annual targets from 2010 until 2050. They are also obliged to take advice on how to 
set carbon budgets to hit such targets, initially from the UK Committee on Climate 
Change set up as part of the UK Climate Change Act 2008 (UK Parliament, 2008). Part 2 
of the Scottish Act allows Scottish Ministers to establish their own expert committee or 
to designate an existing body to fulfil this function. 
 
Part 3 of the CCSA obliges Scottish Ministers to report to the Scottish Parliament on 
Scottish GHG emissions and on the progress being made towards the targets set out in 
the legislation (SG, 2009a). Part 4 places climate change duties on Scottish public 
bodies, and enables Scottish Ministers to issue statutory instruments placing further 
duties on such bodies in relation to climate change. Part 5 contains further statutory 
provisions on climate change which address adaptation, forestry, energy efficiency and 
waste reduction. Part 6 sets out provisions for public engagement with the 
implementation of climate change legislation, and makes provisions for carbon 
assessment, including accounting for carbon trading.  
 
The parallel UK legislation sets a slightly less ambitious interim 2020 reduction target of 
34%. It also excludes aviation and shipping from its targets, and sets them on a 
quinquennial rather than annual basis. Whereas the UK framework allows borrowing of 
up to 1% from the following carbon budget period, no such facility is available under the 
Scottish one. The UK framework also allows the purchase of credits to meet its carbon 
budgets, subject to advice from its Committee on Climate Change, but the Scottish one 
sets a prior limit of 20% of the emissions reduction effort on the purchase of such credits.  
 
The climate change duties placed on Scottish public bodies by Part 4 of the CCSA came 
into effect at the start of 2011. These require that the public sector in Scotland, in 
exercising its functions, must act in the way: 
• best calculated to contribute to the delivery of the mitigation targets set in or 
under Part 1; 
• best calculated to help deliver any programme laid before the Scottish Parliament 
under section 53 (which requires Scottish Ministers to produce adaptation 
programmes); and that they consider most sustainable. 
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Guidance in relation to these duties (SG, 2011) stresses the importance of undertaking 
these duties effectively. It emphasises the need for changes in existing processes and 
procedures to allow pro-active responses that set targets and milestones and integrate 
climate change into their business practice. SLAs and other Scottish public bodies are 
expected to draw on their corporate skills to meet these statutory obligations, utilising 
their expertise in business planning, staff management, estate management and 
procurement. 
 
As well as ensuring that efforts to address climate change are mainstreamed within their 
own organisations, SLAs are expected to ensure that these aims are endorsed within the 
communities they serve. To this end, they must take action to strengthen their 
governance, leadership and commitment in regard to climate change, so that suitable 
community strategies and action plans can be put into effect, including partnership 
arrangements with other public bodies and local organisations in their area. The guidance 
also expects public bodies to incorporate appropriate techniques into their decision-
making, so that they can undertake effective assessment of the carbon impacts of policy 
options, adopt pathways capable of realising their climate change plans, and provide an 
audit trail of their actions for compliance reporting purposes. 
 
4. Policy Instruments for Discharging SLA Climate Change Duties 
 
SLA mitigation measures 
Since 2007, all SLAs have been signed up to the Scottish Climate Change Declaration 
(SCCD, 2011). Launched in 2000, this voluntary initiative requires signatories to 
acknowledge the consequences of climate change and to co-operate with others in 
undertaking many of the climate change actions subsequently set out as statutory duties 
in the CCSA, including the production of annual reports on the performance of their 
carbon management activities. SLAs now have to build on these reports by publishing 
action plans for mitigation and adaptation demonstrating how they will discharge their 
CCSA responsibilities. 
 
The research capacity available to SLAs to meet the technical requirements for these 
voluntary Scottish Climate Change Declaration reports, as well as for the new statutory 
plans and compliance statements meeting their CCSA duties, has been steadily enhanced 
over the past decade. Sources of expertise now include the Scottish Climate Change 
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Impacts Partnership (SCCIP, 2011) and the Scottish and Northern Ireland Forum for 
Environmental Research (SNIFFER, 2011). Additional capacity is provided by the 
Scottish Government’s own environmental agencies, Scottish Natural Heritage and the 
Scottish Environment Protection Agency, as well as through the UK’s Hadley and 
Tyndall climate research centres. 
 
Fife Council has a population of 360,000, making it Scotland’s third largest local 
authority. It illustrates the range of corporate climate change mitigation activities 
undertaken by SLAs. The council’s most recent Annual Progress Report published as 
part of its commitments under the Scottish Climate Change Declaration (FC, 2010) sets 
out its current climate change activities. Those restricted to Fife Council’s own in-house 
operations are channelled through its Council Plan. Supplementing these internal 
management mechanisms, the council is engaged in various community-wide low carbon 
initiatives across Fife. Most of these draw on existing Community Plan provisions, 
through which a Fife Environmental Partnership has been established. 
 
The council’s system for monitoring and controlling its own carbon footprint has 
received Carbon Trust Standard approval. A Carbon Emissions Reduction Plan was 
launched in 2009, and this now drives the majority of the council’s in-house mitigation 
efforts, taking on board the findings of carbon emission audits of individual council 
services. Council procurement services have begun to trial a Whole Life Costing tool for 
estimating the impact of its procurement options on GHG emissions, and council officers 
are developing a Carbon Emissions Impact Assessment toolkit to quantify the climate 
change implications of council proposals (FC, 2010). 
 
Recent audits indicate that Fife Council’s annual carbon footprint is around 110,000 
tonnes CO2 equivalent (FC, 2010). The energy demands of the council’s buildings 
account for 70% of this footprint, the two other main contributors being energy needs of 
its other infrastructure (12%) and fuel requirements for its vehicle fleet (13%). This 
represents a typical footprint for the direct emissions of SLAs, helping explain the 
emphasis placed on public sector schemes in Scotland’s Energy Efficiency Action Plan 
(SG, 2009c).  
 
The EU Directive on Energy Performance of Buildings (CEC, 2002) was transposed into 
Scottish law through amendments to Scottish building regulations (SP, 2008). Since 
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January 2009, all large public buildings (covering an area over 1,000m2) are required to 
display an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC). A revised EU Directive on the energy 
performance of buildings has recently been issued (CEC, 2010), and Scottish Ministers 
are due to implement the necessary further changes to Scottish building regulations. 
 
Data from the current EPC system highlights the poor energy efficiency of Scottish 
public sector buildings, the majority of which are operated by SLAs. A recent audit 
report observes that this: 
 
illustrates the scale of the challenge in reducing emissions from the existing 
public sector estate. Over 70% of large public sector buildings have an EPC rating 
of E to G [poor to very poor], with only 4% rated at A or B [very good or 
excellent](Audit Scotland, 2010: para. 57). 
 
The problem of poor energy efficiency in the face of rising energy costs is not confined 
to the public sector. Evidence of the scale of the problem amongst large UK 
organisations not covered by the ETS or by existing Climate Change Agreements (which 
are targeted at energy-intensive undertakings) has prompted the UK Government to 
introduce a new Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) Energy Efficiency Scheme. This 
is aimed at less energy-intensive businesses and public sector organisations that use over 
6,000 megawatt hours of metered energy per annum. 
 
The CRC will apply to 27 of the 32 SLAs. Initial proposals for the scheme involved a 
cap-and-trade arrangement similar to the ETS that would have allowed participants to 
trade their allowances and retain any profits. Fife Council was the only SLA that 
participated in a trial carbon trading scheme covering 34 local authorities across the UK 
(Bradshaw & Johnston, 2009) in order to test out the opportunities this presented. The 
CRC has since been amended (DECC, 2010c) so that only its penalty elements remain. 
 
Organisations subject to the CRC will be required to audit all their GHG emissions. This 
information will be used to allocate allowances that must be purchased at an initial price 
of £12 per tonne of CO2 equivalent (broadly in line with the current cost of acquiring 
allowances under the ETS). The audited data will also be used to compile and publish an 
overall performance table, ranking each of the participants. Audit Scotland (2010: 
para.68) estimates that Scottish public bodies face an initial overall financial cost of 
buying allowances amounting to £20 million, ranging from £25,000 for a small SLA to 
over £3 million for Scottish Water. The publicity given to their relative performance 
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under the CRC is intended to reinforce the effects of financial sanctions in promoting 
increased energy efficiency. 
 
Domestic energy demands for space and water heating and power account for 29% of all 
Scottish energy consumption (SG, 2009c: 3). In addition to raising their in-house energy 
efficiency, SLAs will also be expected to take strategic ownership of a new domestic 
housing energy efficiency scheme, termed Green Deal, which is part of the Energy 
Security and Green Economy Bill (DECC, 2010d). The Green Deal is targeted at housing 
in the public and private rented sector, as well as owner-occupied homes, suffering low 
energy-efficiency. It allows energy improvements of up to £7,000 per dwelling to be 
implemented without upfront payments: part of the subsequent energy savings by 
households is diverted to meet the cost of these improvements. 
 
The Green Deal (which has also been extended to small businesses) is targeted towards 
funding energy efficiency measures that generate more savings than they cost, based on 
an independent assessment by an accredited adviser. Only accredited installers may 
participate in the scheme. Although Scottish households in owner-occupied dwellings 
currently already have access to a range of incentives to improve the energy efficiency of 
their properties (SG, 2009c), the situation for tenants of local authority and private rented 
accommodation is less clear-cut, since landlords may have little incentive to undertake 
energy efficiency improvements if tenants are responsible for meeting their own energy 
bills. The scheme includes powers to require landlords to honour reasonable requests 
from their tenants for such improvements, where they qualify for Green Deal assistance. 
 
A recent survey indicated that 21% of private sector rented accommodation in England 
had EPC ratings in the lowest categories, ‘F’ or ‘G’ (Hayman, 2010: 11). Under the new 
Bill, all UK local authorities will be empowered to require landlords owning properties 
that fall into the worst performing categories to undertake all energy efficiency 
improvements for which financial support is available. SLAs remain important providers 
of affordable rented accommodation, even though their stock of social housing has been 
significantly reduced in recent decades by right-to-buy legislation. Some of their housing 
stock also suffers from poor energy efficiency, and part of the intention of this new 
scheme is to make local authorities promote area-wide initiatives to raise the energy 
efficiency of all housing stock eligible for assistance, including their own. 
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Measures such as the Green Deal ease the problem of fuel poverty, which continues to be 
a major obstacle to implementing climate change mitigation through measures that drive 
energy costs up for domestic consumers (Dresner & Ekins, 2006). The most recent 
estimates put the number of households in Scotland who are considered to suffer from 
fuel poverty at 618,000 (SG, 2009c: 11). Powers included in the new Energy Security 
and Green Economy Bill would give local authorities access to an Energy Company 
Obligation (ECO) designed to help such households. The UK Minister in charge of the 
Bill is reported as saying that councils would have a key role in ensuring that the ECO 
was effectively spent for this purpose through new forms of engagement with the private 
sector, “with councils selecting a few preferred partners, who would deliver the Green 
Deal in their area according to street-by-street plans drawn up by councils prioritising the 
most vulnerable and the low-quality housing in their area” (Hayman, 2010: 11). 
 
SLA adaptation measures 
Highland Council was the first SLA to publish an adaptation action plan in anticipation 
of its new CCSA climate change duties (HC, 2010). Applying the guidance contained in 
the Scottish Climate Change Adaptation Framework (SG, 2009b), the plan focuses on 
increasing the resilience of Highland communities to climate change. Highland Council 
is easily the largest SLA by area, with many of its 220,000 residents located in isolated 
settlements. Some of its montane, riverine and coastal communities already have an 
exposure to natural hazards that exceeds other parts of the UK. The adaptation action 
plan starts by assessing past climate trends and possible future climate scenarios for these 
communities. 
 
Changes in temperature and precipitation over recent decades have witnessed a 
significant increase in the area’s growing season (HC, 2010: 19), but one of the major 
future climatic imponderables is the impact of climate change on the Meridional 
Overturning Circulation. This ensures that much of the west coast of the Highlands 
enjoys a much milder (and wetter) climate than its latitude (parallel to northern Labrador 
on the other side of the North Atlantic) would indicate. Research suggests that the warm 
North Atlantic Drift it produces might be weakened by ongoing climate change (HC, 
2010: 42). This counter-intuitive possibility of much colder waters poses a significant 
risk for the western Highlands, in terms of its impact on land- and sea-based activities. 
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As part of its preparations for an adaptation plan, the council organised a series of 
workshops for its own service divisions and for community representatives. These 
provided information on what might be the potential effects of climate change on the 
Scottish Highlands, and also allowed the council to receive feedback on what participants 
felt were the main local threats and opportunities arising from these effects. The results 
of such consultations are listed in section 4 of the action plan (HC, 2010: 50-68). They 
display a wide range of views on possible impacts, confirming the need for ongoing 
research on climatic change, particularly in an area with large variations in climate and 
habitat which is occupied by many isolated communities heavily reliant on local public 
services. 
 
Section 5 of the action plan (HC, 2010: 70-79) is arranged around five commitments. 
These require the council to: 
• demonstrate leadership; 
• build on its knowledge base; 
• embed climate change issues into existing policy structures and processes; 
• inform and communicate the need for action, targeting those at greatest risk; and 
• co-operate with relevant stakeholders to identify the most appropriate forms of 
adaptation. 
 
These commitments are supported by a set of 24 action statements, which identify the 
responsible service and provide a review date. These are graded accorded to current 
status: completed or on target; progress with some slippage; no significant progress; or to 
be programmed. Each is also provided with a brief explanatory comment. The final 
section dealing with monitoring and evaluation notes that actions within the plan “will be 
refined through the consultation process and will be SMART: Specific, Measurable, 
Agreed, Realistic and Time-Bound” (HC, 2010: 77). 
 
Although the Scottish Highlands presents some adaptation challenges that are unique to 
the area, the general issues identified echo points made in a recent House of Commons 
committee report on climate change adaptation arrangements. This acknowledged that 
climate change impacts would vary considerably from location to location, warranting 
reliance on local decision making organised and co-ordinated through systems of local 
governance. It also stressed the role of the planning system, recommending that all local 
authorities should be encouraged “to use planning obligations to require developers to 
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take adaptation measures that benefit their new developments and the wider community” 
(EAC, 2010: para.42). 
 
The role of the statutory planning system in promoting effective climate change 
mitigation and adaptation extends well beyond concerns about planning obligations. By 
modifying the shape of the built environment, planning processes can promote 
sustainable growth designed to minimise resource use and carbon emissions and increase 
resilience to climate change (Wilson & Piper, 2010). A recently formed UK pressure 
group offers local planning authorities guidance and model policies on climate change, 
stating that spatial planning can make a major contribution “by shaping new and existing 
developments in ways that reduce carbon dioxide emissions and positively build 
community resilience to problems such as extreme heat or flood risk” (PCCC, 2010: 2). 
 
The Scottish approach to spatial planning exemplifies this philosophy. The Planning etc. 
(Scotland) Act (SP, 2006) created a statutory obligation to produce a National Planning 
Framework (NPF) embodying the precepts of sustainable development. The NPF now 
provides the spatial context for the Scottish Government’s own development priorities, 
articulating the statements of national planning policy set out in Scottish Planning Policy 
(SPP) (SG, 2010a). Scottish planning legislation places a statutory obligation on SLAs in 
their capacity as planning authorities to take the NPF and SPP into account in preparing 
development plans, with the contents of these documents forming a material 
consideration in determining planning applications. 
 
In parallel with legislation to update the Scottish planning system to enable it to promote 
sustainable development, the Environmental Assessment (Scotland) Act (EASA) 2005 
(SP, 2005) has extended the EU Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive 
(CEC, 2001) to virtually all Scottish public sector policies, programmes and strategies 
(PPSs). Scottish Ministers promoted this legislation to make Scotland ‘a world leader’ in 
using such techniques to mainstream the environment in public sector policy-making 
(Jackson & Illsley, 2006). Before any Scottish PPS can now be implemented, it must be 
subject to an environmental assessment process that is open to public scrutiny and 
comment. A Scottish SEA Gateway has been created to facilitate these statutory 
assessment requirements. 
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EASA requires consideration of climatic factors when applying SEA to Scottish PPSs, 
including all Scottish development plans (SG, 2010b). Recently issued guidance on the 
use of the technique to this end identifies opportunities to: 
• explore the potential contribution a PPS makes to GHG emissions, with the aim 
of avoiding or reducing such emissions where possible; 
• consider whether future Scottish PPSs are resilient to the effects of climate 
change; 
• identify measures to address any adverse effects a PPS may have on climate; and 
• help the public sector to make informed decisions about how to reduce the GHG 
emissions of PPSs and ensure they are resilient to the future climate (SG, 2010c: 
para.1.4).  
 
Scottish Ministers are currently actively reviewing how Scottish SEA procedures might 
be further extended to meet the statutory obligations of the CCSA. The potential of 
environmental modelling software packages is being evaluated (Savills, AEA 
Technology & MVA Consultancy, 2011). If such approaches are adopted, they would 
generate quantitative data to supplement the qualitative procedures recommended in 
current guidance, enabling different development scenarios to be tested for their 
environmental and carbon footprints. 
 
Initiatives drawing on these techniques to model the resource and carbon implications of 
SLA operations are already being pursued. The Local Footprint Project, managed by 
WWF Scotland and the Sustainable Scotland Network, is currently working in 
partnership with Eco-Schools Scotland, the Improvement Service and Scottish Power, to 
promote the use of the Resources and Energy Analysis Programme (REAP) interactive 
resource and carbon accounting software package developed by the Stockholm 
Environment Institute (Paul et al, 2008). Such software packages are capable of utilising 
datasets based on environmental input-output data that can be configured for local 
circumstances. 
 
Such tools can be used to enhance SLA capacity to identify and implement low energy 
strategies for meeting their new CRC obligations, and help them manage other aspects of 
their carbon plans more effectively. They can also be used to run alternative scenarios for 
new development strategies, allowing the strategic options within a development plan to 
be tested for their ecological and carbon footprints. This makes the climate change 
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implications of SLA policy choices much more explicit and subject to detailed 
examination. South Lanarkshire Council (2010) has undertaken a pathfinder project 
which applies these carbon footprinting techniques to the masterplans being developed in 
three of its Community Growth Areas: East Kilbride, Hamilton and Newton. 
 
5.   Conclusions: SLA Opportunities and Threats Posed by Climate Change 
Climate change poses a major challenge for systems of local governance. Local 
authorities across the world must justify the confidence shown by central governments in 
their capacity to deliver crucial components of the solution to this problem. Scotland 
offers a test-bed for judging whether local governance can respond to this challenge, 
since SLAs have been given a central role in implementing what the Scottish 
Government considers “world-leading legislation which can act as an example of best 
practice to other countries” (SG, 2010d: para.4.1). 
 
The common-pool characteristics of climate change management ensure that 
affordability will remain a crucial determinant of the demonstration effect of this 
legislation. Assuming central government continues to set the parameters for national 
energy and transport policies, many of the remaining elements of a cost-effective strategy 
can be delivered through a decentralised approach, allowing local governance to identify 
the mitigation and adaptation measures that best suit their own communities. Domestic 
energy efficiency is an obvious example, as the Local Government Association for 
England and Wales recognises: 
 
through their land-use powers, local development frameworks, regeneration and 
area action plans, councils are already setting out how their communities will 
develop and improve over the next few decades. They are uniquely placed to 
understand when and where improvements are going to be made – and as such, 
they are best placed to identify opportunities to integrate the installation of energy 
efficiency measures into these improvements (LGA, 2009: 6). 
 
Compared with the UK average, Scotland has a colder climate, more housing in rural 
locations without access to gas mains, and more households living in dwellings with non-
standard construction that is difficult to insulate. Its domestic energy efficiency schemes 
need to be carefully tailored to local circumstances, with SLA housing officers focusing 
on households likely to be exposed to fuel poverty from rising energy costs (Stewart, 
2010). Many climate change adaptation measures also require local responses shaped to 
specific types of area-based hazards. SLA spatial planners and emergency planning 
services provide the local expertise to identify which communities exposed to climate 
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change risks are capable of reinforcing their current defences at reasonable cost, and 
which might need to relocate or modify some of their activities. 
 
Reliance on local governance to deliver the bulk of community-based mitigation and 
adaptation measures also accords with the argument made in the paper that policies must 
address the consumption determinants of carbon emissions rather than their production. 
Unless individual jurisdictions or trading blocs are prepared to place border taxes on 
imports of high carbon goods and services - a measure advocated by Helm (2010a) but 
unlikely to find widespread political support amongst the electorates that bear the costs 
of such actions - mitigation strategies must ultimately be focused on changing patterns of 
consumption so that producers, wherever located, will be obliged to adjust their product 
mixes accordingly. A low carbon world in a global economy which continues to enjoy 
the benefits of free trade is only possible if this also becomes a low carbon-consumption 
world, in which the location of production for meeting consumer needs is determined by 
where carbon inputs are lowest. 
 
Local governance helps provide a suitable framework for promoting such a low carbon-
consumption world. A large part of consumer expenditure in any country is directed 
towards local public services such as education, public health and water supplies, social 
housing, environmental health and waste management, all of which are susceptible to 
low carbon modifications. Most of these services are also non-competitive in nature, with 
local authorities acting as the sole providers to those who live and work in their area. 
This means that actions SLAs take to promote low carbon-consumption practices cannot 
readily be undermined by carbon leakages to domestic competitors, as might well occur 
if private sector businesses such as supermarkets attempted to emulate them. SLAs that 
succeed in transforming their service delivery from high to low carbon will not lose 
business to other SLAs who fail to emulate them.  
 
A good example of the ability of local governance to deliver low carbon-consumption 
strategies is to be found in waste management. In 2010 the Scottish Government 
published its zero-waste strategy (SG, 2010e). Of the 20 million tonnes of waste 
produced in Scotland in 2008, domestic households accounted for 14.5%, the 
construction industry for 43% and other commercial and industrial sources for 40%. 
Much of this is capable of being re-used, recycled or used for energy generation rather 
than be disposed of via landfill, allowing Scotland to reduce both its ecological and its 
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carbon footprint. In the 1990s, Scotland used to send over 80% of its municipal waste to 
landfill. Under its new zero-waste strategy, a maximum of 5% is designated for landfill 
(SG, 2010e).  
 
In recent years, EU Directives transposed into Scottish legislation have had a major 
impact on Scottish municipal, commercial and industrial waste management practices 
(Brady & Jackson, 2003). Most private sector waste is now managed on a low carbon 
basis. SLAs are responsible for collecting household waste, and their municipal waste 
operations also serve a wide range of commercial and industrial undertakings. Following 
changes in SLA waste collection practices, Scottish households now sort their waste into 
different bins for kerbside collection and make use of SLA recycling centres. As Table 3 
demonstrates, this has triggered a significant low carbon behavioural change by Scottish 
households over a relatively short time-span. 
 
Table 3. Percentage in Scottish Housing Survey who reported recycling waste 
items in past month 
 
 
Item 
Adult 
respondents Households 
2000 2002 2003 2007 2008 2009 
Newspapers/magazines/paper/card 
Glass bottles and jars 
Plastic bottles 
Metal cans 
30 
29 
6 
9 
33 
31 
8 
10 
45 
35 
12 
14 
81 
67 
58 
59 
83 
70 
65 
65 
84 
73 
71 
69 
One or more of the above items 43 45 55 84 87 88 
 
Source: Natural Scotland, 2010 
 
Despite these opportunities, a shortage of finance is likely to prove the main constraint 
on the ability of SLAs to deliver their climate change duties over the next decade. The 
introduction of the CRC will highlight ongoing disparities in SLA in-house energy 
efficiency. The CRC levy should make win-win outcomes from increased in-house 
energy efficiency even more apparent in an era of rising energy costs. However, SLAs 
will still need to find the funds to invest in new estate and to recruit and train staff 
capable of identifying low carbon options (Richens, 2010). 
 
In straightened financial circumstances it is tempting to cut back on training and to 
accept the lowest upfront construction price for new estate, overlooking options that offer 
much lower life-cycle outlays. As Audit Scotland (2010: para.69) observes: “public 
bodies are facing difficult decisions due to increasing financial pressures in the public 
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sector and this may make it more difficult to secure the investment needed to continually 
reduce emissions from energy sources”. The challenge facing SLAs such as the Fife and 
Highland Councils is to find the means to fulfil their statutory obligations with regard to 
climate change while restructuring to cope with sharp reductions in funding. It will be a 
good test of the resilience of Scottish local governance.  
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1. Introduction 
 
‘If you have built a castle in the air your work need not be lost – that is where they should 
be. Now put the foundations under them.’ (Henry Thoreau) 
 
First, the good news. Africa’s economic pulse has quickened, infusing the continent with a 
new commercial vibrancy. Real GDP rose by 4.9 percent a year from 2000 through 2008, 
more than twice its pace in the 1980s and 1990s. Telecommunications, banking, and retailing 
are flourishing. Construction is booming. Private-investment inflows are surging. Africa’s 
collective GDP, at $1.6 trillion in 2008, is now roughly equal to Brazil’s or Russia’s, and 
according to the McKinsey Quarterly, ‘What’s driving Africa’s growth’ (2010), the continent 
is among the world’s most rapidly growing economic regions. This acceleration is a sign of 
hard-earned progress and future promise.  
 
There is also good news about public management. According to the African Development 
Bank (2011), many African countries are making significant progress in improving public 
financial management. In recent years, public expenditure management in several countries 
has improved, regulatory and supervisory bodies have been strengthened, and tax systems 
have been reformed towards internationally recognized standards of good fiscal practice. A 
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World Bank and Brookings survey of 31 African countries, found that at least 25 had 
adopted reforms involving payroll, procurement, internal audit and external audit (Andrews 
2010). 
 
However, development is of course about more than just improving people’s economic and 
financial situation and many of Africa’s 50-plus economies still face hugely challenging 
issues of poverty, social inequity, social justice, security and corruption, issues that cannot 
simply be addressed by economic growth alone. So there is a need for further progress. 
Many of the reforms have been applied at the central or federal level and have not filtered 
sufficiently or at all to local government level. There is limited institutional and human 
capacity. Whilst, a lot of attention has been given to the legal frameworks and budgeting 
methodologies, there has not been enough focus on the development of professional skills in 
the public sector, and historically it has been hard to attract people to work in the African 
public sector because of the poor pay levels and archaic systems of government, particularly 
in local government. 
 
The Local Government Service in Africa today is still fundamentally the product of the 
nineteenth century colonial philosophy although the problems it faces are those of the twenty 
first century. In spite of some progress in some areas, it remains inadequate for the most 
efficient discharge of the present and prospective responsibilities of government. To the 
credit of some African countries, there has been an increased adoption of reforms, but in 
general there is still a lack of strong, stable local governments. The progress made by some 
governments in the past ten years is noteworthy. However, the challenges remain colossal. 
Evidence of poor service; citizen discontent and dissatisfaction; incompetency; poor 
leadership; and adverse audit reports all point to the need for greater capacity to be able to 
fulfil the shared vision of an effective and innovative local government sector. 
 
Across Africa, there is a need to come to grips with the reality of our situation however 
disheartening it may look and feel. Whilst we have legitimate and proud cause to celebrate 
our successes to date, our “castles” which are symbols of our success cannot be grounded 
without significant development and professionalization of the local government sector. Well 
thought-through and effective efforts have got to be made to ensure that political leaders, 
 AJAYI: Professionalising local government leadership 
 
 CJLG May-November 2011 138 
 
executives and administrators have the right mix of skills and expertise to enable their 
departments or agencies to deliver effective services. To this end, the goal must be to 
professionalise the business of government. Given the increasing investment in capacity 
building and the acute shortage of local government professionals, it is time to work together 
to build set standards across the local government sector; develop the leaders that can 
transform the sector; and develop professional practice in local government. With the right, 
robust and rigorous interventions and support, local government can truly become a vehicle 
for lasting development. And the aim of this paper is to stimulate and facilitate a 
collaborative inquiry into the need, motivations and benefits for a professionalised local 
government.  
 
2.  Local Government and Professionalisation 
There is a general consensus about what local governments should be doing in Africa (as 
indeed, around the globe). We want local governments that can: 
• provide effective municipal governance;  
• provide community and democratic leadership; 
• provide efficient services; 
• empower communities and citizens; 
• provide strategic leadership - setting vision, 
• be effective regulators - licensing, environmental 
• health, planning, trading standards, etc; 
• collect and administer taxes effectively 
• be a scrutineer – for the sector 
• be shaper of the economic and physical development of communities. 
 
But local government will not be up to these multiple tasks unless it develops the necessary 
human capital through the injection of professionalisation and professional practices.  
 
Africa's urgent priority is to reduce poverty through strong and sustained economic growth 
and improved services that benefit the poor. But no country has succeeded with levels of 
human development as low as those found in the majority of African countries today. The 
development of human capital is one of the major challenges facing the region and is a 
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critical factor in the fight to reduce poverty and reach the Millennium Development Goals. 
Human capital includes the attributes of a person that are productive in some economic 
context. It often refers to formal educational attainment, with the implication that education 
is an investment whose returns are in the form of wage, salary, or other compensation. These 
are normally measured and conceived of as private returns to the individual but can also be 
social returns. Professionalisation can be seen as a process of building upon this formal 
educational attainment with a view to skills enhancement and specialization.  
 
In a recent interview Ritva Reinikka, World Bank Director for Human Development in 
Africa, highlighted the importance of human development in the run-up to 2015 when the 
Millennium Development Goals are due. She stated that: 
 
It’s certainly true that a lot of physical capital must be built quickly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. By that I mean roads, electricity, water supply, internet connectivity, and so 
on. But the other side of the coin is that countries also need to build “human” capital. 
That is, a skilled and knowledgeable workforce that can contribute to the economy 
productively. So countries need to make sure that people are healthy, well-educated, 
and have the right skills for jobs, and that they are protected from poverty and hunger 
(World Bank 2011). 
 
There is no doubt that efforts at public sector reform are succeeding in some areas. However, 
without an urgent investment in professionalisation, noble national and state aspirations and 
the influx of donor aid will only achieve minimal improvements. 
 
3. What We Do Not Mean By Professionalism 
Whilst there is general agreement that skills need to be improved in order to generate 
sustainable change and improvements in local government administration, a highly skilled 
service is not an end in itself. It is important to be clear about what we do not mean by 
professionalisation.  According to Wilensky (1964), this label is loosely applied to increasing 
specialization and transferability of skill, the proliferation of objective standards of work, the 
spread of tenure arrangements, licensing, or certification, and the growth of service 
occupations. Professionalism, by definition, involves belonging to a profession and is about 
behaving in a way that is consistent with certain professional standards. A profession is an 
occupation that requires extensive training and the study and mastery of specialized 
knowledge. It usually requires accreditation, certification, or licensing. It has a specific code 
of ethics, and it holds members accountable. (Carter and Wilson 2006). 
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Professionalisation of Local Government cannot be used as a blanket term because the sector 
is made up of several professional streams. Professionalisation of local government is 
therefore about more than improving professional practice. It is also about institutional 
capacity and can only be achieved through cultural and behavioural change. So it is 
important to differentiate between the structural and behavioural attributes of 
professionalism. Professional associations have a vital role to play in ensuring standards in 
local government services but efforts to build institutional capacity must be targeted at 
bringing about change in behaviours and attitudes, both at the leadership and grassroots 
level. Professionalism means having an internal set of standards of performance and 
behaviour. Professionals aspire to high ideals: altruism; honour and integrity; respect; 
excellence and scholarship; caring, compassion, and communication; leadership; and 
responsibility and accountability. (Carter and Wilson 2006). Professionalisation is about 
espousing a particular philosophy of how we govern in local government – the aim is to 
professionalise the business of local government.  
 
4. Enabling Conditions for a Professional Local Government 
In spite of progress made to date, local government in Africa still remains inadequate in 
seven important respects. It is still too based on the philosophy of the amateur (or 
"generalist" or "all-rounder"). This is most evident among the senior ranks. Second, the 
present system of categories and grading in the local administration, (each for the most part 
with its own separate pay and career structure) seriously impedes its work. Third, members 
of specialist classes such as finance, planners, and engineers are frequently given neither the 
full responsibilities and opportunities nor the corresponding authority they ought to have. 
Fourth, there are too few staff is skilled managers or leaders. Fifth, there is not enough 
contact between local councils and the communities they are there to serve. Sixth, human 
resource management and career planning are inadequate. Finally, there is a problem of poor 
pay in comparison to other sectors. 
 
There is a need to improve local government capability in all these areas so that local 
government staff have the right mix of skills and expertise to enable their departments (be it 
in policy delivery, operational service delivery and corporate service delivery (including 
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services such as finance, ICT, communications and HR) to deliver effective services to 
citizens. There is a need for staff and leaders to have the right attitude and behaviours in 
order to serve their citizens and local communities effectively. It is about injecting dignity 
into local government administration by moving away from the concepts of "generalist" and 
"specialist", and to create a Local Government sector where all staff is specialists of one 
form or another and leadership is distributed. We know that systems with years of tradition 
and embedded bureaucracy behind them won’t be easy to change. Before real progress can 
be achieved, we must cultivate the conditions under which change and this means tackling a 
range of issues. 
 
Elitism 
Historically across the world, the public sector is rife with elitism. In Africa, there is a 
tendency to view local government as inferior to other parts of the civil service. Policy work 
is the most revered and the one linked to promotion. What is needed is whole-systems 
professionalisation so that the key work streams of local government including policy, 
finance, human resources and general management, carry equal esteem and all three should 
provide opportunities for promotion. This should be reflected in the processes of attraction; 
recruitment; selection; retention and refreshment. 
 
Staff should be encouraged early in their careers in local government to choose whether to 
pursue a career in a particular profession - such as a professional policy delivery specialist or 
a professional public finance management (PFM). Although all careers should include 
experience of at least two professions and preferably more, individuals should major in one 
of those. They should then be advised to plot career paths accordingly (for example, a 
professional policy adviser might gain operational delivery experience by working in a 
management or leadership role). For the upper echelon, standards can be raised so that there 
is a minimum requirement for entrants including the need to be skilled in organisations; 
management theory and practice; and the experience of managing complex organisations 
and; a commitment to continuous professional development. For the lower echelon, there 
should be a process whereby the everyday skills of civil servants is recognized through some 
kind of vocational qualifications that can be graduated into either academic or professional 
qualifications. In an effort to raise standards, the following core skills should be made 
mandatory for senior local government officials:  
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• Analysis and use of evidence; 
• Financial management; 
• People management; 
• Programme and project management; 
• Strategic thinking; and 
• Communications.  
 
Standards 
Raising professional standards is a core strand of public sector reforms. People need to know 
what standards are expected and what behaviours underpin them. All over Africa, 
governments should be seeking to rebuild citizens’ trust and confidence in local government 
administration by raising standards of professionalism across the sector. One of the key ways 
of doing this is for local governments to build in house capacity though the achievement of 
higher level qualifications; meeting enhanced standards of continuing professional 
development; and adhering to common ethical standards.  
Pay 
The issue of poor pay is important because it contributes to two big problems in local 
government: attrition and corruption. Generally, local government is seen as a last resort for 
desperate people who are hoping to supplement their income by moonlighting and 
conducting business during office hours so that they can make ends meet. The public sector, 
and in particular, local government, continues to experience a drain of talent to the private 
sector (including foreign companies) and NGOs, even losing talent to the very aid agencies 
that are supposed to be helping governments build their capacity (Wuyts 1996). Although it 
can be difficult to close the pay gap between the public sector and the private sector, this is 
an issue that must be addressed, and urgently, for there to be a demonstrable improvement in 
the attraction, recruitment and retention of talent to local government.  
 
Corruption 
The issue of low pay is strongly linked to corruption and lack of individual and 
organizational discipline. Local government employees resort to all sorts of unethical 
practices in order to make ends meet. This is an endemic problem especially as some 
particular pockets of the administration are seen as “to die for money-making zones”. 
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Weaning employees off unethical practices and bribery will be impossible without pay 
reform fostering the principles and practices of individual and collective social responsibility 
and accountability.  
 
Career Progression and Meritocracy 
Although one of the essential pillars of public sector reform and professionalisation is 
meritocracy, it is not always easy to achieve in any country, and is particularly difficult in 
Africa. There is a historically based on aristocracy with a perceived right to privileged 
positions, including the upper echelon of civil service. In a world where who you know, 
where you went to college, and your surname does matter, the upper echelon has become a 
class of its own.  Rules of fairness and equal opportunities can be used to create more 
favourable conditions for meritocracy in local government including: 
• The injection of competition into recruitment and selection processes so that the best 
candidate gets the job; 
• Basing recruitment on competencies and experience by adherence to strict and 
enforceable codes and processes of recruitment and selection; 
• Recognition of non-academic qualifications (on-the-job learning) and past 
professional performance; and 
• Matching past performance to the job requirements. 
 
There should be further improvement to the recruitment and induction practices that provides 
recruits with support and a more open culture with is conducive to success. This requires 
significant management and leadership commitment.  
 
Legal and regulatory framework 
There must be robust legal and regulatory frameworks to ensure compliance with the 
professionalisation agenda.  
 
Training 
Training is vital to professionalism but it cannot simply a case of training for the sake of 
training. It is impossible to build capacity if we cannot identify the skills that are needed. 
Local governments should invest in a coherent strategy that helps to identify skills gap in 
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administration and leadership. Training must have four overlapping but complementary 
objectives: 
• To enhance technical capacity; 
• To strengthen core professional skills; 
• To facilitate change; and 
• To change behaviours and attitudes. 
 
The goal of professional training should be to improve employee performance and 
achievement. To be judged effective, therefore, training must result in ongoing benefits as 
measured by improvements in employee performance. However, there is a growing body of 
research that shows that much training does not lead to long-term changes in practice. 
Therefore, the focus for professional development must not be limited to external courses 
and workshops but needs to embrace the development of strong professional learning 
communities within local governments where professional learning is built into employees’ 
every day working lives and responsibilities. In addition, training programmes must also be 
improved to build in some cross-boundary learning or work experience to boost 
organisational versatility and agility. 
 
Beyond accrediting the skills of existing and future staff, local government must invest more 
in its employees by providing formal and informal training to develop their skills. Legal and 
human Resource frameworks must ensure that employees have access to appropriate training 
throughout their careers in local government. Such access clearly depends on a number of 
factors, from the suitability of training offered, to the adequacy of time and money available. 
 
Attitude 
Any attempt at establishing the elements that constitute appropriate professionalism is 
complex. This is because professionalism stretches along a continuum from the individual 
(beliefs, attitudes, behaviours and attributes) through the interpersonal domain (interactions 
with citizens and communities and fellow staff), to social responsibility and ultimately, 
political agendas. 
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It requires a culture that fosters continual improvement and emphasises both personal and 
collective responsibility for improvement in local government. Because professionalism is 
not simply a technical matter of acquiring or updating skills, but covers a myriad of cognitive 
and attitudinal elements, it needs to address required changes in behaviours and attitudes that 
incorporates the determination of required level of individual and organizational competency 
in local government professionalism against world best sector standards is essential.  
Therefore, the professionalisation agenda should be a hybrid of extending the use of 
accredited qualifications; on-the-job training; and creating the right environment, structure 
and cultural climate for a professionalized local government. This diversity of approach is 
absolutely critical to getting it right.  
 
Leadership 
Professionalism must cut through all levels of local government. It is not uncommon to find 
the blind leading the dumb in local government. Neither is it uncommon to find unskilled, 
inexperienced and uneducated people at leadership levels. Local government needs qualified, 
well-trained, experienced and committed leaders who observe and honour the democratic 
processes and who are professional in their practice. 
Leaders have a very important role to play in steering the organisations towards change and 
mobilising teams. For successful professionalisation of local government, there is a need for 
senior civil servants in local government to “be the change they wish to see”. It is no use the 
leaders pointing the fingers at the shop-floor and saying, “they must change”. Bad leadership 
practices at the upper echelons sets the tone for organisational behaviour and diminishes 
collective responsibility and accountability. It is not merely a case of demanding change 
from the grassroots; this is a case of leading by example.  Efforts must also be made to 
reduce the rate of turnover of local government leaders in order to provide a better degree of 
stability and to preserve organisational memory. This is vital to the professionalisation 
process because of the need to transfer skills sideways and downwards as well as through 
team working. This requires a process of change from the bureaucratic and arms-length 
leadership to a new, engaging, responsive and professional style which also promotes 
responsibility and accountability in action. 
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Political Will 
Success in our efforts to professionalise local government depends on various factors: a 
common definition of professionalisation; identifying the most appropriate approach; 
promoting new policies that foster professional practice. But it also depends on the 
mobilization of political will. This is the engine of change and the most powerful tool in the 
transformation of local government; and it is needed to reach agreements on what needs to 
be done and to start taking immediate action.  
 
To move forward with the professionalisation agenda, political leaders will have to take 
decisions that involve risks and political costs. There is no swapping of price tags. To obtain 
the collective will, they will need to work collaboratively to provide countries and decision 
makers with high quality analysis; objective and reliable economic evidence and serious 
predictions with clearly thought-through scenarios for improvement. They will also need to 
know what has worked or not to date and the lessons that have been learnt so that they can 
compare their country’s performance and plan for change and improvements.  
 
Any measures to strengthen the professionalisation of local government requires political 
will and a socially and politically responsible leadership (as the quote goes, “the fish rots 
from the head”. This powerful combination of political will and leadership, if achieved, will 
overcome resistance, build grassroots advocacy for change and start to address the habits and 
behaviours of civil servants in local government.  
 
Measuring Professionalism 
Given that the definition of professionalism is complex, careful consideration has to be given 
to how we measure professionalism and what degree of it can be attributed to success in 
public sector reform and new public management efforts. Furthermore, there is the issue of 
what is being measured; what aspect of employees’ performance is being predicted for 
improvement; and what numbers of measures are to be selected. This is recommended as an 
area for further study.  
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5. Conclusion 
Castles in the air need foundations. People throughout the region are beginning to realize that 
whilst dramatic words and phrases might provide a temporary reprieve, they cannot satisfy 
their aspirations for a better life. What is needed is a philosophy of critical reflection and 
practical action that induces change simultaneously at both state and local government 
levels. There is a need courageously to confront the continent’s challenges at grass roots 
level which manifest themselves in the corrosion of local government and local services. 
 
First and foremost, we need to come to grips with the reality of our situation, however 
disheartening it may look and feel, and take conscious and determined steps to address the 
challenges facing us in local government. This paper is a call for an honest undertaking to re-
shape our values; to re-build the lives in our communities; and restore some modicum of 
confidence in our citizens - those whom we govern, those who elect us. The challenges 
facing local government are enormous but we need to consciously and willingly embark on a 
journey of reform and we must do it in a new way. We must stop doing what I call 
‘constipation management’ (by which I mean, if it does not work, try harder!). 
 
The rationale for professionalisation is based on the conviction that a strong and vibrant local 
government is essential to the attainment of a society and region in which all citizens have 
access to basic services; equal opportunities; and have real opportunities to participate in and 
shape their local communities. And for this we need a highly skilled workforce with the right 
mindset and behaviours; and corresponding enabling culture and leadership.  
The professionalisation of local government cannot take place in a vacuum and must be part 
of the whole-system change of public sector reform and new public management, where it is 
applied. Public sector reforms have got to be integrated and interactive to ensure success and 
to work together to create good governance. All across Africa, people want their locality to 
be one where they have a high quality of life and good life chances. They want a pleasant, 
safe, clean and green environment with low levels of crime, clean water, and no rubbish. 
They want a strong local economy with a wide range of opportunities for employment, fair 
access to services and equal opportunities for lifelong learning. They want to live in socially 
cohesive communities where the vulnerable are protected; do not lose their dignity; where all 
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individuals are respected; and where people have a sense of pride and care about the place in 
which they live. 
 
Globally, we continue to experience unrelenting change, and in terms of globalisation of the 
economy, new technologies and balance of power. Inherent in every change is the 
opportunity for improvement. The opportunities to create a 21st century local government in 
Africa require professionalisation of its administration underpinned by good governance. 
Indeed, local governments everywhere need administrations that have well-trained, 
experienced, committed and well paid staff to achieve their goals of efficient and effective 
delivery of public service supported by dynamic and fruitful citizen engagement.  
 
Regardless of the challenges and their capacity constraints, local governments are still better 
placed than anyone else to respond to the needs of their citizens simply because they are the 
closest to them. Evidence and experience demonstrate that the best way of building capacity 
in local government is to put resources at the disposal of local governments so that they can 
learn their jobs through doing their jobs. Development of human resources in both public and 
private sector organizations has become critical in an increasingly knowledge-based 
globalizing economy (Analoui, 2002). One cannot over-estimate the strategic importance of 
professionalisation in the public sector reform because of its implications for improved 
development, leadership and good governance. At the World Bank notes: ‘Africa’s future 
lies in its people. Indeed, Africa must solve its current human development crisis if it is to 
claim the 21st century. Africa’s future economic growth will depend less on its natural 
resources, which are being depleted and are subject to long-run price declines, … and more 
on its labour skills and its ability to accelerate a demographic transition’ (World Bank, 2000, 
p.103).  
 
Africa’s most precious resource is its human capital and, just as a diamond has to be 
polished, human capital must be developed and professionalised to unleash its potential and 
to make reform possible and sustainable. The challenge is real but it is not insurmountable. 
We have already begun to build castles of public sector reform, now we need to put the 
foundations under them. 
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1. Introduction 
Endeavours to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of local government have been a 
persistent theme both of politicians in higher tiers of government and of interest groups, 
especially business. The two contenders for improvement which receive most coverage both 
in the research literature and in popular discussion are amalgamation and shared services. 
Arguments from the literature have generally favoured shared services over amalgamation. 
Bish (2001) in a comprehensive review of North American research dismisses the argument 
for amalgamation as a product of flawed nineteenth-century thinking and a bureaucratic urge 
for centralized control. He does so making the very reasonable point that the presumed 
economies of scale which will result from amalgamation are a function not of the size and 
scale of individual local authorities, but of the services for which those local authorities are 
responsible, and the point at which economies of scale will be optimised will be very 
different for different services. The case against amalgamation is also reinforced by the 
absence of any significant post-facto evidence that amalgamation achieves either the 
promised savings or the anticipated efficiency gains (McKinlay 2006). 
 
Despite this, the major strategy for seeking to improve local government performance in 
developed countries such as England, Canada, Australia and New Zealand has been 
amalgamation, typically forced or at least significantly encouraged by higher tiers of 
government. This approach has been reinforced by a clear lack of confidence in the potential 
of shared services to provide the desired improvement in local government performance. 
Peter McKinlay  
Local Government Centre 
Auckland University of Technology, NZ 
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Queensland's Local Government Reform Commission whose report triggered a major 
restructuring of Queensland local government (Local Government Reform Commission 
2007), dismissed shared services as an option with the following comment: 
 
Regional co-operative structures and shared service arrangements generally offer less 
efficiency and economies of scale than could be achieved through amalgamation (essentially 
because of the additional overheads they incur). However, they may have applicability in 
areas where amalgamation is not being recommended by the Commission. 
 
The Royal Commission on Auckland Governance, which reported on the establishment of a 
single strong unitary authority for the whole of the Auckland region (Royal Commission 
2009), considered whether it should retain existing district and city councils as a second tier 
of local government. The Commission was aware of the failure of previous attempts to 
improve efficiency across the region through the use of shared services.1
 
 It rejected the idea 
of a second tier commenting:  
The Commission considered the possibility of retaining the existing territorial authorities 
and limiting their powers, by removing from them responsibilities relating to regional 
infrastructure and assets and development, and requiring councils to share services. The 
Commission concluded that this approach would be difficult to implement and would not 
necessarily achieve the organisational and cultural change required. 
 
In England, despite a strong government emphasis since the Gershon review (Gershon 2004) 
on shared services as a means of achieving efficiency gains, progress has been at best 
relatively patchy. Deloitte (2010) in an overview of shared services in local government in 
England identified a number of inhibitors including: 
• An absence of expertise, the cost of the initial investment and capacity.  
• Behavioural and political obstacles, linked to individuals' careers or the risks of 
reducing headcount. 
• A desire by elected members to maintain self-determination over front-line services 
and back-office support functions.  
• Resistance to sharing control with another local authority. 
 
The New Local Government Network, a leading UK think tank on local governance, notes 
on its website (www.nlgn.org.uk) that:  
                                           
1  A failure attributed by one senior official (who had been very closely involved with the negotiations) as 
resulting from resistance on the part of second and third tier managers to what they perceived as threats to their 
personal empires (personal communication). 
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the scale and scope of shared services remains extremely limited. Managerial, political, 
geographic and professional protectionism have too often impeded these reforms and led to 
their untimely demise. However, the UK’s fiscal deficit and the imperative to make huge 
reductions in public spending are now making such apathy and insularity an unaffordable 
luxury. While the Government is committed to avoiding formal local government 
reorganisation, Ministers have advocated once again a much more widespread take-up of 
shared services and functions. 
 
It does seem that, in England at least, the harsh reality of reduced funding is encouraging a 
renewed interest in the potential for shared services. A 2010 survey of Council attitudes to 
shared services undertaken by the law firm Browne Jacobson in conjunction with Ipsos Mori 
(Browne Jacobson 2011) reveals a shift in attitude since its previous survey in 2008. The 
survey findings include the comment "It appears on the surface that some of the barriers of 
the past are being seen as less of a hurdle as the full impact of austerity hits home." In some 
specific areas changes are quite marked. In 2008 half of public sector managers cited 
workforce opposition (53%) and lack of a collaborative culture (51%) as significant 
obstacles. In 2010 only 6% of senior managers regarded opposition from unions and staff as 
the biggest single obstacle, with 7% identifying the lack of a collaborative culture as key. 
 
If this change is indeed happening, then it looks as though England may be moving ahead of 
much of local government in jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada and generally New 
Zealand. Dollery et al (2009) supports the view that although there has been some interest in 
shared services in Australia, progress has not been significant and substantially held back by 
many of the same barriers as had been identified in research on English local government.  
 
Even in British Columbia which has had a long established tradition of eschewing forced 
amalgamation and relying, instead, on encouraging collaboration especially through regional 
districts (a form of voluntary collaboration), recent work suggests that there are still 
considerable difficulties from time to time in achieving the level of collaboration required 
(Regional District Task Force 2010). 
 
The New Zealand experience has been similarly limited with some report of successful 
individual collaborations but a general sense that, especially in terms of any substantive 
activity, local government is still reluctant to go down the shared services route (a view 
which the Royal Commission on Auckland clearly held). Recent case studies undertaken as 
part of fieldwork for a report supported jointly by the Local Government Association of 
South Australia, and Local Government New Zealand, Consolidation in Local Government: 
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A Fresh Look (Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government, 2011) point to a 
potentially encouraging development, with a new approach to the development of shared 
services based on a re-conceptualisation of the essence of the shared services endeavour. 
 
2.  New Zealand: Context 
Apart from the Auckland Council, a major unitary authority representing one third of the 
country's population, New Zealand local government comprises two principal forms of local 
authority; regional councils and territorial authorities (which may be either city or district 
councils). There are currently 11 regional councils each of whose boundaries encompasses 
all or part of a number of territorial authorities (the 12th, the Auckland Regional Council, it 
is now subsumed within the Auckland Council) across the country. Their functions are 
primarily environmental management (including responsibility for air and water quality), 
land transport, the coastal zone out to the 12 mile limit and pest and noxious weed control. 
Territorial authorities are responsible for the bulk of local authority service delivery, 
including water and sewerage services, local roads, arts culture and recreation, local 
regulation (including district planning and building consents) minor health regulation and a 
wide range of other essentially local services. There are in addition four small unitary 
authorities each combining the functions of a regional council and territorial authority within 
their own boundaries, and one very major unitary, Auckland. 
 
The second important contextual issue is the unique statutory framework which New 
Zealand has regulating the ability of councils to establish what are referred to as council 
controlled organisations (CCOs); these include companies owned or controlled by a council 
(or councils), trusts and other incorporated entities. The legislation gives councils wide 
powers to establish CCOs subject only to a requirement that they first consult their 
communities. Importantly, the legislation also includes extensive provisions regulating the 
relationship between councils and CCOs (see below). The intention is to strike a balance 
between the powers which normal commercial directors have to direct the company with 
limited interference from shareholders, and the demands for public accountability expected 
of any council owned activity. 
 
3.  The Case Studies 
Case studies were undertaken of two regionally-based shared services initiatives, one in the 
Waikato region and one in the Bay of Plenty region. Both regions contain a mix of urban 
and rural councils. The Waikato region is dominated by a single city, Hamilton, which is the 
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centre of the region's business, educational health and public service activities. In the Bay of 
Plenty although Tauranga has a somewhat higher proportion of the regional population, 
Rotorua is the centre for a number of central government activities within the region, and 
educational and health services are more evenly distributed between the two centres. Both 
regions also contain smaller largely rural councils with limited resources and capacity purely 
because of their size. And in common with much of New Zealand local government, both 
regions were very aware of the pending restructuring of local government within the 
Auckland region, and concerned about the implications for their own regions. Both drew the 
inference that one consequence of the Auckland restructuring would be an increased 
emphasis on the efficiency and capability of local government in other parts of New 
Zealand. 
 
Both had some previous experience of various forms of shared service - in the Waikato 
region a number of councils had been working on creating a joint capability for building 
consents; in the Bay of Plenty the regional council had played a role in providing IT support 
for smaller territorial authorities, and had led joint contracting for the purchase of aerial 
photography services, the contract for which was coming towards the end of its term. 
Personal relationships were an important factor in both cases. In the Waikato three key chief 
executives had a very close working relationship (Hamilton City, the Regional Council and 
the largest rural authority). In the Bay of Plenty chief executives of the regional council, 
Tauranga City and Western Bay of Plenty District Council (which surrounds the city) had 
been building a close working relationship through a joint long-term strategic land-use 
planning initiative, Smart Growth. 
 
Waikato 
The Waikato region was the first of the two regions to establish a regionwide shared services 
initiative. The immediate trigger came out of the councils' rating responsibilities. Regional 
councils and territorial authorities both have rating powers. Prior to 2002 territorial 
authorities were obliged to act as collection agents for their regional councils. As the result 
of new rating legislation which came into effect in that year, collection of regional rates 
became optional for territorial authorities. The Hamilton City Council advised the Waikato 
Regional Council that it would no longer collect rates on its behalf - basically as a side effect 
of a major IT upgrade within the city. One consequence of this was a recognition not just by 
the Regional Council, but by a number of the territorial authorities within the region that 
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they would each need to develop a new valuation database.2
 
 The precise means of doing this 
was seen as an administrative decision within the authority of individual chief executives 
(reflecting the split of responsibilities under New Zealand's local government legislation 
between elected members on the one hand and the chief executive on the other).  
The task of developing a shared valuation database was seen as an appropriate one for a 
shared services approach. Led by the regional council, the councils took legal advice on the 
appropriate form for a shared services undertaking. The advice they were given was that 
they should establish a council owned company - under the legislation a council controlled 
organisation (CCO) - in which they would all be shareholders.  
Briefly, a CCO operates under a legislative framework which includes a strong measure of 
accountability by the board of the company to the council owner(s). This includes the 
development of what is known as a statement of intent, developed by the directors in 
consultation with the council, which sets out matters such as the areas of business in which 
the company intends to engage, its performance requirements, its accounting policies, how 
often and how it will report to the council and a number of other matters. The board of a 
CCO is required by law to manage the company in accordance with its statement of intent. 
Importantly the council owner(s) has the power by resolution to require the Board of 
Directors to change the statement of intent, thus giving the council much greater influence 
than shareholders in a conventional company. 
 
Two crucial decisions were taken as part of establishing the shared services CCO which had 
a major impact on its effectiveness. They were: 
• Because of the number of councils involved (a total of 13) not all councils should be 
represented on the board. This was seen as necessary to ensure that the problems of 
bringing busy chief executives together for regular meetings could be managed. The 
constitution provided for six directors, with two each representing just one local 
authority (the city and the regional council) one representing two and three each 
representing three. 
• Rather than establishing its own administration, including financial reporting, the 
new company should use the services of the regional council. 
 
                                           
2  In New Zealand and local authorities must revise their rating valuations at least once every three years. Most 
local authorities relied on Quotable Value New Zealand (previously the government's valuation department) to 
provide rating valuations but councils in the Waikato concluded it would be more cost-effective to develop their 
own. 
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In practice, the board structure has proved problematic. The effect has been that the majority 
of the region's chief executives do not take a direct part in deliberations on the activities of 
the company. Those who are not board members are briefed by their representative prior to 
each board meeting, but that brief does not extend to giving the board members themselves 
discretion to commit the other councils they represent if any significant changes are 
suggested. This can seriously delay decision-making, and also helps undermine the 
collegiality which is important for an effective shared services organisation. 
 
The decision to utilise the services of the regional council, rather than establishing its own 
administration arrangements, looked sensible in terms of cost minimisation but had an 
unintended and unfortunate consequence. The chief executive of the shared services 
company was unable to obtain timely financial information and was thus unaware of a 
significant cost blowout in the shared valuation database project, a blowout which seriously 
undermined the credibility of the shared services undertaking. 
 
The Bay of Plenty 
The Bay of Plenty did not face the same rating issue as the Waikato region (the Bay of 
Plenty councils opted to continue collecting rates on behalf of the region). Instead, the 
decision to establish a shared services activity was able to be a more considered one. Among 
the relevant considerations were: 
• The belief on the part of two of the region's key territorial authority chief executives 
that in order to retain their local identity, they needed a strategy of radical 
collaboration - driven by a positive search for better outcomes rather than simply as 
a post-Auckland anti-amalgamation strategy. 
• A recent history of successful collaboration on one-off issues (for example aerial 
photography). 
• The availability of the Waikato region's legal advice on possible structures. 
• An interest at the executive level in options for sharing access to selected services, 
especially IT in areas such as aerial photography and GIS. 
 
The Bay of Plenty councils generally followed the Waikato approach with the establishment 
of a CCO but with three crucial differences: 
• Each council should be represented on the board by its chief executive. One reason 
was the importance of building a collegial approach; this was seen as requiring the 
commitment of all chief executives (an important factor here was that one of the key 
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chief executives was a member of the Institute of Directors with a very good 
understanding of corporate governance and of the differences between corporate 
governance in a commercial environment and within a local authority). The fact that 
the board now meets six weekly has played an important role in building trust and 
relationships among the region's chief executives as a quite separate outcome from 
the company's shared services activities. 
 
• The CCO should have its own administrative arrangements, including control over 
its own financial reporting. 
 
• In order to build credibility, it was seen as important to start with 'low hanging fruit' 
so as to achieve some early successes, rather than focus on a single major and 
complex project with the attendant risks if the project did not deliver the expected 
outcomes. 
 
The chairman, and now the board as a whole, has placed a strong emphasis on principles of 
good governance including ensuring that directors understand the different interests they 
represent - as directors, as shareholders, and as chief executives of the company's clients. 
This includes ensuring directors understand that their obligation is to act in the best interests 
of the company, and not to favour their shareholder or client interest. It is now the practice 
that, if a director appears to be speaking from his or her shareholder or client interest, other 
board members will point out the director has stepped outside the director role. 
 
The Bay of Plenty shared services company (formally titled Bay of Plenty Local Authority 
Served Services Ltd - BOPLASS) has established a successful record in delivering savings 
in a number of conventional shared services areas, primarily procurement of services and 
consumables (for example insurance and stationery, GIS and aerial photography). If this 
were all it had done, then it would simply be just another example of local authorities 
sharing a range of peripheral services with some reasonable benefits but no significant 
impact on their overall operation. 
 
The potentially crucial breakthrough in thinking about shared services is a consequence of 
the region's involvement with the government's broadband initiative. For some years, New 
Zealand's central government has been engaged in a series of endeavours to encourage the 
widespread adoption of broadband services. The potential to connect up the councils of the 
region became a trigger for BOPLASS to rethink the nature of shared services. Its chairman 
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now takes the view that the most useful way to think about shared services is as an exercise 
in sharing information. BOPLASS has established a 1Gbps fibre network linking the major 
councils in the region, and is putting in place microwave links to connect to the remaining 
councils. This connection is allowing a rethink of the way in which shared services are 
developed and managed, and of how councils access information about any particular shared 
service. It is providing an opportunity to develop capability which all councils can utilise 
even although they may lack the individual scale or financial resource to do this in any other 
way. A prime example is the development of GIS. BOPLASS will support a single centre of 
excellence which will serve all of the councils within the region (and any councils from 
outside the region which wish to join in with the service). The fibre network link will enable 
any other council instantly to access and utilise GIS data in respect of its area. 
 
It is allowing the councils within the shared services consortium each to develop areas in 
which they can build specific strengths so that, for example, one council may specialise in 
debtors control, one in HR, and one in payroll management another in rating administration 
and so on. The fibre network is also expected over time to allow a seamless approach to 
administering a range of regulatory activities including building consents. There is also 
significant front office potential. With the ability of any council, from any office, to access 
all of the data held by councils across the region, each council office where ever it may be 
can act as a point of contact for a resident or ratepayer from anywhere in the region, and use 
the ability to access any council’s database to answer questions about that resident or 
ratepayer's property or other concerns. 
 
An immediate benefit from this approach is to strengthen local democracy. The argument 
that smaller councils should be amalgamated with their neighbours because they simply lack 
the capability or capacity to provide their districts with the full range of local government 
services loses much of its force. Councils of whatever size should have the ability to provide 
their communities with a full range of services (front office or back office) because of the 
"centres of excellence” approach and the way in which that is supported by data sharing and 
access. It also minimises the threat to council autonomy, and to incumbents on staff. 
Because it is a distributed model, the “centres of excellence” approach does not mean that 
services are removed from councils to be undertaken by some separate entity. Elected 
members should retain a sense of control over the services which the council provides, and 
staff will generally have opportunities for career development, rather than face the prospect 
of redundancy. 
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4. Conclusions 
One conclusion of broad application which emerges from the case studies is the critical 
importance of people and personal relationships. Both shared services initiatives depended 
critically in their early days on the close personal relationships between key chief executives.  
One, Waikato, effectively failed to realise its potential when those personal relationships 
ceased as the three chief executives whose personal relationships had been fundamental 
moved on to new positions. The new appointee to the position of chief executive at 
Hamilton City Council, whose role was pivotal in the development of any shared services 
strategy, opted for a different approach focused on developing capability within his council 
rather than through a shared services structure. As a consequence what could have been 
additional shared services initiatives failed to gain any traction. The other, Bay of Plenty, has 
had the strong backing of two committed chief executives sharing a belief in the need for 
radical collaboration coupled with an understanding of the importance of good corporate 
governance among other things as a way of building a strong team. The recent resignation of 
one of those two chief executives has seen the partner councils within BOPLASS actively 
encouraging the recruitment process for that chief executive's replacement to specifically 
seek someone committed to a shared services approach. 
 
The sense that even BOPLASS with its acknowledged success remains strongly dependent 
on personalities highlights an issue which merits further research; what is it within local 
government arrangements in jurisdictions such as England, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand which makes apparently logical measures to improve efficiency so dependent on the 
whim or preference of individual executives (and politicians) notwithstanding the occasional 
consequences? It seems clear that one reason governments are so willing to intervene in the 
structure of local government is a sense that those responsible for decision-making within 
local government lack a sufficient commitment to ensuring efficient performance, especially 
when it does come to initiatives such as shared services. Is it a combination of the monopoly 
position of individual local governments as the deliverer of local government services, and a 
lack of any genuinely informed public understanding of the extent to which resistance to 
change costs ratepayers/citizens? 
 
This paper has presented two different applications of a specific governance model in the 
development and delivery of shared services - a council owned company operating under 
New Zealand's council controlled organisation framework. The importance of attention to 
good governance is highlighted by comparison between the two companies. BOPLASS has 
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placed very significant emphasis on building a unified board, maintaining and enhancing 
board commitment, and applying principles of good governance. The Waikato shared 
services company, in contrast, adopted a board structure which has made it difficult to build 
a unified sense of purpose. The contrast between the two also emphasises the importance of 
managing business risk. The Waikato decision to start with a single major and complex 
project set the scene for undermining the confidence of participating councils , when costs 
ran significantly ahead of budget, whereas the BOPLASS emphasis on achieving early 
successes has helped build the trust needed to undertake more challenging activities, such as 
the fibre-optic network. But the greatest interest from the case studies is the potential for 
shared services generally of the way in which BOPLASS has reconceptualised the idea of 
shared services. The recognition that the common element in shared services is information, 
and the combination of effective information management and seamless access to data by all 
participating councils is leading to a major change in attitude especially on the part of 
council managements. Although it is still very much 'early days' in realising the full potential 
of this approach to shared services, including the 'centres of excellence' model, the potential 
to reshape the way that local government addresses shared services is clear.  
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1. Introduction 
The problem of the ‘financial sustainability’ of individual local councils represents the most 
significant policy question at issue in contemporary debate on Australian local government. 
This concern with financial sustainability has not only dominated almost all recent local 
government conferences across Australia, but it has also formed the capstone of several 
public inquiries into state local government systems. For instance, at the state level, both the 
South Australian Financial Sustainability Review Board’s (FSRB) (2005) Rising to the 
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Challenge and the Independent Inquiry into the Financial Sustainability of NSW Local 
Government’ s (LGI) (2006) Are Councils Sustainable were centrally occupied with 
determining the meaning of financial sustainability in Australian local government and 
developing measures of financial sustainability. Moreover, the Queensland Local 
Government Association (LGAQ) (2006) Size, Shape and Sustainability (SSS) program, the 
Western Australian Local Government Association (WALGA) (2006) Systemic 
Sustainability Study and the Local Government Association of Tasmania (LGAT) (2007) 
Review of the Financial Sustainability of Local Government in Tasmania had at their core 
the problem of assessing financial sustainability in their respective local government 
systems.  
 
Similarly, at the national level, a commissioned report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) 
(2006), entitled National Financial Sustainability Study of Local Government, considered the 
problem of financial sustainability across all Australian local government jurisdictions. In an 
analogous vein, the Productivity Commission (2008) examined the revenue-raising capacity 
of Australian local government. In addition to these efforts, an embryonic Australian 
academic literature exists (see, for example, Murray and Dollery, 2005; 2006; Walker and 
Jones, 2006; Dollery, 2006). 
 
Dollery and Crase (2006) have scrutinized the contemporary debate on financial 
sustainability in Australian local government. Various salient conclusions were drawn from 
their analysis. In the first place, no agreed definition of financial sustainability existed in 
Australia. Secondly, recent attempts at determining the financial sustainability of local 
councils had considered quite different aspects of the monetary situation of municipalities; 
this served to further underline the lack of national consensus on the meaning of financial 
sustainability. Thirdly, whereas the South Australian, New South Wales, Queensland, 
Western Australian, Tasmanian and PWC investigations into financial sustainability all 
employed Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) (most commonly in the form of financial 
ratios), Dollery and Crase (2006) have identified numerous problems with the KPI method of 
performance appraisal, including the fact that the observed incidence of local government 
failure bears little statistical relationship to KPI scores, at least in the New South Wales local 
government milieu (see Murray and Dollery 2005). It thus follows that policy makers should 
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be very wary of making far-reaching decisions based upon disputed definitions of financial 
sustainability as well as flawed KPIs with poor predictive capacity. 
 
Quite apart from the doubt surrounding the meaning and measurement of financial 
sustainability, a second important question that must be taken into account deals with the 
‘non-financial’ aspects of sustainability in local government. This question has been at least 
partially explored in other comparable national contexts, where local government 
sustainability has been discussed in somewhat more holistic terms than mere financial 
sustainability. For example, while the initial brief of the Lyons Inquiry into Local 
Government in England required it to ‘search for a sustainable solution to the problems of 
local government finance’ (Lyons, 2005, 3), the Inquiry stretched its ambit to include (i) the 
strategic role of local government; (ii) devolution and decentralisation; (iii) managing 
pressure on local services and (iv) scope for new agreement between central and local 
government (Lyons, 2005, 7-10). Grant and Dollery, (2011) have argued that the Inquiry’s 
subsequent recommendations, and especially ‘place-shaping’ (Lyons, 2007) amounted to a 
revitalised theory of local government which has been reflected in the Cameron 
Government’s Localism Bill (2010) (see, for example, CLG, 2010). Financial sustainability 
embraced local governments’ own revenue-raising capacity, but also included sustainable 
community strategies where sustainability is context-dependant (see, for example, Lyons, 
2007, 11) and where ‘lifestyle sustainability’ is based upon alleviating pressure on the 
environment (see, for example, Lyons, 2007, 69). 
 
In the New Zealand the Report of the Local Government Rates Inquiry (2007), entitled 
Funding Local Government, initially defined sustainability according to terms derived from 
the Government’s Fiscal Responsibility Act (1994) or what it described as ‘the affordability 
of expenditure and equity of funding over the long term’, noting that ‘in general, local 
government is paying insufficient attention to these issues’ (Rates Inquiry, 2007, 3) and 
incorporating ‘environmental sustainability’ into its recommendations.  
 
Against this comparative international context, in this paper we pursue the question: aside 
from direct financial considerations, what other factors determine the broader long-run 
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sustainability of Australian local councils? In other words, can we identify ‘overall’ local 
government sustainability and define its characteristics?  
 
The paper itself is divided into three main parts. Section 2 considers the problem of defining 
adequately council sustainability and identifying the chief determinants of this broader 
conception of local government sustainability. Section 3 examines each of the three main 
putative attributes of community or social sustainability in local government advanced in 
section 2 and seeks to illustrate how the current LGAQ (2006) Size, Shape and Sustainability 
(SSS) program and the WALGA (2006) Systemic Sustainability Study have addressed these 
attributes. The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks in section 4. 
 
2. Defining Overall Council Sustainability 
 
Generic sustainability 
The concept of sustainability first emerged in the development literature through the work of 
the World Commission on Environment and Development (‘Brundtland Commission’) 
(1987: 8), which defined sustainable development as a process that ‘meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. A 
key element of this definition lay in its conflation of environmental concerns with economic 
growth which had previously been juxtaposed (Romero-Lankao, 2000). As a consequence, 
the Brundtland Commission (1987) definition was rapidly adopted by a wide range of writers 
since it served as a unifying umbrella term for a diversity of perspectives on development. 
However, the consensual nature of this definition came at the price of ambiguity and 
imprecision (Adger and Jordan, 2009; Leuenberger and Bartle, 2009), which has now 
fragmented into ‘dozens of definitions [that] are being passed around among experts and 
politicians, because many and diverse interests and visions hide behind the common key-
idea’ (Sachs, 1995: 8).  
 
The disintegration of the earlier general consensus on the meaning of sustainability into a raft 
of conflicting and frequently value-laden streams of thought is evident in its application to 
local government. This should not be surprising given the complex multi-dimensional nature 
of local government with its democratic, economic, environmental, and social role in local 
service provision and local community life. Nonetheless, the fact that there is currently no 
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satisfactory universal definition of sustainability in local government is unfortunate because 
explicit recognition of sustainability forces local government policy makers to give weight to 
the future consequences of current decisions. It is thus worth exploring the nature of 
sustainability in the local government environment.  
 
In this paper, we propose that the concept of local government sustainability should extend 
beyond the narrow confines of financial sustainability or financial viability to include the 
vibrancy of local democracy, local social capital and local council administrative and 
technical capacity. In this sense, sustainability is taken to broadly refer to the ability of a 
local authority to function effectively over the long term. However, we do not embrace 
environmental concerns directly since local government seldom has the legislative authority 
to make a decisive contribution to long-run environmental sustainability nor does 
environmental sustainability itself have an uncontested meaning. 
 
Tensions between democracy and efficiency 
In common with the conceptual and factual difficulties of defining financial sustainability, 
the problem of defining overall council sustainability presents similar analytical challenges. 
In all Westminster-style advanced democracies, local government plays a dual role. Aulich 
(2005, p.198) has described this twin function in Australian local government in some detail. 
In the first place, local government ‘provides a voice to local aspirations for decentralized 
governance’. What can be termed the ‘local democracy approach’ thus places fundamental 
value on ‘local differences and system diversity’ and encourages directed activities and 
policy reforms aimed at improving ‘local choice and local voice’. This is premised on the 
notion that a local council ‘can and will make choices that will differ from those made by 
others’. According to this view, ‘a premium is placed upon traditional democratic values’ 
that fully embrace ‘access’, ‘accountability’, ‘representativeness’ and ‘responsiveness’ 
(Stewart 1997). The ‘vibrancy’ of local democracy thus becomes a desired outcome in its 
own right. 
 
In addition to these attributes of the local democracy approach, it is possible to identify other 
dimensions that may be important. In this respect, the concept of ‘social capital’ is crucial. 
First conceived by Coleman (1988) and later popularized by Putnam (1993), social capital 
refers to those features of social life that enable participants to act together more effectively 
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to pursue shared objectives. In the local government context, social capital engenders local 
civic awareness that manifests itself in a variety of community projects, ranging from the 
formation of local social associations and sports clubs to local business initiatives. The 
determinants of local social capital are complex and not well understood (Quibria 2003), but 
include a ‘sense of community’ and a ‘sense of place’ that derive from living in a small and 
distinctive community, such as a local government area. Community size and community 
social capital are therefore intrinsically linked together.  
 
The local democracy approach necessarily implies support for ‘collaborative or pluralist 
processes of reform’ rather than top-down ‘technocratic’ policy intervention that overrides 
local opinion (Aulich 2005). Rather than being viewed as a burdensome financial impost on 
the local exchequer, representative local government is seen as a worthy policy goal on its 
own merit. The costs associated with local governance, including local elections, 
consultation processes, ‘democratic audits’, community participation, elected councillors, 
their supporting secretariat and the whole gamut of local democratic autonomy, can thus be 
justified in the same way as financial outlays on any other bona fide council service. 
Accordingly, public policy should not simply seek efficient service local provision, but also 
effective local democracy. Political process becomes as important as economic outcome. The 
result is an emphasis on ‘bottom-up’ local consultation and local policy formulation. 
 
The second primary role of local government in a Westminister-type democratic 
constitutional system focuses on local councils as ‘a mechanism for [the] efficient delivery 
of local services to local communities’ (Aulich, 2005, p.199). In terms of this perspective, in 
its role as a provider of local public and quasi-public goods and services, local government 
must focus on efficient service delivery above all else (Tucker 1997). In other words, local 
government is not regarded as a representative entity in its own right, but rather as an 
instrument for meeting local needs through local services in the most cost effective manner 
possible. This instrumentalist conception of the role of local government in a federal system 
thus stresses the importance of policy reform aimed exclusively at enhancing the efficiency 
of local government, regardless of the impact this might have on the vibrancy of local 
democracy. Put differently, in the instrumentalist service provision approach ‘fiscal and 
economic issues override other social and political concerns’ and ‘tradition-bound or value-
orientated forms of political and social organization are replaced by purely instrumentally 
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rational institutions’ (Aulich, 2005, p.199). Economic outcomes thus take precedence over 
political processes. 
 
The main policy implications of this ‘local service delivery approach’ have been described 
by Aulich (2005, p.199). First, the policy goals of operational efficiency and overall 
economy are pursued by state government intervention into local government. Second, this 
intervention often generates legislative and regulatory criteria aimed at uniformity in 
processes and outcomes at the local level. Third, as a consequence, participatory and 
deliberative processes are devalued, ‘with top-down technocratic processes being more 
typical’ (Aulich, 2005, p. 199). 
 
Obvious tensions exist between the two primary roles of local government in a 
Westminister-style democratic polity and these are perhaps best exemplified in the 
diametrically opposed policy implications that derive from the local democracy approach 
and the local service approach. Steyvers, et al. (2006, p.429) draw a distinction between 
‘input legitimacy’ and ‘output legitimacy’ to highlight this tension. Input legitimacy rests on 
‘responsive government’ that can be achieved by ‘integrating citizens and providing space 
for participatory input’ into municipal decision-making. By contrast, output legitimacy 
occurs through providing ‘effective and efficient public services’. This dichotomy can be 
illustrated by means of Figure 1: 
 
 
Local democracy 
Economic efficiency 
INSTRUMENTALIST 
DEMOCRACY EFFICIENCY 
PLURALIST 
Dominant 
values 
Dominant 
process 
 
Figure 1. Competing Roles of Australian Local Government 
Source: Adapted from Aulich (1999, p.20). 
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Figure 1 depicts the opposing value systems and associated process orientation of the local 
democracy approach and the local service approach. The instrumentalist policy preference of 
the local service approach is manifest in its end-state objective of achieving greater cost 
effectiveness regardless of the price paid in terms of democratic process. For example, if 
local democratic processes express community preferences for small ‘close-to-the-people’ 
local councils, even if this may involve relatively more expensive service provision, then 
‘top-down’ state government intervention in the form of forced amalgamation, or other kinds 
of obligatory structural change, is justified if it can deliver cheaper services. By contrast, if 
due democratic process embodies full public participation, even where this may entail the 
provision of redundant additional services or more costly local services, then this is 
warranted under the local democracy approach since it expresses legitimate community 
preferences.  
 
Whereas Aulich (2005) sets the local democracy approach and the local service approach in 
juxtaposition as competing and almost mutually exclusive roles for Australian local 
government, it is possible to identify aspects of both positions that contain overlapping and 
mutually reinforcing (or mutually destructive) dimensions of contemporary local authorities. 
If we consider a hypothetical case where an enforced local government merger of several 
small councils with a single large municipality in a regional spatial setting would generate an 
aggregate reduction in the per capita costs of service provision across the entire new 
amalgamated entity, and this merger will necessarily mean that council activities and 
employment are geographically reallocated away from the previous small councils towards 
the dominant large municipality, then feedback loops between local democracy approach and 
the local service approach become apparent. For instance, small country councils are often a 
major employer in small rural towns. If council employees are forced to work in the former 
large council area in the new amalgamated structure, then this will set in motion powerful 
negative multiplier effects that can lower population, reduce economic activity, and threaten 
the viability of other public and private services, like public schools and banking facilities.  
 
Secondly, if we invoke attributes of the local democracy approach neglected by Aulich 
(2005), such as the historically, psychologically and sociologically crucial concepts of ‘sense 
of community’ and ‘sense of place’, that form an important part of the social capital of small 
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country towns, then this will also have substantial economic effects. After all, a municipal 
council often represents the ‘heart’ of a community and serves to symbolize its character and 
independence. The abolition of these councils could thus severely damage a ‘sense of 
community’ built up over the generations. The economic consequences of this loss may be 
felt in different retail shopping patterns, altered school enrolment, changed sporting club 
allegiances, and so forth, which will have ramifications for the composition of economic 
activity and the strength of the rate base of the former small council areas.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, process and outcome are inextricably linked through 
democratic representation in local government. Thus, the merger of small councils with a 
larger municipality can have obvious and severe resource implications for residents of the 
small merged towns. For example, if a previously autonomous local council is compulsorily 
amalgamated with a larger, adjacent regional centre, then its elected representation 
automatically falls as a proportion of all councillors. This may mean relatively fewer 
resources will be directed towards the needs of residents of the small councils relative to 
their counterparts living in the dominant larger regional city. Moreover, where service 
provision preferences differ between the citizenry of small and large councils, the pattern of 
service provision can also shift to the detriment of residents of small towns. These effects 
will be even more acute if electoral wards are abolished since this may mean no 
representation at all for minority ratepayers living in sparsely populated areas on the 
outskirts of the new local government structure.  
 
In essence, the local democracy approach and the local service approach can thus overlap in 
some respects and this affects the nature of trade-offs between the two perspectives. In other 
words, single-minded pursuit of economic gain regardless of political process can have the 
unintended effects of reducing the aggregate economic benefits through the spatial 
redistribution of economic activity and council service operations within the new 
amalgamated entity. Political process thus cannot be entirely divorced from economic 
outcome.  
 
The tensions between input legitimacy and output legitimacy, stressed by Steyvers, et al. 
(2006), has focused attention on the need to reconcile these two imperatives. Some scholars 
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have pursued this line of inquiry, including Kersting and Vetter (2003), and have sought to 
close the ‘gap’ between service efficiency and participatory democracy. However, the fruits 
of this debate have yet to appear. 
 
Community sustainability 
The identification of two contending primary roles for Australian local government by 
Aulich (2005), and the augmentation of this dichotomized approach with the recognition that 
in some respects outcome and process are inextricably linked (since service efficiency cannot 
be considered as entirely discrete from service distribution), can shed considerable light on 
the problem of local government sustainability. We have already very briefly considered the 
thorny question of ‘financial sustainability’ – a critical component of the local service 
approach. But what are the chief elements of ‘community sustainability’ (as distinct from 
financial sustainability) that comprise the essence of the local democracy approach?  
 
Several clusters of factors suggest themselves. The first constellation of attributes will centre 
on the vibrancy of local democracy in the sense that it engages maximum public 
participation. Local democratic processes obviously play a central role in overall council 
sustainability and these include democratic ‘access’, ‘accountability’, ‘representativeness’ 
and ‘responsiveness’ outlined by Aulich (2005).  
 
The second cluster of attributes revolves around local social capital and its relationship with 
local councils. Although little is known about the genesis of social capital, it seems to spring 
from a well-developed ‘sense of community’ and a ‘sense of place’ that flow from living in a 
small community whose members interact frequently. While these abstract and somewhat 
‘ethereal’ factors are very difficult to measure, this obviously does not diminish their 
importance. 
 
The third constellation of factors that influence local government sustainability focuses on 
the capacity of local government. Local government cannot command the respect of its 
constituents if it is unable to effectively formulate agreed policy positions and implement 
these decisions into concrete action. The capacity of local government thus has two 
dimensions: Well-functioning elected leadership and sufficient administrative and technical 
expertise. These two attributes of local government capacity are crucial to council 
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sustainability. In the first place, there must be effective functioning of an elected council free 
of personal rancour and disruptive factionalism. Although the Australian literature has not 
addressed this aspect of local councils empirically, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
dysfunctional elected councils are the single most important cause of local government 
failure in New South Wales local government. This is hardly surprising since efficacious and 
cooperative elected councils represent the bedrock of ‘local choice and local voice’ that 
underpin local government leadership.  
 
Each of these elements will now be considered in greater detail. Amongst other things, we 
will consider the problem of how these attributes are tackled by the LGAQ’s (2006) Size, 
Shape and Sustainability program and the WALGA (2006) Systemic Sustainability Study by 
way of illustrative examples. It must be stressed that since almost nothing has been written 
on this question in the literature on Australian local government, the discussion is 
exploratory and the conclusions tentative. 
 
3. Factors Influencing Overall Local Government sustainability  
The three constellations of factors identified above should not be regarded as definitive. With 
this caveat in mind, we now consider each cluster in turn. 
 
Vibrancy of Local Government Democracy 
Scholars of local government have charted a steady transformation in the nature of 
government within the local sector over the past decade. The term ‘governance’ attracted 
increased scrutiny in the 1990s (see, for example, Stoker, 1998) and has been used to 
describe the new relationship between government and the governed that emphasizes 
‘steering’ and not ‘rowing’. Unfortunately, a confusing array of meanings has been attached 
to the term. In the present context, we adopt the definition advanced by Goodin (1996, p.7) 
in which governance represents ‘nothing less than the steering of society by officials in 
control of what are organizationally “the commanding heights” of society’. 
 
Another way of approaching governance was formulated by Keohane and Nye (2000, p. 37): 
‘by governance we mean the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, which 
guide and restrain the collective activities of a group’. Thus ‘government is the subset that 
acts with authority and creates formal obligations’. However, governance is not the exclusive 
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domain of governments themselves, but also involves private organizations, nonprofit 
institutions, and a host of other social structures.  
 
Denters and Rose (2005, p.6) have characterised the new relationship between local 
government and its various client groups as involving a ‘dual challenge’: An increase in 
citizen involvement has required local authorities to ‘improve their capacity for effective and 
efficient governance’, prompting local governments to search for innovative ways to meet 
these demands, including turning to citizens and community groups in the search for 
innovation and problem-solving. However, at the same time, the decline in party-political 
links into councils has required the implementation of different avenues for decision-making 
and citizen involvement. Denters and Rose (2005, p.6) labelled these different types of 
involvement ‘new forms of local democracy’. 
 
Developing operational measures of the vibrancy of local democracy presents immense 
conceptual problems that obviously cannot be resolved in the exploratory conjectural context 
of the present paper. However, if we consider the deliberations of two recent inquiries into 
Australian local government systems, then this at least serves to highlight not only the 
implicit importance of local democracy, but also provides at least some idea of the flavour of 
the discourse on local democracy in contemporary Australian local government.  
 
The Systemic Sustainability Study produced under the auspices of the WALGA (2006, p.1/2) 
stressed the importance of ‘good governance’. It defined this quality as ‘the ability of local 
government to operate with integrity and to assure the community that efficient and effective 
management is applied in the community interest’. In the Western Australian context, the 
Report argued that ‘good governance’ had not always been manifest in that state, especially 
insofar as ‘large intergenerational equity transfers’ in asset management had taken place and 
the general competence powers in the Western Australian Local Government Act had not 
been fully understood. However, apart from these issues, the Systemic Sustainability Study 
did not provide any indicators to measure this attribute of local government. 
 
The Queensland Size, Shape and Sustainability Guidelines Kit (LGAQ, 2006, Chapter 3) 
does provide some implicit measures of good governance. For instance, Indicator Category 4 
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deals with ‘standards of governance’ and proposes two indicators. ‘Decision Making and 
Management’ seeks to measure three formal aspects of the ‘level of competence’ of a given 
council: ‘Corporate planning’; ‘risk management’; and ‘delegations’ (p.20). In a similar vein, 
‘Accountability’ concerns itself with ‘how a council accounts for its key activities and what 
systems and processes are in place to support this accountability’ (p.21). Two separate 
indicators are put forward to gauge this kind of ‘accountability’: ‘Performance management’ 
as measured by the performance management process in place; and the ‘internal audit 
process’ as captured by the nature of the internal audit process. 
 
It could also be argued that the Size, Shape and Sustainability Guidelines Kit (LGAQ, 2006, 
Chapter 3) contains some other measures that indirectly touch on good governance. For 
example, Indicator Category 3 focuses on ‘planning’. Two specific indicators are outlined: 
‘Service coordination and efficiency’ which considers the question of whether ‘key 
infrastructure’ is ‘coordinated’ and yields ‘efficient services’ (p.18); and ‘growth 
management’ that attempts to gauge ‘how well a council is able to respond to and manage 
population growth impacting on its area’ (p.19). 
 
Finally, the Size, Shape and Sustainability Guidelines Kit (LGAQ, 2006, Chapter 3) may 
gather information with a bearing on public participation under Indicator Category 2 that 
deals with ‘community of interest’. ‘The performance indicator ‘community engagement’ 
tries to evaluate ‘how well a council engages with it’s community’ (p.17) and suggests the 
use of ‘existing community surveys’, ‘current community engagement plans’, and the 
‘community complaints register’. It should be noted that all three sources of information 
represent formal processes and thus act as proxy variables for ‘real’ or informal engagement.  
 
Local Social Capital and Local Government 
The concept of social capital is based on the notion that ‘social interaction matters’ since it 
‘creates social networks, fosters trust and values, sustains norms and culture and creates 
community’ (Quibria, 2003, p.19). Coleman (1990, p.302) conceived of social capital as 
analogous to ‘other forms of capital’ because it makes ‘possible the achievement of certain 
ends that would not be attainable in its absence’. In much the same vein, Putnam (1993, p.7) 
defined social capital as ‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, 
that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’. 
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The key components of social capital identified by all these scholars are ‘networks of civic 
engagement’, ‘norms of generalized reciprocity’, and ‘relations of social trust’. Quite apart 
from the significance of social capital for economic development and social integration, it 
also has important public policy implications for local government. Various mechanisms 
have been proposed that link the performance of local councils to social capital. In the first 
place, Putnam (1993) argued that municipal performance may be enhanced by high levels of 
social capital since it encourages greater monitoring of the behaviour of council officials. 
This process occurs directly because council employees care about their reputations with 
people among whom they interact frequently. It also occurs indirectly because monitoring 
council performance is a public good and thus prone to the well-known free rider problem in 
collective action; social capital assists in overcoming free riding. 
 
If Putnam (1993) is correct in identifying informal performance monitoring as the link 
between local government performance and social capital, then what are the policy 
implications of this view for local government? We have seen that social capital is likely to 
be high when people interact frequently with each other. Moreover, the reputational impact 
of monitoring by people who have regular dealings with the council employees in question 
will be stronger than in the case of comparative strangers. It follows that small councils in 
small local government areas characterized by small populations will be the most effective in 
fostering social capital, frequent interaction between council workers and elected 
representatives and the public, and thereby more efficacious monitoring of council 
performance. 
 
A second mechanism that may link social capital to the performance of municipalities was 
suggested by Putnam (1993; 2000), Aarts (1995) and other scholars. It is argued that various 
factors, especially increased urbanization, have contributed to a decline in organizational 
participation by citizens. This in turn has led a reduction in the linkages between the public 
and local authorities and altered the relationship between the two for the worse.  
Unfortunately, little is known about the empirical attributes of social capital and therefore on 
appropriate policy responses to increase social capital. However, some work has been done 
on this aspect of social capital. For instance, in Bowling Alone, Putnam (2000) established 
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evidence that points to a decline in social capital in the United States over the past three 
decades. Similarly, Knack and Keefer (1997) found that social capital is a measurable 
determinant of economic performance in international terms.  
 
In addition to this international empirical literature on social capital, some Australian work 
has focused on social capital in regional and rural communities that can shed at least some 
light on the question. For instance, Woodhouse (2006) conducted a comparative study of two 
anonymous ‘regional towns’ and found that high levels of social capital facilitated local 
economic development and this process can best be stimulated by policy measures aimed at 
integrating these communities with broader partnerships and policy debates. Other 
Australian scholars, including Onyx and Bullen (2000), Sobels, Curtis and Lockie (2001) 
and Leigh (2006), have arrived at analogous conclusions. However, to the best of our 
knowledge unfortunately no Australian study has focused exclusively on the relationship 
between effective local councils and social capital.  
 
The empirical basis for policy formulation on local government and social capital is thus 
very limited. This necessarily means that any policy proposals must be speculative. But it 
does seem clear that small communities in small local government areas are best placed to 
engender high levels of social capital since interaction between citizens and local 
government representatives and employees will be higher under these circumstances. 
Furthermore, it is highly likely that a well-developed ‘sense of community’ and a ‘sense of 
place’ will be most pronounced in small local government areas where people are acquainted 
with a relatively high proportion of their fellow citizens. 
 
What implications do these speculative hypotheses have for local government reform in 
general aimed at enhancing sustainability? Consider the example of the Queensland Size, 
Shape and Sustainability program. The Guidelines Kit (LGAQ, 2006, pp.6-7) prescribed four 
‘options for change’ that could be followed by local councils: ‘Resource sharing through 
service agreements’; ’resource sharing through joint enterprise’; ‘significant boundary 
change’; and the ‘merger/amalgamation of adjoining councils’. The last two of these options 
involve modification to the size, shape and population of an affected local government area 
and thereby could influence adversely both the ‘sense of community’ and a ‘sense of place’ 
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among residents. In this respect, these two options might serve to reduce social capital, 
damage the associated monitoring aspect of social interaction, and thus impair the efficacy of 
local government. Since both forms of resource sharing leave the boundaries and population 
of a participating local council intact, it can be argued that they would leave both the ‘sense 
of community’ and a ‘sense of place’ untouched.  
 
Local Government Capacity 
In section 2, it was argued that local government capacity had two separate dimensions. 
Firstly, the political capacity derived from the democratic legitimacy and effective decision 
making abilities of elected representatives comprising local councils. Although no 
comprehensive empirical research has yet been undertaken in Australian local government, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the primary cause of the failure and ultimate dissolution of 
local councils by state governments lies in dysfunctional elected councils rather than 
financial distress and other problems. Where councils are plagued by bitter personal 
animosities, ‘infighting’ between councillors, intransigent factionalism, and disruptive 
meetings, ‘policy gridlock’ typically occurs that can effectively stall the smooth running a 
local authority. A secondary effect of dysfunctional elected councils resides in the loss of 
public confidence in their elected representatives and a diminution of collaborative 
partnerships between community organizations and local government. In other words, the 
most important element in local government sustainability can be found in cooperative 
functional elected bodies.  
 
It follows that any attempt to assess the long-run viability of local authorities should first 
establish whether sound relations exist between both mayors and elected councillors and 
amongst elected representatives themselves. In practice, this can only be established by 
observing the workings of council meetings and the relationships between elected 
representatives. No abstract performance indicator can replace observation and judgment. 
 
The Systemic Sustainability Study (WALGA 2006) stressed the importance of effective and 
cohesive elected councils. It emphasized the key role of ‘leadership capacity’ by observing 
that ‘the experience, competence, and passion of elected members’ is essential ‘to represent 
the desires and aspirations of local communities’ (WALGA, 2006, p.2). However, no 
definite statistical measures were proposed to assess empirically these attributes.  
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The administrative and technical ability of council staff forms the second dimension of local 
government capacity. The importance of this type of council capacity can hardly be 
overstated. In this regard, Dollery, Crase and Johnson (2006, p.148) made the following 
observation: ‘A proposition sometimes advanced in the Australian debate over amalgamation 
is that larger councils tend to have greater levels of administrative and other expertise, in part 
due to the fact that their size permits the employment of specialist skills that cannot be 
readily acquired by smaller municipalities’. But they hasten to add that while this argument 
has ‘considerable merit’, partnership agreements between small councils can achieve the 
same outcome in terms of acquiring specialist skills.  
 
The Systemic Sustainability Study (WALGA, 2006, p.2) also underlined the importance of 
the capacity of local government employees to the efficient functioning of local councils. 
Insufficient administrative capacity in Western Australia had resulted in two identifiable 
problems. Firstly, ‘innovation’ had occurred in the local government sector in that state, but 
had not been implemented ‘from a systematic perspective’. Secondly, ‘asset management 
practice’ was unsatisfactory and had masked ‘exposures for communities and councils’.  
 
The question of whether or not an individual council is sustainable by virtue of its 
administrative and technical expertise can only be settled with certainty by empirical 
examination of staffing levels relative to need. In this sense, local government administrative 
capacity is amenable to measurement through selected performance indicators. For instance, 
an informative ratio could compute the proportion of vacancies for professional and technical 
staff. This would provide a simple and robust statistic that would allow for comparisons 
between different councils.  
 
By contrast, the Size, Shape and Sustainability Guidelines Kit (LGAQ, 2006, Chapter 3) did 
at least attempt to provide measurable estimates of council sustainability in human resources. 
For example, the ‘Human Resourcing’ indicator considered various factors, such as ‘staff 
turnover rates’. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
It has been argued that not only does ‘financial sustainability’ have no agreed meaning in 
Australian local government, but also it represents only a single dimension of overall council 
sustainability (Dollery, Byrnes and Crase, 2007). Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the primary cause of local government failure lies in ‘infighting’ in elected councils and 
related ‘policy gridlock’. This means that an accurate assessment of aggregate ‘overall 
sustainability’ in local government must also include other attributes of contemporary local 
authorities.  
 
Apart from the intractable difficulties in determining financial sustainability, two main 
problems have been identified with evaluating overall local government sustainability. In the 
first place, the abstract and ephemeral nature of the concept of overall sustainability makes it 
hard to define with any degree of precision. Many factors clearly play an important role: 
Local government democracy; local government capacity; ‘sense of place’; community 
sustainability; local social capital; local preference diversity; local leadership; and local 
economic development all seem relevant.  
 
In this paper, we have argued that three main ‘clusters’ of attributes of overall local council 
sustainability seem apposite: The ‘vibrancy of local democracy’ that has become even more 
essential in the new local governance paradigm; ‘local social capital’ that can enhance the 
good working of effective local authorities; and ‘local government capacity’ in both the 
political and technical aspects of local governance. However, given the exploratory nature 
off the analysis, this tripartite classification may not be exhaustive. Other factors could also 
easily be included, perhaps most notably ‘environmental sustainability’.  
 
However, an obvious constraint on the inclusive of a large ‘wish list’ of additional attributers 
of overall sustainability is the extent of council control over these factors. For example, in 
the Australian federal system of government, several functions formally handled by local 
government are in fact strictly governed by state and Commonwealth regulation and their 
effective discharge is often determined by finance controlled by these higher tiers of 
government. Local government thus has little discretionary power of these functions, 
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regardless of how well it operates. It is therefore misplaced to seek to embrace attributes of 
overall sustainability that councils cannot influence and then evaluate councils on this basis. 
 
The existence of restrictions imposed on local government by higher tiers of government is 
by no means limited to Australia. Indeed, almost all local government systems, in developed 
and developing countries alike, face legislative and other constraints which confine policy 
latitude. This problem seems especially acute in the realm of finance, where restrictions on 
taxation powers and borrowing authority are commonplace (see, for instance, Shah 2006a; 
2006b). 
 
A second constraint on the determination of overall local government sustainability resides 
in the thorny problem of measurement. The three clusters of overall sustainability proposed 
in this paper - the ‘vibrancy of local democracy’, ‘local social capital’ and ‘local government 
capacity’ – cannot be measured directly. This means that proxy variables must be used to try 
to capture key elements of these clusters and none of these variables is exact. It follows that 
subjective judgment and inference are unavoidable. 
 
Despite the obvious need to evaluate local government sustainability from a broader 
perspective than simply financial sustainability, these two problems seem to have deterred 
some earlier state local government sustainability investigations from adopting this wider 
perspective. As Dollery and Crase (2006) have shown, both the South Australian Financial 
Sustainability Review Board’s (2005) Rising to the Challenge and the Financial 
Sustainability of NSW Local Government’ s (2006) Are Councils Sustainable paid lip 
service to the importance of overall sustainability, but did not attempt to assess it in their 
work. By contrast, to their credit, the ill-fated LGAQ’s (2006) Size, Shape and Sustainability 
program and the WALGA (2006) Systemic Sustainability Study: In Your Hands - Shaping 
the Future of Local Government in Western Australia did at least recognize that financial 
sustainability alone is insufficient. However, as we have attempted to demonstrate, much 
remains to be done. 
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Rapid urbanisation creates a need to expand urban services and 
that expansion is not possible without adequate finances. 
However, fiscal decentralization has not kept pace with 
administrative and functional decentralisation so that municipal bodies lack the funds 
required to operate existing facilities and extend services into new areas. Municipal 
Infrastructure Financing addresses this issue. It draws on a desk-based secondary study 
of relevant literature and municipal data, supplemented by primary research in four case 
study municipalities: Dar es Salaam and Kampala in East Africa, and Karachi and Dhaka 
in South Asia. The first two chapters provide a general overview of the book and of the 
state of municipal finance in Commonwealth developing countries. Chapters 3 – 6 set out 
the findings of the four case studies, Chapter 7 examines a number of innovative 
approaches to municipal financing and Chapter 8 draws conclusions from what has gone 
before.  
 
Chapter 2 makes two key points: First, local governments generally have a limited and 
relatively inelastic tax base and are therefore reliant on transfers from higher levels of 
government; and Second, the high pace of institutional and political decentralisation in 
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recent years has not been matched by fiscal decentralisation. The result is that local 
governments have more responsibilities than ever, but are still reliant on a limited and 
inflexible tax base and transfers from higher levels of government. It is worth pointing 
out here that local governments in South Asia have lost the one substantial source of tax 
revenue that they used to have, the octroi tax on the movement of goods.  
 
The following chapters provide a good overview of the situation in the four case study 
cities. They confirm that all four rely on transfers from higher levels of government, 
most notably in Karachi, where own-source revenues constitute only about 14% of total 
income. Forecast figures were considerably better but experience elsewhere in Pakistan 
suggests that optimistic forecasting of own-source receipts is common, but rarely 
justified. Only Dhaka raises more than 50% of its revenue from its own sources. In all 
four cities, finance from municipal borrowing is negligible, in the case of Karachi at least 
because it is not allowed. The book briefly reviews in-country supply-side capacity to 
provide municipal loans and bonds, suggesting some variations from country to country. 
In some cases this is a constraint. In others, it seems that the main constraint is the 
creditworthiness of the municipalities themselves. Apart from the failed PSP initiative 
for water and sanitation in Dar es Salaam, engagement with the private sector has been 
mainly low-key management contracts, often for solid waste collection. It is worth noting 
that the four case study cities are the largest in their respective countries and, as such, are 
likely to have more capacity to implement financial innovations than smaller 
municipalities.  
 
Chapter 7 is the core of the book, providing examples of innovative approaches to 
municipal infrastructure financing. These include national development banks and 
financial institutions, borrowing from capital markets through municipal bonds, 
specialised municipal intermediaries providing either funds, guarantees and insurances, 
and public private partnerships defined as risk-sharing relationships between the public 
and private sectors. It is perhaps not surprising that the example of a long-term bond 
issue is that of Johannesburg, a city with well developed institutions. All the examples of 
revenue bonds come from India’s southern States, and again appear to illustrate the fact 
that a city must be fairly well managed and financially secure before it can consider such 
options. They also, crucially, assume that local government can borrow and it is worth 
noting that efforts to replicate the Tamil Nadu/Karnataka urban development fund model 
in Punjab, Pakistan were unsuccessful until the emphasis of the organisation was shifted 
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from providing loans to managing grants from Central Government and providing 
technical assistance. Examples of specialised financial intermediaries come from a wider 
range of countries, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Brazil and Colombia.  
 
The conclusions are drawn in Chapter 8. Some, for instance that devolution of fiscal 
powers has been limited to date, have emerged in previous chapters. Others, for instance 
that transfers from higher levels of government have been inadequate, are hardly 
surprising. Another conclusion that poor financial management contributes to 
weaknesses in municipal finances, is clearly very important. Indeed, the more general 
problem of weak municipal management systems and the resultant lack of municipal 
capacity is surely one reason, perhaps the main reason, why private and public sector 
funders are reluctant to lend to municipalities. Many of the ‘fundamental’ strengthening 
measures suggested towards the end of the Chapter, for instance establishing an enabling 
policy environment and an appropriate legal and regulatory regime, are well established. 
Others are clearly needed, but the real challenge is to determine how they might be 
brought about. The recommendation that municipalities should strive to balance their 
books through a combination of revenue enhancement and cost containment measures 
could have developed the point made at the beginning of the book that municipal 
revenues tend to be inelastic and so difficult to enhance.  
 
The book is well written and the tables are clear and relevant. It is well referenced. 
Indeed, Chapter 9 is actually a detailed listing of primary and secondary sources of 
information. In summary, this book contains four useful case studies and introduces a 
number of interesting initiatives in the field of municipal finance. In doing this, it will 
perhaps provide a starting point for those who are interested in these initiatives to find 
out more about them and explore their relevance to their own situations. This would 
appear to be a more than adequate reason for reading it. 
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“The theme of your conference, Energising local economies: partnerships for 
prosperous communities, is highly relevant at this time of global economic downturn. 
The Commonwealth with its connections, economic success, and commitment to free 
trade and democracy, has the potential to contribute significantly to the prosperity of all 
its members. Local democracy, as promoted by the Commonwealth Local Government 
Forum, is a key component of the core Commonwealth values, responding to the needs of 
local communities, and working with a range of partners to deliver quality public 
services, often with limited resources.” 
Rt Hon David Cameron, Prime Minister of the UK, in his message to the conference 
 
In the current economic climate, creating the right environment for local enterprise, 
inward investment, and business and skills development, is an important factor in 
ensuring the prosperity and wellbeing of local communities. The impact of the global 
financial crisis has not been uniform across the Commonwealth and countries are using 
different strategies to overcome their financial difficulties. Local government 
increasingly plays an important part in this. More and more local governments in 
countries across the Commonwealth have responsibilities and powers for local economic 
development: in some countries local authorities can already show how their policies and 
actions are helping energise their local economies, while in other countries local councils 
are just beginning to get to grips with these responsibilities.1
                                                          
1  The conference background paper, Energising local economies: local economic development around the 
Commonwealth by Prof. P. S. Reddy and Malcolm Wallis, and Energising local economies: partnerships for prosperous 
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There is general agreement that the role of local government must go beyond traditional 
service delivery and seek to provide the leadership needed to energise local economies 
and communities. Localities globally have a critical role in investment, decision-making 
and development as has been acknowledged by the UN-Habitat and the World Bank in 
the recent State of World Cities report. So this year’s Commonwealth Local Government 
Conference - Energising local economies: Partnerships for prosperous communities – 
focusing on local economic development was very timely. LED not only can help reduce 
poverty and deliver the MDGs, but creates a climate for partnership and inward 
investment that is vital to all communities to improve the quality of life of the people 
who live there. 
 
What is LED? 
Local economic development (LED) has been in existence and practiced internationally 
for more than three decades. LED is a process which brings together different partners in 
a local area to work together and harness local resources for sustainable economic 
growth. The World Bank defined LED as: 
the process by which public, business and non-governmental sector partners work 
collectively to create better conditions for economic growth and employment 
generation. The aim is to improve the quality of life for all. 
 
According to the International Labour organisation LED is: 
a participatory process which encourages social dialogue and public/private 
partnerships in a geographical area. LED enables local stakeholders to jointly 
design and implement a development strategy which fully exploits local resources 
and capacities and makes best use of the area’s comparative advantages. 
 
Local government has both a leading and enabling role in LED – bringing together all the 
relevant stakeholders to drive forward the local economy and using its powers and 
responsibilities to create a positive climate for inward investment and skills development. 
Local authorities have a wide range of regulatory powers and processes that have an 
impact on business - such as business taxes and charges, licensing, incentives, 
procurement policies and land use, and the provision of effective services and modern 
infrastructure. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
communities, conference report are available from the CLGF or can be downloaded from the conference website 
www.clgc2011.org 
 
 RHODES: Conference report 
 
 CJLG May-November 2011 189 
 
LED is critical for job creation, broadening the local tax base, improving municipal 
services, and for capacity and institutional development. It is an important mechanism 
for poverty alleviation. Pro-poor and inclusive LED enables local governments to 
address poverty, unemployment and social deprivation, including through strategies to 
promote youth employment, empower disadvantaged and marginalised communities, 
support skills development, and promote gender equity and equality. 
 
Delivering LED 
There is no blueprint for LED that will be appropriate for every locality; each area has its 
own opportunities and challenges, natural assets and human resources. For example, the 
conference heard about the challenges facing the Pacific countries, where natural events 
such as typhoons and earthquakes are frequent and increasing as a result of climate 
change, and scarcity of natural resources is compounded with distance to international 
markets. Thus, for policy transfer to be successful, we must take account of local 
economic, social and political context. 
 
However, there are common aspects to delivering LED that were generally agreed by 
delegates at the conference and can be used as a starting point in planning local economic 
strategies. Delegates identified a number of key actions for local government if it is to 
play its full role in local economic development: having a clear national framework, an 
enabling environment, good local strategy development, partnership working with the 
private sector and others, adequate resources, and the ability to adapt to changing local, 
national and international circumstances. 
 
There was strong agreement that local government is the key player and has a leading 
role, but must work in partnership with other stakeholders, including the private sector, 
civil society and, importantly, other levels of government including national 
governments. Local government cannot do it all by itself. There has to be firm 
commitment and support from all the major stakeholders. 
 
Although Trinidad and Tobago has an economy based on oil, as a small nation it has 
many economic challenges as Mayor Orlando Nagessar, Chairman of the Trinidad and 
Tobago Association of Local Government Authorities, explained. He said that local 
authorities in his country are developing strategies and approaches to LED and poverty 
reduction that best suit their localities, and involving communities to make them 
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participants in the economic life of the community. He explained that in the current 
financial climate it is critical to look at solutions that can be implemented at little or no 
cost. As a result, every local authority has developed a local economic plan in 
consultation with stakeholders which is dependent on local partnerships. These include 
strategies to attract investors, especially for the tourist industry and business 
development. 
 
Having a clear national framework is helpful in ensuring that national and local 
government efforts are coordinated and complement each other. One of the conference 
workshops discussed a pilot project in Uganda which has been developed by the UNCDF 
with the government. This aims to achieve a whole of government response to LED and 
has helped to review the national framework as well as supporting local governments to 
boost their capacity. LED is now a clear and key component of the development plans 
which local authorities must prepare.  
 
In her address to the conference Hon Kamla Persad-Bissessar, Prime Minister of 
Trinidad and Tobago and Chairperson-in-Office of the Commonwealth, emphasised that 
“Energising local economies and creating partnerships for prosperous communities 
requires a fundamental shift in philosophy for governance, particularly at central level”.  
 
Capacity and financial resources continue to be a problem, and often there is a gap 
between expectations and resources. According to the conference statement: “the 
underfunding of local government to deliver its statutory series often results in inability 
to deliver effective LED. Effective decentralisation and guaranteed and innovative 
funding sources are essential for local government to support LED.” Local government 
not only needs funding to be decentralised along with its responsibilities, but must also 
develop the capacity and expertise to be able to use innovative financing mechanisms 
and access credit.  
 
In Tanzania, the government’s National Economic Empowerment Policy (NEEP) has 
provided a framework for economic development and is increasing the level of citizen 
participation in economic activities. The NEEP has enabled better access to credit, soft 
loans, and direct loans, including local government community development funds for 
young people and women economic groups. Local governments are further supporting 
community-led skills and other forms of development through specific funds in villages 
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and poor communities and have provided employment opportunities in public works 
programmes that increase local incomes and skills. 
 
LED needs to address poverty and disadvantage, and empower disadvantaged and 
marginalised communities. Rwanda’s Minister of Local Government, Hon. Jamea 
Musoni explained how reforms in Rwanda have been recognised by the World Bank. 
Though there are still many challenges to be overcome, LED has become a major focus 
for local government as part of a process of decentralisation, and local economic projects 
and investment have been boosted through local savings and credit cooperatives and 
micro finance projects to support women. 
 
For local economies to continue to thrive and grow, local governments must be able to 
adapt to rapid change and to local, national and international markets. Strategies must be 
continually reviewed and updated to take into account the changing economic, social and 
political environment. Cardiff Council demonstrated how it has used tourism, sports and 
major events to transform the city, following the decline of heavy industries. It has 
refocused the local economy, creating a sport infrastructure which it has used to drive 
regeneration and brought in key events to attract inward investment. Council 
representatives emphasised the need for buy-in from residents and ensuring that benefits 
are spread across the city, particularly some of the more economically disadvantaged 
communities. It has done this by bringing together service and skills agencies to make 
sure that the local labour force can provide the skilled workforce needed by new 
investors.  
 
Technology can bring a leap into the future to enable countries to compete for jobs and 
services. The Deputy Commissioner of Ahmedabad, India, Mr I K Patel, described how 
the city has invested in infrastructure and people, constantly upgrading skills to be at the 
cutting edge of technology. As a result, Ahmedabad now has one of the highest per 
capita incomes in India. 
 
 
 
Conference Recommendations 
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In the conference statement – the Cardiff consensus for local economic development – 
delegates agreed on a number of actions to enable local government to play its full role in 
LED. 
 
They declared that ‘Ministries of local government play a key facilitation and 
coordination role in this process, and in assessing and monitoring the impact of LED’ 
and they called on national and state/provincial governments to ‘establish national LED 
frameworks, and ensure decentralisation of appropriate powers, functions and resources, 
including financial resources, empowering local government to play a leading role in 
LED’. 
 
They agreed that local governments should plan, develop and implement LED strategies 
in partnership with the private sector and other stakeholders at the local level and 
develop a strong alliance with the private sector to ensure that LED promotion and 
actions are well-grounded. 
 
Participants also agreed that local government associations play a key role in advocating 
for local government involvement in LED, operationalising national frameworks and 
assessing impact. They are important partners in sharing good practice, capacity 
development and identifying and leveraging resources for LED. 
 
In addition the delegates called on the CLGF to advocate for LED to be a key 
responsibility for local government across the Commonwealth, and to advocate for LED 
within the wider Commonwealth, to generate better understanding and support for local 
government’s role in LED and to share good practice and knowledge about LED, 
through its various networks. 
 
Finally, they called on development partners to provide resources, support and expertise 
to improve capacity and enable local governments to deliver effective LED, and 
emphasised the importance of development partners making funding available directly to 
local governments. 
 
 
 
Next Steps 
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Commonwealth Heads of Government endorsed the Cardiff Consensus at their meeting 
in Perth at the end of October 2011. They “supported and upheld the role of local 
government in promoting strategies for localism, sustainable development and economic 
growth,” and supported the implementation of the Cardiff Consensus for Local Economic 
Development. This backing of national governments is essential for CLGF and its 
member ministries and local governments when they begin to take the recommendations 
forwards to implement them in their own countries. Ghana has already made reference to 
the outcomes of the conference in its own national framework for LED which the 
government recently agreed. 
 
LED is clearly a priority area for our members. CLGF has been working with a number 
of local authorities in South Africa, Ghana and Jamaica to help them develop local 
economic development strategies as part of the Commonwealth Local Government Good 
Practice Scheme and is currently disseminating the lessons and the good practice learned, 
including developing a toolkit for local authorities in Ghana. Building on this practical 
work and the policies developed at the conference, we will be looking at how we can 
develop a programme of support to help local authorities implement LED strategies and 
working with governments to encourage them to provide the framework and financing to 
enable this. 
 
However, as Cardiff Council Leader Cllr Rodney Berman said at the closing of the 
conference: “The real success of the conference can only be measured by the results of 
the actions that follow from it, leading to a positive impact on our local communities”. 
 
